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Abstract 
In recent decades, Congress has failed to raise transportation revenues to keep pace with inflation 
and growth in traffic volume.  Insufficient funding for transportation programs has induced many 
local governments to fund new road and transit infrastructure themselves, using ballot initiatives 
known as local option transportation taxes.   While localized taxing decisions have become more 
politically expedient than raising federal and state motor fuel taxes, local funding comes with 
inherent drawbacks for developing regional transportation, which crosses into multiple taxing 
jurisdictions. This creates a potentially serious impediment to dealing with crucial problems like 
air quality, job access for the economically disadvantaged, and promotion of economic growth. 
In response, some regions have chosen to make local funding decisions using multi-
jurisdictional, rather than local, taxes.  These places have voted across an entire region, allowing 
them to develop comprehensive, systemic solutions to transportation problems.  
 
This study identifies barriers to the implementation of regional self-help strategies, and 
approaches that have worked in overcoming them. Using interviews and archival evidence, this 
study examines seven cases in Atlanta, the San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, and Denver, 
focusing on how state authorizing legislation shaped each process. This study develops a 
typology of multi-jurisdictional transportation funding mechanisms and identifies appropriate 
state and local policy approaches for situations that vary according to features of the authorizing 
legislation.   
 
 ix  
The political cost of developing a multi-jurisdictional option tax can be reduced by the existence 
of robust regional policy making institution, though these rarely exist in U.S. regions.  The cost 
may also be lowered by permissive legislation.  Such legislation can lift a major political 
obstacle to regional funding initiatives but can also make local collaboration more costly due to 
absence of legislation forcing rival jurisdictions to cooperate.  Nevertheless, both possibilities are 
much less costly than the lack of any pre-approved authorizing legislation.  This situation 
requires special legislation for each tax measure, which can result in elevated influence by state 
legislators in developing the transportation plan, and difficulty repeating the process. 
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Chapter 1: Multi-Jurisdictional Option Taxation:  
The Problem and the Theory 
Chapter 1 Summary:  
This chapter describes the localization of transportation funding that has resulted from stagnating 
federal transportation funding, and illustrates how disjointed local funding structures can result 
in a fragmented transportation system.  The chapter discusses local option taxes as an important 
driver of this fragmentation—taxes decided one jurisdiction at a time, often by putting the 
question to voters whether they would be willing to fund a proposed infrastructure improvement 
plan.  Local referendums of this sort can be politically expedient for politicians, because they 
shift the responsibility for politically difficult decision making to the electorate. Yet they also 
incentivize local decision planning, making multi-jurisdictional infrastructure planning a serious 
challenge. This research expands the discourse on local option taxes to identify potential 
solutions to these taxes’ inherent localism. It focuses on multi-jurisdictional approaches to local 
option taxation, in particular, cases that have employed local option taxes across multiple 
jurisdictions in a single ballot initiative. These cases remain relatively unstudied, but hold the 
potential to maintain local option taxes’ political advantages, while providing a way to fund 
cross-jurisdictional infrastructure needs.  This study assesses multi-jurisdictional option tax 
processes across four U.S. regions, in order to identify benefits and costs of using the multi-
jurisdictional self-help finance approach to funding future transportation infrastructure. 
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This chapter defines terms that are critical to the discussion in later chapters, especially pre-
authorization versus special authorization of state enabling legislation for holding regional tax 
votes, as well as permissive versus prescriptive legislative language. These concepts will define 
the parameters under which the local or regional tax proposal is constructed, as well as the 
likelihood that voter approval can take place across multiple jurisdictions at once.  The chapter 
provides an overview of specific prescriptive factors of legislation, which are considered 
important for the policies examined, including taxing instruments, the tax rate to be imposed, the 
timing of the election process, the geography of local jurisdictions to be included in the vote, and 
the process for selecting projects to be proposed.  This chapter discusses the difficulty of 
overcoming the aforementioned prescriptive legislative provisions, and the challenge of lobbying 
for state enabling legislation as part of the process of proposing a multi-jurisdictional tax. 
Introduction: Localization of Transportation Funding 
In Southern California, anyone driving from Orange County to Los Angeles will notice a 
persistent bottleneck at the county line.  This is where Interstate 5 constricts from a 12-lane 
superhighway to a modest eight-lane freeway, in obvious need of repair.  Almost 20 years after 
Orange County voters elected to raise taxes to double the size of their road, Los Angeles County 
is only just beginning to add a single lane.  Transit riders from Los Angeles to Orange County 
will notice something similar, as they cannot take the Los Angeles Metro system’s new light rail 
routes past the county line.  These two counties have failed to coordinate their divergent 
transportation systems and differing priorities—Los Angeles favoring transit, and Orange 
County, roads. 
This is what can happen when funding decisions for regional infrastructure like 
transportation are left up to local governments with no incentive to coordinate their policies.  In 
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the absence of adequate federal and state funding for new infrastructure, each county’s electorate 
has passed its own local sales tax increase, with different plans and incompatible priorities—65% 
of the money in Los Angeles going to transit, while 75% of the money in Orange County is 
going to roads (OCTA, 2015; LAMTA, 2010).  This does not prevent the two counties from 
coordinating their operations. However the creation of separate funding streams with inconsistent 
funding levels, and different priorities, incentivizes inward-looking intra-jurisdictional 
infrastructure development over the construction of cross-jurisdictional infrastructure.  
Funding strategies can have real impacts for citizens, as illustrated so prominently by a 
recent news story about a Detroit man who spent four hours traveling 21 miles to work due to 
excessive poorly coordinated transfers from one county to the next, and the lack of bus service in 
cities that had opted out of the system (Laitner, Detroit Free Press, February 10, 2015).  As in 
Southern California, local taxation supported separate agencies with little incentive to serve one 
another’s area. 
 While many communities in the United States have long funded a number of local 
services, dependence on local ‘self-help’ funding has grown in recent years due to a weakening 
federal commitment to transportation funding.  Local funding sources, often referred to as local 
option taxes, have made it possible to fund large new infrastructure projects needed by fast- 
growing metro regions, even as federal funding has not risen sufficiently to cover growing 
maintenance costs and demand for new projects.  Yet local option taxes raise important issues 
over whether people paying the taxes will benefit from new roads or transit, especially when 
sales taxes are used (Goldman et al., 2001a: 22). Local option taxes are tinged in politics, to a 
much greater extent than transportation planners are accustomed to, due to their reliance on local 
elections for approval. And local taxes have raised important questions over their long-term 
  4 
viability as a transportation funding source, especially because they often fail to include 
necessary maintenance of existing projects, in favor of new projects for which politicians can 
take credit (Hess & Lombardi, 2005: 143).   
Figure 1.1: Local Funding Can Fragment Infrastructure 
 
Detroit Free Press, February 10, 2015 
Furthermore, local option taxes provide an incentive for local planning of the type 
illustrated in Southern California and Detroit (above), making them a poor choice for resolving a 
number of challenges like air quality, job-housing imbalances, isolation of distressed inner city 
areas from regional labor markets, employer access to larger and more diverse job markets, and, 
conversely, access to expanding and constantly changing regional job markets by the disabled, 
the elderly, and others unable to drive.  All these policy challenges require regional solutions, 
and integrated regional transportation systems to facilitate their implementation. Obstacles to 
coordination may arise unintentionally, simply from differing local priorities, different tax rates 
across jurisdictions, and separate planning processes, since each jurisdiction’s voters usually 
approve a separate list of proposed projects.   
Given the reluctance to raise taxes for new federal transportation funding, local option 
taxes should continue to be a key finance mechanism in the coming decades.  Yet it is an open 
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question how well local option taxes can incorporate regional planning into their framework. All 
these taxes require state authorization, and legislation defines the features of each local option 
tax process. This requires a deeper look into this legislation, the way different legislative 
elements shape the local/regional process for developing each plan, and the politics at both state 
and local/regional levels. This dissertation examines seven processes in four regions, and focuses 
on local option transportation taxes conducted across several jurisdictions, in order to identify 
legislative approaches that resulted in particular benefits and costs at the state and 
local/regional levels.  This research should help identify the obstacles to using these processes 
more universally for regional infrastructure needs, and it contributes to existing literature in four 
ways.  These include, first, the expansion of existing local option tax literature into a regional 
context; second, a better understanding of the funding and legal structures that support regional 
governance; third, a better understanding of the laws and financial resources that can influence 
the collaborative planning process, as well as the role a political ‘champion’ might play in local 
option taxes and collaborative planning processes under different circumstances. 
The Rise of the Local Transportation Funding Regime 
 Infrastructure planning can produce nothing without funds, and strategies for ensuring 
financial resources require attention to local politics due to increasing insecurity of the funding 
model for the Interstate Highway System over the last couple decades.  In particular, the motor 
fuel tax funds a large proportion of federal transportation programs, and growing fuel efficiency 
has reduced the amount of gasoline used per mile driven. Rapid inflation in the 1970s further 
reduced fuel tax collections,1 while maintenance costs for an aging Interstate Highway System 
have increased (Goldman, 2003: 30), and demand for new infrastructure has risen. This situation 
                                                
1 The motor fuel tax has not kept pace with inflation because the tax is charged by volume of gasoline sold, rather 
than by percentage of the price (ad valorem), which would adjust to inflation automatically.
  6 
has long demanded Congress raise the fuel tax rate. But this has rarely happened, due to 
politicians’ fear of being perceived as having ‘raised’ taxes—though, in in real dollars, tax rates 
have actually declined steadily over time (Wachs, 2003a: 235).   
These long-term trends were compounded by deliberate and substantial federal cuts in 
transportation funding during the 1980s, which had an especially acute impact on public transit 
funding, cut 20% in 1982 alone.  Congress cut funding for transit operations entirely in 1998, 
and in the same year, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) changed its guidelines to reduce 
the federal matching share for new locally proposed projects from 80% to 60%.2  The federal 
government further encouraged local contributions to new infrastructure by making the stability 
and commitment of local funding sources a key criterion in their process for selecting projects 
for federal funding (Weiner, 1999).  Thus it is not surprising that state and local efforts to 
improve their transit systems ensued, and, the federal share of funding for public transit has 
generally dropped over time (Hess & Lombardi, 2005: 141).3 
The situation for highways has been one of weakening federal commitment as well.  The 
last time Congress raised the motor fuel tax was in 1993.  Since the early 1990s there have been 
many Congressional hearings and conferences by transportation experts on what to do about the 
declining fuel tax, but Congress has had little political appetite to raise taxes.  Congress has 
sought a host of other solutions, primarily focused on tolling, public/private partnerships, and 
increased state and local funding (Weiner, 2013).  
Federal money has largely stagnated in real dollars since the late 1990s (Figure 1.2), and 
in recent years, political disagreement over how to fund transportation has grown so 
controversial that Congress changed from the usual seven year renewal of the transportation bill 
                                                
2 This program provides money for building new public transit infrastructure projects (Hess & Lombardi, 2005).   
3 While the dollar amount, in real dollars, rose, so did total expenditures, making the federal share decrease (Figure 
1.2). 
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to a two year extension (Weiner, 2013).  And by 2015, Congress was approving stopgap 
extensions for months at a time, increasing concern about the long-term viability of the system 
(Laing, 2015). 
Figure 1.2: Transportation Revenues by Government Level (Thousands of 2009$) 
 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2014: Table 10B 
The figure reflects a rise in federal transportation revenues in the 1990s, due to a rise in the fuel 
tax approved in 1993, and a budget compromise in 1997, redirecting fuel tax monies toward 
transportation uses, which had previously been designated for deficit reduction. Following this 
rise, federal revenues dropped, and then stagnated, while state and local sources have risen 
(DOT 2015). 
 
Uncertain and inadequate federal funding for new transportation projects, regardless of 
mode, has induced many local governments to fill the void by funding new transportation 
projects themselves, often through transportation taxes approved directly by local voters (Hess & 
Lombardi, 2005; Goldman, 2003; Goldman and Wachs, 2003; Wachs, 2003).  Local funding 
brings certain advantages like letting the people who will use the system have a greater voice in 
its development.  However increased local decision making has also exposed regional 
infrastructure plans to many new challenges from cross-jurisdictional disagreements, and other 
  8 
parochial issues that federal transportation funding has bridged for half a century. Consequently, 
this raises important questions about the delivery of cross-jurisdictional projects if local sources 
continue to be a regular feature of the transportation funding regime.   
The Challenge of Local Funding 
Local governmental structures are not particularly well equipped to provide robust multi-
jurisdictional services in the absence of federal or state money, making it necessary to examine 
multi-jurisdictional funding models.  Following federal reductions in financial support for 
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) and Councils of Governments (COGs) in the 
1980s (Goldman, 2003: 15), state governments might have decided to compensate for the lost 
revenue, since historically, they have provided more transportation money than the federal 
government.  However when faced with the political difficulty of raising their own fuel taxes to 
compensate for federal losses (Crabbe et al. 1995), many states have instead favored allowing 
local governments to tax themselves.  Many local governments have, out of necessity, funded 
their own infrastructure improvements using local option transportation taxes (LOTTs). This is a 
form of funding decided at the local level, often by referendum, which shifts much of the 
political responsibility over funding decisions from politicians at upper levels of government to 
voters in each local area, usually for a specific period of time and a clear list of projects.  
Researchers have developed a concise three part definition, describing LOTTs as “…a tax that 
varies within a state, with revenues controlled at the local or regional level, and earmarked for 
transportation-related purposes” (Goldman and Wachs, 2003: 21).  Since these taxes are 
developed and approved at the local level, local jurisdictions, and local voters, often control the 
use of the money.  This can have a profound impact on regional plans, especially in regions 
where most counties or cities have approved a LOTT.  Nominally, such regions will still have to 
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approve a federally required Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) every five years, which directs 
allocations of federal highway funds towards projects intended to support a number of regional 
goals.  However in regions with many LOTTs, a large portion of the money will come from local 
taxes, rather than coming down from higher levels of government. Furthermore, these taxes and 
intended uses will vary, and they may or may not be well coordinated with each other.  Of 
course, the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) responsible for developing the RTP will 
continue to develop a regional planning document, but it becomes a conglomeration of projects 
previously approved by voters in each local jurisdiction, rather than an integrated regional plan 
(Goldman, 2003). This has led to significant gaps in developing transportation connections 
across jurisdictional lines.  For example, past research in the San Francisco Bay Area found a 
number of key regional projects went unsupported by county local option taxes, because local 
decision makers shied away from projects that crossed the county line (Goldman 2003).  
 Conversely, multi-jurisdictional versions of LOTTs offer a tool to overcome inter-
jurisdictional service gaps, and previous research has identified projects passed over in single-
jurisdictional tax initiatives, that were funded by multi-jurisdictional ones (Weinreich, 2015: 17). 
Inevitably, not all regions will use multi-jurisdictional option taxes, referred to in this study as 
MOTTs, to the same effect. And, as with any decision making process, the results depend greatly 
on factors like negotiations and popularity with voters, but greater knowledge about how such 
measures operate should identify obstacles preventing them from being more effective, and this 
should make it easier for more regions to attempt MOTTs in the future. 
Some regions have already tried this route, either instead of, or in addition to, single-
jurisdiction option transportation taxes, and the incentives for doing so have only grown greater 
over time, as federal and state politicians both try to devolve tough decisions on raising taxes to 
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lower levels of government. Lost in this political drive to move decision making closer to the 
voters is what to do about multi-jurisdictional infrastructure.  Multi-jurisdictional option tax 
measures offer, at least the possibility for developing regional infrastructure in a funding process 
dependent on self-funded transportation and other services. 
In theory, multi-jurisdictional measures could offer the promise of better coordination 
from one jurisdiction to the next, while preserving potential advantages of single-jurisdiction 
measures, like support for local decision making, ability to avoid federal funding restrictions, and 
the possibility of bringing a wider range of politically active local interests into the planning 
process (Goldman, 2003: 7).  This can include citizen groups, those who depend on public 
transit, business interests, unions, and others who might have a strong interest in ensuring the 
transportation system meets their needs—a goal that technocratic planning, complying with 
federal guidelines, might easily pass over.  For example, disability advocates might be especially 
concerned about the precise location of a stop, and its ability to connect with surrounding 
services, or environmental communities might be concerned about a proposal that focuses on 
roads, but not transit, while businesses might want to ensure that the system serves the region’s 
airport—concerns that may be reflected in ridership numbers and other indicators, but would be 
improved with more substantial community inclusion when developing the plan.  However use 
of MOTTs has been limited in most U.S. regions, and a better understanding of their 
development process is needed to shed light on why that is the case. 
Policy Role of Multi-Jurisdictional Taxes 
Past MOTTs have allowed regional agencies, or a collection of local governments, to 
develop a plan for transportation improvements for their region, and to offer voters the option to 
support the plan with higher taxes.  Historically, multi-jurisdictional elections on whether to 
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support a transportation plan through higher taxes have seen sporadic use for large proposals, 
including a three-county 1962 measure to support the Bay Area Rapid Transit system, and 
measures in 1980 and 1983 to support the Dallas Area Rapid Transit light rail system.  Multi-
jurisdictional tax votes have occurred in at least ten U.S. regions since 1980 (See Table 4.4 for a 
full list), including the San Francisco Bay Area, Denver, Atlanta, among others.4   
A number of agencies have used regional measures to build ambitious, cross-
jurisdictional transportation projects that were not possible using single-jurisdiction measures.  
For example, this study will further discuss a 2008, three county measure, in the Seattle 
metropolitan area (Chapter 7).  Not only was this a large proposal, at over $12.5 billion,5 and 
funding an extensive light rail system, but this proposal was able to focus on routes that cross 
local jurisdictional lines.  These cross-county routes would have been far more challenging with 
a series of single-county measures.  Similarly, in the San Francisco Bay Area, policy makers 
included many crucial regional transportation links in a 2004 bridge toll increase proposal 
(Chapter 5), many of which had gone unfunded by the area’s numerous single-county tax 
measures (Goldman, 2003).  Most startlingly, these projects included many public safety 
measures like the seismic retrofitting of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system’s Transbay 
Tube, which is an essential link between San Francisco and the rest of the Bay Area, but had not 
been a priority for county-level local option tax measures (Weinreich, 2015: 17). 
Challenges of Multi-Jurisdictional Election Processes 
While multi-jurisdictional option taxes offer a framework for supporting regional 
infrastructure, they are very challenging to develop, as is most regional policy making, and 
require a great deal of collaboration across numerous local jurisdictions.  This requires not only 
                                                
4 Vancouver, British Columbia recently became the first Canadian region to attempt a multi-jurisdictional 
transportation measure, though it did not succeed (Bula, Globe and Mail, July 2, 2015). 
5 The lifetime budget for the program, as of the most recent financial estimate (Sound Transit, 2015: 12). 
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political agreement for the betterment of the region, even when this might not be in the best 
interest of each jurisdiction involved, or when money collected in one jurisdiction must be spent 
in another part of the region in order to develop regional connections.  The overall region might 
benefit, but the local jurisdictions with high tax collections might want to protect their own 
control of the decision making.  
State legislation authorizing multi-jurisdictional processes has the potential to overcome 
or minimize the local jurisdictional cost-benefit calculation associated with the decision to 
participate politically, or to contribute local money to a regional system.  This could be an 
important advantage over local option taxes, and collaborative processes that local jurisdictions 
can easily opt out of.  On the other hand, if state legislation authorizing MOTT measures is 
written in a very prescriptive manner, it may add challenges for locals to comply with the state 
legislation, making it less attractive to conduct a regional process.  The costs imposed by state 
legislation differ primarily along two dimensions (Figure 1.3), which are further examined in the 
coming chapters.  These include whether the process was authorized before it began, and the 
factors that might constrict local decision making.  
The State Role in Local/Multi-Jurisdictional Decision Making 
Authorizing a MOTT process before it begins may have an important role in affecting 
how politically costly the process is to pursue.  It is incumbent on state governments to authorize 
any local elections, and multi-jurisdictional tax referendums are no different. In the U.S. legal 
system, local powers are vested with the state government, and state governments delegate this 
power to local governments like cities, counties, and regional entities through what is known as 
state authorizing legislation. As of the most recent count, 37 states had authorized some kind of 
local option tax election process (Goldman et al., 2001), and almost all of these were single-
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jurisdictional.  By contrast, this study only found nine states that had authorized multi-
jurisdictional tax elections in the years since 1980 (Chapter 4).6 In most regions, policy makers 
must go through the legislature to initiate a multi-jurisdictional tax process, since there is no state 
legislation authorizing it in advance. If multi-jurisdictional processes are to be used more 
frequently to resolve regional infrastructure needs, it is essential to understand the impact that 
lack of previous authorization, and other legislative features might have on the potential for a 
multi-jurisdictional proposal to move forward, and the process of developing one.  
Authorizing legislation can be pre-authorized, meaning the legislation exists well before 
the process begins. A closely related concept is legislation that provides blanket authorization, 
with no sunset clause, which allows the region to conduct a new ballot initiative at any future 
date, without bringing the issue back to the legislature for consideration.  Blanket authorization 
may be especially helpful in ensuring local governments can select the election cycle most 
conducive to their changing local political circumstances.  And this may also provide for the 
possibility of a revote, should the measure fail the first time around. On the other hand, a process 
that has not received pre-authorization or blanket authorization requires a new bill in order to 
conduct, and is referred to in this study as special authorization. Since a special bill requires 
resources and time, this is, potentially, a situation adding great political costs, but also the 
prevailing circumstance in most U.S. regions and states today. 
Prescriptiveness 
A second dimension from which to analyze multi-jurisdictional legislation is the 
prescriptiveness of its language.  The difference between prescriptive and permissive legislation 
refers to a number of features that could potentially reduce or expand local autonomy to make 
decisions once the process begins.  For example, specific features like an election date or choice 
                                                
6 California, Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, Oklahoma, Michigan, Virginia, Washington State & Texas. 
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of jurisdictions to be included could have a profound effect on the contours of the process, and it 
may be very important whether these details are decided at the state capitol, or left to local 
leaders. Identifying where a particular piece of authorizing legislation falls along the continuum 
requires one to specify the factors that make a process prescriptive or permissive. This is 
necessary because it is not possible to speak in absolute terms. Indeed, by virtue of allowing a 
tax vote, the legislation is permitting something, even if it has many restrictions.  However a 
relatively permissive process leaves important decisions to local and regional policy makers.  
Figure 1.3: Dimensions for Evaluating MOTT Legislation 
 
*Defined here as legislation not written expressly for the local election process examined.  
** Defined here as legislation with no sunset clause for the tax vote, allowing it to occur 
again without another legislative approval. 
*** Defined here as legislation authorized expressly for the single process examined. 
 
One could imagine the very most restrictive process being one not authorized at all, 
leaving all decision making with the state by default. However, this study focuses on the features 
of each process that facilitate or hinder its progress by examining the nuances of processes that 
sub-federal governments attempted to initiate, especially the collaborative process of developing 
the proposal that was offered to voters.  
Some key types of prescriptive features observed in later chapters include limitations on 
taxing instruments and tax rates to be imposed, timing of the election process, geography of local 
jurisdictions to be included, the process for selecting projects, and the voting process (Table 1.1), 
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all of which can influence the process in important ways, and provide factors to compare the 
level of prescriptiveness of several legislative bills, as this study does in Chapter 9. 
Table 1.1: Elements of Prescriptiveness 
Factors Explored 
1. Taxing instruments  
2. Tax rates to be imposed 
3. Timing of the election process 
4. Geography of local jurisdictions to be included 
5. Process for selecting projects 
6. Voting Process 
 
Promises and Perils of the Legislative Features 
The form of legislative authorization (i.e. pre-authorized versus blanket authorized), as 
well as the prescriptiveness of the legislation can result in both political benefits and costs, which 
may differ at the state versus the local levels. For example, pre-authorized legislation may 
significantly reduce the cost of beginning a new proposal, a benefit for local policy makers.  
However it could also reduce state leverage over the process or result in approval of new taxes at 
a time inconvenient for state politicians, which, for them, would be a concern.  And, since there 
is no guarantee that local politicians will ever initiate a process authorized by the state, 
legislators may worry that without strong deadlines, there is no way to ensure the process ever 
reaches completion—a concern that may be even more poignant in regions with a history of 
cross-jurisdictional discord.     
Similarly, each factor of prescriptiveness may come with advantages and disadvantages 
for state leaders and local ones, which are not necessarily the same. For example, it might benefit 
local and regional leaders to have flexibility over the choice of taxing instrument.  Some taxes, 
like a sales tax, might be more popular with voters in a particular region, and their decisions 
might be strongly influenced by local polls. However state leaders may be reluctant to offer too 
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many choices, or may want to ensure that tax instruments do not take away from state and local 
funding sources.  
Similarly, the timing of the election process is an important decision that can influence 
the outcome, and local/regional leaders will want to have the option to choose an election cycle 
when the tax is doing well in the polls, and appears likely to pass.  Legislation that prescribes the 
election cycle may make it difficult for the measure to pass.  However for state politicians, 
choosing the election cycle may ensure local governments do not abuse the privilege of 
permission to hold a tax vote, and may ensure that election times do not conflict with state 
leaders’ own political campaigns.  
For similar reasons, one can imagine that flexibility concerning the selection of projects 
is very important to local/regional policy makers, and potentially important to the outcome of the 
proposal.  But it may be a risk for state politicians to grant flexibility on this matter to local and 
regional governments, who might make choices that conflict with state politicians’ own agendas, 
incentivizing them to impose strict guidelines for selecting projects, or even select them directly 
in the legislation—solutions that may be problematic for regional policy makers.  
The Legislative Process and Impacts of the Legislation 
It appears that the lack of authorization has hindered the development of MOTT 
processes, as has prescriptive legislation.  This dissertation will try to answer how different 
legislative features can be beneficial or costly to the process, and focuses, especially, on the role 
of the policy entrepreneur, or as this character will be called in this study, the boundary-spanner, 
due to this agent’s role in developing collaboration across jurisdictions, while initiating and 
leading MOTT processes.  The boundary-spanner’s role may become less vital if a process is 
authorized well in advance, which could be a key factor in ensuring that these processes can 
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begin and repeat themselves without depending on a single politician, thus reducing the cost of 
initiating a new process, and ensuring repeatability. Furthermore, this study will examine 
whether the boundary-spanner was needed to lobby in favor of a more permissive process, better 
suited for the local political environment.  This study will examine ways that permissive 
language facilitated or hindered that process, and the boundary-spanner’s role in lobbying for 
new legislation. This might be especially important in cases requiring special authorization, 
where the boundary-spanner’s relationship with legislators could determine the success of 
legislation designed to reduce the local/regional costs of undertaking a MOTT process. 
Potentially, anything that limits the number of people or organizations able to act as successful 
boundary-spanners could be a limitation on the ability to conduct MOTT processes, for example, 
if only a few well-connected politicians are interested in initiating a multi-jurisdictional option 
transportation tax process. 
 MOTTs Versus Other Regional Funding Solutions 
Faced with a need to fund regional infrastructure, despite pressure to fund it locally, some 
regions have chosen to use multi-jurisdictional option taxes to fund large infrastructure 
proposals.  However academics have yet to study them. There is no guarantee that MOTT 
processes are sufficient to overcome the problems associated with LOTTs.  However other 
options for providing cross-jurisdictional projects are woefully inadequate.  States are rarely 
interested in funding a large collection of regional projects because they also need to fund 
projects in other parts of the state.  Overreliance on state funding also ties the program to 
continual state political battles over funding levels.  On the other hand, local funding often 
results in poor coordination across jurisdictions. MOTTs offer perhaps the best possibility for a 
coordinated system that preserves local/regional autonomy in decision making.  And it fulfills 
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the call by federal and state politicians for greater devolution of decision making over funding.  
Thus, this study does not recommend MOTTs as the only way to overcome jurisdictional barriers 
in transportation funding, but, rather, as an important tool that many regions are likely to need in 
the current funding climate.  However the concept of self-help necessitates that each region will 
choose the best multi-jurisdictional funding model for its circumstance.  And in cases with very 
high levels of inter-jurisdictional division, like in a multi-state region, or a region with 
longstanding discord between jurisdictions, MOTTs may call for more cross-jurisidictional 
cooperation than is feasible.  On the other hand, in regions with extraordinary state-level interest 
in providing services, or few jurisdictions, cohesiveness might be so great that MOTTs are not 
needed.  However in most regions, MOTTs will be needed in order to ensure a cohesive plan in 
the self-funding era. 
Outline of This Study 
This study examines seven regional processes in four regions, to learn more about what 
has helped or hindered them, and the role of state enabling legislation in shaping them.  This 
study begins with a thorough discussion of previous research on sub-state taxation, in Chapter 2.  
Based on this background information, Chapter 3 develops a theoretical proposition, research 
question, hypothesis and research design.  As the previous discussion indicates, it seems clear 
that pre-authorization, and the various elements of prescriptive legislation (Figure 1.3) impact the 
process.  The more interesting question is how. To answer this, Chapter 4 defines multi-
jurisdictional option taxes, along with other forms of multi-jurisdictional transportation funding 
used in the United States. The chapter identifies which funding types are used in which regions, 
and selects cases that have used MOTTs, based on specific criteria.  The four regions this study 
examines provide a range of pre-authorization and permissiveness in their legislative elements.  
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The San Francisco Bay Area case, discussed in Chapter 5, was specially authorized, and 
examines a situation where a well connected boundary-spanner gained legislation that made the 
process possible, but also leveraged the situation to add some of his own desired projects to the 
proposal, thus altering the proposal for political reasons, and raising the possibility that 
dependence on a well connected boundary spanner might add potential costs to a process that 
uses special authorization.  The Atlanta case, discussed in Chapter 6, required special 
authorization as well, and resulted in a very prescriptive process, where the legislature imposed a 
number of costs on the process that made it difficult to succeed.  This chapter examines the 
problem of the state-local disconnect that can develop during the legislative process, which 
becomes an important part of the theory of this study.  In Chapter 7, two of the three Seattle 
processes used very permissive legislation, which was pre-authorized. This chapter discusses the 
benefits of Seattle’s process, and some of the innovative techniques the region used to overcome 
geographic equity challenges.  Yet it also discusses the challenges related to a third process, 
which was specially authorized and more prescriptive than the others. Even in this process, it 
was not terribly prescriptive compared to that in Atlanta, but imposed requirements on key issues 
like election timing, which ultimately made the process unsuccessful.  Chapter 8 discusses the 
two Denver processes, which were also permissive, but without the benefit of a well connected 
boundary-spanner to lobby for flexible legislation from the legislature.  This chapter examines 
the paradox, and identifies the importance of a robust regional agency, as an important element 
that allowed them to succeed, even without a powerful boundary-spanner. Chapter 9 looks across 
these cases, providing an assessment of the hypotheses in relation to the cases, and drawing 
conclusions based on the results.  Finally, Chapter 10 focuses on broader implications of this 
study, applying its theoretical proposition and findings to theory and public policy. 
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature  
Chapter 2 Summary 
This chapter explores previous research on regional transportation, home rule, regional 
governance and collaborative planning.  These topics help clarify the challenges of providing 
regional transportation, and possible strategies to overcome them. These include the importance 
of regional accessibility over local/neighborhood accessibility in ensuring access to 
transportation systems, the growing role of local funding sources in transportation, and the 
challenges these create for regional infrastructure planning.  This is followed by a discussion of 
the principles of local and regional governance formation, and the role of collaborative planning, 
policy entrepreneurs and boundary-spanners in overcoming legal and funding limitations of the 
current system. which is something multi-jurisdictional tax processes often need to do, and 
informs  the theory in Chapter 3 on the process for their development. 
Introduction: Transportation’s Role in a Regional Job Market 
 Regional transportation is becoming ever more important in the current job market.  Yet 
the current funding and institutional governance instruments to provide it are woefully 
inadequate.  Regional transportation is especially important for economic development. Larger 
cities, or better-connected agglomerations of smaller cities, do a better job than smaller ones in 
matching workers to the job they want most, and make possible greater specialization of labor 
(Krugman, 1993). Yet the transportation links needed to connect those places are often 
inadequate.  This is unfortunate, because links between two cities with poor connections can 
have a larger impact on the economy than additional transportation within a local area that 
 21  
already has a high level of accessibility (Giuliano, 1995: 306, 328). The reason for this is that in 
any transportation investment—highway or transit—the magnitude is important, as is the 
investment’s scale compared to the transportation system already in place.  For example, the first 
ten miles of a regional freeway system will have a much greater impact than the last ten miles 
(Giuliano, 1995: 306).  Based on this principle, an analysis of the existing transportation in most 
U.S. regions would find a highly developed auto network, with over 80% of American 
commuters driving to work (Census, 2009), and a high degree of accessibility for most travelers.  
Consequently, most transportation improvements, whether for cars or transit riders, will be 
limited to marginal impacts.  However, new infrastructure that bridges gaps in the existing 
system is likely to have a significantly stronger impact than a project that parallels existing 
infrastructure (Giuliano, 1995: 306). Yet a number of financial, legal and political obstacles 
make regional transportation infrastructure development a difficult proposition in most regions in 
the United States. 
Multi-jurisdictional Transportation Coordination:  
The Need and the Challenge 
 One such challenge can be found in the existence of separate local jurisdictions with 
increasing influence over transportation financing and policy, making regional transportation 
planning more challenging.  This is especially problematic for public transit, due to the 
detrimental effect that transfers in poorly-coordinated cross-jurisdictional systems can have on 
ridership.  While incompatible cross-jurisdictional road planning would be expected to create 
traffic bottlenecks, the existence of separate transit operators or separate transit services would 
require riders to transfer from one agency to another—assuming the lines connect at all. 
Uncoordinated transfers require a great deal of waiting time to change from one bus or train to 
the next. (As seen below, transit’s financial structure exacerbates this situation, since there is 
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very little federal money available for transit operations, requiring operators to seek local 
funding sources).   
 Based on empirical observations (Koppelman and Bhat, 2006: 43), transportation riders 
often feel less utility for time spent out of the transit vehicle than the same amount of time in 
it,7even though both are components of the same trip (Koppelman and Bhat, 2006: 43).  Perhaps 
time standing still waiting for the bus or train to come simply feels less productive.  Out of 
Vehicle Travel Times (OVTT), as these values are often called, are generally higher for trips that 
require more transfers, and transit trips inherently have more transfers than auto or shared ride 
trips.   
 Transfers cause a further psychological sense of disutility to the rider on top of OVTT, 
known to modelers as a transfer penalty. For example, if a rider were offered a 35 minute trip 
with no transfer, or a 30 minute trip that required a transfer, the rider would likely choose the 
longer trip.  Models based on rider surveys have borne this out, revealing that any transfer at all, 
regardless how seamless, reduces transit trip demand by an estimated 25%.8  A transfer between 
transit modes reduces ridership demand by about 55% (Liu, Pendyala and Polzin, 1998: 91-92).  
 Not all transfers are equal, however.  For example intra-modal transfers might 
inconvenience riders by subjecting them to the elements, possibly dropping them off in areas 
with poor security, or making them walk a long distance.  Intermodal transfers are more 
problematic, often requiring separate tickets and creating uncertainty about missing the next bus 
or train (Liu, Pendyala and Polzin, 1998: 91). When different transit agencies plan together, there 
are significant efficiencies they might realize.  Some examples include timed transfers, 
                                                
7 Importantly, utility decisions are not the only decisions found to influence ridership.  Individuals may harbor a bias 
towards a particular mode, or may not have adequate information about a particular mode to be able to choose it. 
(e.g. Where does the bus go and what time does it come back?) (Koppelman and Bhat, 2006: 17, 23). 
8 Guo and Wilson, 2004 and Kanafani. 1983 essentially agree with this finding.  For example the latter found that 
riders believed transfer time cost them three times more than in-vehicle time (pg. 201).   
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free/discounted transfers, multi-agency fare cards, or multi-agency cooperation to develop a 
single cross-jurisdictional service. 
 The need to reduce transfers is one of the key reasons why it is so important that 
transportation be well-coordinated across jurisdictional lines.  However the transportation 
funding structure has not supported this need, and instead, transportation funding has come to 
rely on increasingly localized sources that make it difficult to plan in an integrated regional 
manner. 
The Shift from Federal Transportation Funding to Local Option Taxes 
In recent years, there has been a growing use of local funding sources for transportation, 
due in part to an inability to raise taxes at the federal level.  This devolution of taxation often 
brings with it more parochial planning, making it more difficult to develop an integrated 
transportation system.  Much of this localization of transportation funding goes back to the 
devolution that began in the 1970s, and accelerated in the 1980s.  The energy crisis was the chief 
precipitator, causing inflation, which eroded the primary source of revenues supporting the 
federal Highway Trust Fund—the motor fuel tax.  Since this tax is charged per gallon of 
gasoline, it does not increase with inflation without an act of Congress.  Consequently, the tax 
rate increased at a lower rate than the cost of acquiring rights of way, and construction.  At the 
same time, the energy crisis demanded the imposition of fuel economy standards for the first 
time, which reduced fuel usage—and decreased fuel tax collections per mile of roadway built. 
 In response to similar cuts, and declines in state governments’ own fuel tax revenues, many 
states decided to authorize local governments (e.g. cities, counties, townships, etc.) to raise taxes 
on themselves, when federal and state funds were not meeting pressing transportation 
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Figure 2.1: Highway Revenues Shares Over Time 
 
Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003: 82 
Figure 2.2: Transit Revenues Shares Over Time 
  
Altshulter & Luberoff, 2003: 185 
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needs (Goldman and Wachs, 2003).  This type of funding is known as local option transportation 
taxes (LOTTs). By 1998 this revenue source was providing 12.9% of the non-federal money for 
highways and 19.4% for transit, across the U.S., though these numbers have varied substantially 
from state to state, as seen in Figure 2.3 (Goldman and Wachs, 2003: 34-35).  
Figure 2.3: Top Ten States Using Local Option Tax Revenues,  
Share Non-Federal Money Provided by LOTTs (1998$) 
 
 
Goldman & Wachs, 2003: 34-35 
 Much of the state and local money has come through local option transportation taxes, or 
LOTTs, whose contribution to localized planning is still not fully appreciated. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, researchers have defined these taxes as a “…a tax that varies within a state, with 
revenues controlled at the local or regional level, and earmarked for transportation-related 
purposes” (Goldman & Wachs, 2003: 21). A great deal is known about the variety of LOTTs,  
with different taxing instruments, different tax rates, different rules of passage depending on the 
state.  The most comprehensive study on the subject provides an overview of each state’s LOTTs 
policies as of 2001, using surveys from state departments of transportation, departments of 
revenue, associations of counties, and major transit agencies (Goldman et al., 2001a,b). Further 
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research looking into why local option transportation taxes have become so popular raises 
concerns about a number of features intrinsic to LOTTs, such as overreliance on regressive sales 
taxes;9 selection of projects based on popularity rather than usefulness; and a disincentive to 
tackle transportation needs on a regional basis (Wachs, 2003c).  On the other hand, research into 
the process of developing LOTTs has revealed a number of reasons why local public officials 
choose to use them, and finds that LOTTs fulfilled many of the needs of a growing region not 
being met through the federally mandated MPO process (chiefly infrastructure targeted at 
fostering economic development).  And LOTTs allowed local civic organizations like chambers 
of commerce or citizen advocacy groups closely affected by the outcome of transportation 
planning to be directly involved in the planning process to a much greater degree than they 
would through the development of MPOs’ periodic regional transportation plan updates 
(Goldman, 2003).  
 Despite these benefits, LOTTs are also decidedly local, and in all four cases Goldman 
examines, the organizers selected local projects over important regional ones that did not provide 
direct tangible benefits to local jurisdictions (Goldman, 2003: 181-183).  The problem appears 
closely related to LOTTs’ political underpinnings, which encourage local jurisdictions to think 
within their own boundaries, and provide benefits to the voters paying the tax.  Indeed, 
researchers have viewed LOTTs as a political tool as well, and have done a number of studies 
looking at methods to ensure such taxes pass (Beale et al., 2007).   
 Unsurprisingly, researchers have found that it is important for the proposal to have the 
appearance of providing geographic equity to voters across the various parts of the voting area 
(Werbel and Haas, 2002).   However this complicates the goal of regional planning, if some parts 
                                                
9 Sales taxes are more popular at the polls than fuel taxes because sales taxes’ larger tax base requires a lower 
percentage tax in order to provide the same revenue, making them appear ‘cheaper’ to the voter (Wachs, 2003b, c). 
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of the region are part of a local tax voting area, while many are not—or if two or three counties 
in a region each have their own local option taxes, with different project lists, priorities, and 
taxation rates.  
 Localized taxation has led to a disjointed planning style in many cases.  In regions heavily 
dependent on LOTTs for their transportation funding, the new de facto project planning process 
may occur when local leaders are composing the proposed list of projects for the ballot, which 
the MPO diligently approves and inserts into its RTP.  The LOTT is ‘found money’ as far as the 
MPO board is concerned, but it comes at a price.  After approval by voters, such measures lock 
MPOs into locally approved projects for decades at a time. Local control of the purse strings 
leaves policy makers little room to develop integrated plans for the region. This reality gives 
MPOs less control over what gets built and when (Sciara and Wachs, 2007), since these 
decisions are merely confirming what local voters have already decided. Most concerning, 
LOTTs contain a lack of an established procedure or incentive system to reconcile differences 
between proposals that conflict across jurisdictions. Under a LOTT-based planning system, there 
is no forum to advance regional goals. This can result in uncoordinated policy aims from one 
jurisdiction to the next, with no overarching regional policy framework10 (Crabbe et al., 2005: 
111 & Goldman, 2003: 193-194).  
 Due to this political and jurisdictional dynamic, LOTTs are quite attractive for tackling 
local issues (Goldman and Wachs, 2003: 29), but are not very effective at providing broad 
benefits to citizens throughout a region, especially if those programs require local costs 
(Goldman, 2003: 188).  Consequently, increased use of LOTTs presents a disincentive to tackle 
regional over local issues (Goldman, 2007; and Crabbe et al., 2005: 111).   
                                                
10  A unified policy framework would establish a set of policy goals, which direct agency plans.  Examples might 
include establishing regional accessibility, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving air quality, or reducing 
congestion, among others. 
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Multi-Jurisdictional Cases of LOTTs 
 Self-help transportation funding is a natural outgrowth of a federal funding structure that 
provides inadequate opportunities to meet local needs, but absent a major political shift, LOTTs 
are likely to become an increasingly important tool for transportation finance.  Yet, while the 
existing literature describes the emergence of this de facto regional planning regime, it has rarely 
considered multi-jurisdictional cases of LOTTs, even though they suggest the potential to 
harness this funding method for regional transportation planning purposes. 
 Doing this requires a better understanding of how self-help taxes occur in multi-
jurisdictional environments than provided by the current literature.  Existing studies indicate that, 
as of 2001, there were 37 states that had authorized LOTT processes (Goldman et al., 2001).  
However, only nine of them—California, Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, Oklahoma, Michigan, 
Virginia, Washington State and Texas—had authorized multi-jurisdictional option transportation 
taxes since 1980 (Chapter 4). Some authors have mentioned the possibility of using local option 
taxes to solve regional problems (Goldman, 2007: 15), or used MOTT cases to examine another 
phenomenon like networks or taxpayer elections (Alpert et al., 2006; Wall, 2013), and the 
deepest examination of the MOTT as a phenomenon in its own right has been confined to a 
single case (Weinreich, 2015). 
 Based on that study, however, the process of developing a multi-jurisdictional option 
transportation tax (referred to hereafter as a MOTT) raises unique challenges around the relative 
influence of the participants in the collaborative decision-making process. A key factor affecting 
this process is the relationship between the person who initiates the process and lawmakers at the 
state capitol, due to the fact that MOTT processes are often not pre-authorized in state 
legislation. In the Bay Area case, the authorizing legislation was not in place in advance, and the 
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politician who initiated the process needed special ties with the state capitol in order to write new 
authorizing legislation.  (He was himself a powerful state senator).  It is not surprising that this 
relationship allowed him to influence the projects chosen and the transparency of discussions on 
which projects to include. This dissertation seeks to better understand how MOTT measures 
work across a diverse range of multi-jurisdictional cases, which were heavily influenced by the 
legislation that authorized them.   
The Evolving Nature of U.S. Regional Governance 
 Regional governing solutions have evolved over the past century from a focus on city 
annexations to federally-funded regional programs, and then towards collaborative planning 
across many jurisdictions, though the shift from one model was never entirely chronological, as 
several might be present at the same time, in the same region or state.  Nevertheless regional 
decision making has increasingly moved towards collaborative multi-jurisdictional strategies, 
rather than city governments morphing into regional ones through annexation.  
The First Wave: the Monocentric Central City and Suburban Annexation 
 Regional governments rarely exist in the United States as legally sanctioned entities with 
electoral representation and powers of taxation. States often grant local self-government powers 
to cities, counties, townships, and other units, but almost never to regional elected 
governments.11  
 However in the late nineteenth century, there was a movement to consolidate big city 
powers over larger geographical areas through direct annexation. Reformers, driven by 
manufacturing interests, believed centralized power could provide greater efficiency of service 
distribution, and eliminate free riders paying low taxes on their homes in the suburbs, while 
benefiting from city jobs and services.  These goals were achieved almost entirely through state 
                                                
11 State-granted autonomous powers are often the same powers referred to as “home rule,” which is discussed 
further in Appendix B. 
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legislative approval of suburban annexations, often over the objections of local residents (Wallis, 
1994b: 160-163).  
Over time, however, regions continued to grow past the new boundaries.  As one study 
observed, “...as regions grow, newly created metropolitan boundaries are as resistant to change 
as those of the municipalities that anteceded them.” (Benjamin and Nathan, 2001; pg. 92).  
Indeed, newly-expanded cities were unable to keep up with the expanding urban areas. Over 
time, suburban interests gained power in their own right, and were sometimes able to provide 
equally good, if not better, services as the central city, causing some to question the “first wave” 
reformists’ chief argument for annexation.  Legislatures became disinclined to approve new 
annexations by the 1920s, and succumbed to lobbying efforts by increasingly influential 
suburban interests for changes to state constitutions. These changes often required local 
referendums in order to approve new annexation proposals, thus providing a tool for suburbs to 
resist future annexations to their central city. By the 1960s, the movement for annexation was 
losing ground to growing suburban power, and polycentric job growth (Wallis, 1994b). 
Limitations to State Authorization of Regional Governance 
 First Wave reformers focused heavily on state authorization legislation. Following the 
1920s, regional government authorization often required the consent of local jurisdictions being 
annexed (Frug, 2002: 8; Benjamin and Nathan, 2001: 56).  
 First Wave governance regional governance became still less practical as cities grew across 
state lines, leading to governance challenges that city governments were no longer able to 
resolve on their own. Since the U.S. Constitution recognizes states, not cities or regional 
governments (Appendix B), multi-state regions pose a special problem, since political entities 
created to govern across state lines must be approved by the participating state legislatures 
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through an Interstate Compact.  
 There are 38 multi-state regions in the United States, of which New York City is the largest 
(Benjamin and Nathan, 2001: 27), but some other notable ones include: Chicago; Washington, 
D.C.; St. Louis, Philadelphia, Cincinnati and Portland.  Perhaps due to the political difficulty of 
establishing such authorities, only five regions use interstate compacts to authorize the 
construction or operation of transportation projects within their urban areas, applying to only the 
Kansas City, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C. metro regions (National 
Center for Interstate Compacts, 2015).12 Such agreements require the federal government and 
individual states to cede power.  Interstate compacts create significant political complications for 
establishing a system to represent each state on a joint management commission, while 
sufficiently representing local interests within the region. This can be complicated by the 
presence of separate policy agendas and clashing politics from different state governors—a 
constant problem at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, where the two governors 
have, historically, rushed to take credit for successes, while blaming each other for the agency’s 
failures (Benjamin and Nathan, 2001). 
 Transportation infrastructure managed through interstate compacts experiences significant 
challenges funding regional infrastructure—often contributed unevenly across state boundaries, 
                                                
12 Bi-State Development Agency (IL-MO: St. Louis metro region), V.A.M.S. §238.010-238.100; Delaware River 
Port Authority Compact (NJ-PA: Philadelphia metro region), 36 P.S. §3503, N.J.S.A. §32:3-2 et seq.; Delaware 
River Joint Toll Bridge Compact (NJ-PA: Philadelphia metro region), N.J.S.A. §32:8-1 et sq., 36 P.S. §3401-3415; 
Delaware River and Bay Authority Compact (DE-NJ), 17 Del. C. §1701-1728, N.J.S.A. §32:11E-1-32:11E-12; P.L. 
§87-678; Kansas City Area Transportation District and Authority Compact (KS-MO: Kansas City metro region), 
V.A.M.S. §238.010-238.100, K.S.A. §12-2524 et seq.; New York-New Jersey Port Authority Compact of 1921 
(NY-NJ: New York metro region) N.J.S.A. §32:1-1 et seq., §32:2-1 et seq., N.Y. McKinney's Unconsolidated Law 
§6401-7217; Rail Passenger Transportation Compact (NY-CT: New York metro region), C.G.S.A. §16-343, §16-
344, N.Y. Mckinney's Transportation Law 5 Sec. et seq.; Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact 
(Congress-MD-VA: D.C. metro region), Md. Transp. Code Ann. §10-201to10-203, V.A. Code 1950, §56-529, §56-
530, D.C. Code §9-1103.01 to 9-1103.07; Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Regulation Compact (Congress- 
MD-VA: D.C. metro region) D.C. Code §9-1103.01 to 9-1103.07, Md. Transp. Code Ann. §10-201 to 10-203, V.A. 
Code 1950, §56-529, §56-530; Woodrow Wilson Bridge and Tunnel Compact (D.C.-MD-VA: D.C. metro region), 
D.C. Code §9-1115.01 to 9-1115.04, Md. Transp. Code §10-301 to 10-303, V.A. Code 1950 §33.1-320.2. 
  32 
and not helped by the fact that many interstate compact agreements explicitly prohibit cross-state 
taxes in the powers granted, 20 thus relying on voluntary contributions from each state, rather 
than regional governance.   
 Interstate compacts point to reasons why state-authorized regional governing bodies are 
insufficient to fund infrastructure in multi-state situations, just as city annexations were unable to 
provide this within a single state.  As regions continued to grow, other solutions had to be 
devised for planning, funding and managing regional infrastructure. 
The Second Wave: Procedural Reforms 
In an attempt to overcome some of the obvious limitations to direct state authorization for 
central city annexations of their suburbs, or of regional governments, the federal and state levels 
of government developed regional policy implementation processes to establish particular 
programs across many jurisdictions.13 These processes included structures for distributing money 
that were designed to incentivize regions to discuss issues that affected more than one 
jurisdiction, allowed them to plan across jurisdictions, and remedy spatial inequities (Wallis, 
1994b: 168).  
By 1977, there were 39 federal programs that contained area-wide comprehensive 
planning requirements. Many programs required regions to establish Councils of Governments 
(COGs) in order to distribute federal money, thus increasing the number of regions that 
developed COGs, and enhancing their significance as an institution for regional governance 
(Wallis, 1994b: 169).  The advantages and limitations of these programs provide important 
background for the research in this dissertation, since MOTT are considered a way to supplement 
the planning and funding process performed by MPOs and COGs. 
                                                
13 E.g. Housing Act of 1961, the Federal Highway Act of 1962, and the Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964. 
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Benefits and Limitations of the Second Wave 
 Federally supported regional programs have had the benefit of covering the whole region 
and integrating many different policy programs into the same agency, under a national funding 
umbrella, which has made policy coordination possible. The federal government could easily 
direct MPOs to solving a single planning goal across a particular region, or the entire country.  
For example, they could direct road capacity expansion, ensure social equity (Goldman, 2003: 
194), or implement air quality improvements in the transportation system.  MPOs and other 
agencies could also be instituted with relative ease across major political boundaries, including 
state lines. 
However, the need for state authorization of these federally funded institutions (as with 
local government annexations, discussed earlier) has been a key limitation to further 
development of these regional programs.  At first, governors identified existing agencies or 
created new ones to fulfill their responsibilities, and to the extent feasible, state legislatures were 
asked to approve them (Weiner, 1999: 93).  However few states have granted MPOs or COGs 
major autonomous powers, since state governments felt threatened by the potential for political 
competition (Wachs & Dill, 1997).  As a result, in almost every U.S. metro region, federally 
mandated regional agencies like MPOs remain unelected, and without authority to raise their 
own revenue (Sciara and Wachs, 2007), limiting many agencies’ legitimacy, visibility and 
political power.  
The situation is made worse by threats to their authority from below.  Without significant 
state-granted powers, MPOs rely on unelected board representatives from other levels of 
government, as well as key organizations in their region (e.g. the state government, transit 
operators and members from business or citizen organizations).  This structure gives MPO 
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policies a strong bias towards local interests over regional ones (Gerber and Gibson, 2009: 635).  
Consequently, the power they do have is “derivative,” rather than autonomous, from other 
organizations and levels of government.  This incentivizes MPOs to focus on providing relatively 
equal distributions of resources across geographic jurisdictions,14 rather than promote cross-
jurisdictional social equity (Wachs & Dill, 1997) or system efficiency.   
 In most U.S. regions, the challenges for Second Wave programs have only increased since 
the 1980s due to federal funding cuts. Of the 39 federal programs supporting a regional focus in 
1977, President Reagan either terminated the program, reduced its funding, or redirected the 
program away from a regional focus (Wallis, 1994b: 172).  Though it is notable that MPOs in 
Las Vegas, the San Francisco Bay Area, Portland, and others, have managed to overcome these 
federal challenges and improve their functionality through innovative state and local-level 
initiatives (viz. Sciara and Wachs 2007). 
 The Second Wave began as an attempt to plan infrastructure for an increasingly polycentric 
region, with a focus on comprehensive planning, coordination and performance (Wallis, 1994b: 
172).  However, these federally-funded regional agencies have not been able to convince most 
states to authorize, or local governments to cede, enough autonomous authority to create regional 
agencies with strong political legitimacy. With weakened federal procedural processes and less 
federal money as the fuel tax has lost value to inflation (Wachs, 2003a,b), many regions have 
dissolved into a multitude of poorly-coordinated local option transportation tax programs. 
Meanwhile, a Third Wave of regionalism has gradually emerged from MPOs and local 
policymakers that have tried to overcome these localist tendencies through extra-governmental 
collaboration. 
                                                
14  Many MPOs rely on a one-city-one-vote formula for their boards, which can skew the distribution of resources 
away from populous central cities, or distribute funds based on tax contributions rather than resource needs for each 
project  (Wachs and Dill, 1997).  
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The Third Wave: Devolution 
 Rather than approach the problem through hierarchical, top-down processes, this “Third  
Wave” has come from below, through policy setting and mobilizing for action.  It has de-
emphasized the role of government, in favor of cross-sectoral negotiation between public, private 
and nonprofit actors, attempting to draw from the strengths and connections of each. The focus 
has not been on formal structure and mandated coordination towards specific policy goals, but 
rather, the creation of regional visions, goal setting, consensus building, and mobilization of 
resources towards implementation.  Notably, the Third Wave has operated through networks of 
actors, not a formal structure (Wallis, 1994c: 293).   
 This process can be quite different from region to region, and while it can lead to creative 
policy collaborations, flexibility can also be a weakness.  A collaborative process’ ability to 
occur, or succeed, is closely associated with the strength of a region’s “civic infrastructure,” i.e. 
organizations with strong networks, which have worked together on solving issues in the past, 
communicate often, and trust one another (Wallis, 1994c: 308-309).  Ostensibly, this may appear 
to be an unreliable and unpredictable process. However it may be able to achieve regional 
objectives in situations where it is politically infeasible to authorize a strong regional planning 
body.  
The Challenges of the Third Wave: Constructing the Region 
 Stagnating federal funding, and decreasing effectiveness of federal and state-supported 
planning efforts has increased the importance of overcoming jurisdictional inconsistencies at the 
local level of government.  Consequently, the success of the regional policy process depends 
heavily on the ability of people in the region to coordinate across jurisdictional boundaries. 
Foster’s “regional impulses” provide a useful framework for the obstacles such a process would 
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need to overcome.  This framework focuses on factors that motivate local governments and 
interest groups to cooperate in achieving regional outcomes (Foster, 1997: 1).  Foster writes that 
it is easier to pursue regional alliances when there is greater similarity between people or places 
within a particular region—socially, fiscally or politically (Foster, 1997: 15).   
Table 2.1: Foster’s Regional Impulses 
Regional Impulse Examples 
Natural Resource Natural feature that cities share. 
Economic Rural vs. urban economic needs. 
Centrality Are the suburbs self-sufficient, or do they need the core city? 
Growth Competition when uneven growth.  When no growth or decline, cities band together. 
Social Social differences across region. 
Fiscal Benefits several cities to share services or merge. 
Equity Needy city has an incentive to share services, while an affluent one does not. 
Political Same/different political parties dominant from one city to another. 
Historical Shared history/animosity. 
Foster, 1997: 15 
 Others have explained this phenomenon in political economic terms, as the cost/benefit of 
negotiating. As Feoick puts it:  
For public officials that are bargaining agents for their governments, knowledge that counterparts 
in other jurisdictions represent similar constituencies signals similar political and economic 
interests.  Demographic homogeneity suggests that there will not be political and economic 
power asymmetries that advantage one of the parties and create problems for negotiating fair 
divisions of benefits (Feoick, 2009: 369). 
 
Factors like a similar racial background, political, fiscal or historical factors can all provide 
contextual reasons why two jurisdictions might or might not be able to collaborate together on a 
single project, depending on the ‘cost’ of working together (Feoick, 2009: 369).   
Implementing the Third Wave: Collaboration 
 Third Wave regional governance strategies are essentially collaborative planning, though 
it is difficult to translate the existing theory on collaborative planning to infrastructure planning, 
because it only covers the planning stage of developing a project, and does not give sufficient 
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treatment to funding and implementation.  Despite these limitations, collaborative planning can 
be a useful framework for understanding how MOTT plans are negotiated, in a horizontal power 
situation. 
Collaborative methods are theorized in the Communicative Action planning 
epistemology championed by Jürgen Habermas, which aims to bring stakeholders together in 
order to break out of the bureaucratic and governmental barriers that would otherwise limit the 
scope of discussion to a small range of politically acceptable ideas, in order to develop far-
reaching solutions to intractable problems.  However his epistemology provides no way to enact 
these goals (Bernstein, 1976).    
Habermas seeks free and open communication among stakeholders who normally might 
not ever talk to one another.  To be able to come to a consensus on a solution to a particular 
problem, participants must be able to understand one another, have the same amount of power, 
must all have the same level of information needed to come to a decision, and discuss without 
compulsion (Bernstein, 1976: 213).  The result of such a discussion does not arrive at a single 
unquestionable truth.  It is a truth that presupposes the possibility for further argumentation 
(Bernstein, 1976: 214).  Friedmann sharply criticizes this epistemology for its lack of 
practicality, calling it “…the ideal of a graduate university seminar, though for Habermas it 
describes the conditions of a perfect polity” (Friedmann, 1987: 267).  
 Innes, Booher and Helling describe what it takes for collaborative governance to work for 
planning:  There must be a clear issue that brings participants to the table to try to solve (Helling, 
1998: 343); participants must control the process (Helling, 1998: 344); all must have access to 
the same information (Innes, 1996: 467), as well as the ability to collectively set their own 
ground rules (Innes and Booher, 2003: 37); and finally, the process works best in win-win 
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situations (Innes and Booher, 2003: 37), where fundamental changes to the system are not 
necessary.  Additionally, as seen during the discussion of local option taxes above, collaboration 
can bring new types of groups to the table that have been left out by the traditional political 
process, or the MPO process (Goldman 2003: 190), giving greater meaning to the resources 
Third Wave processes are able to tap into from different sectors of the civic infrastructure 
(Wallis, 1994c).   
 Yet transferring the results of a collaborative process into policy can be a vexing problem.  
Some theorists recognize the need to better “mesh collaborative planning with conventional 
institutions” (Innes and Booher, 2003: 58). Their answer is to view the collaborative processes as 
a kind of shadow governance that traditional government bodies must enable.  This can be done 
through incentives for stakeholders to participate, provision of technical knowledge and 
legitimacy, budgets, laws, regulations and political or financial incentives for participation, as 
well as setting targets and direction (Innes and Booher, 2010: 207, 211).  In other words, by 
replicating what government already does, in a horizontal power multi-jurisdictional 
environment. 
 However even with all these forms of institutionalization, collaborative planning is 
unlikely to happen without someone to initiate the process—the boundary-spanner.  
Network Policy Making & Boundary-Spanners: 
 Infrastructure of the Third Wave 
 In this era of policy making, networks tie collaborative actors together.  In such networks, 
government agencies are but one actor among many (Kickert et al., 1997: 32), though they can 
sometimes take on a larger role, helping arrange the network or manage it.  Actors may be 
individuals or organizations such as businesspersons, nonprofit organizations, and government 
agencies.  They choose to join networks because of dependency on each other for information, 
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policymaking and other needs.  What began as informal networks may become formalized over 
time, as participants begin to share perceptions, and establish patterns and rules of interaction 
(Kickert et al., 1997: 6). 
 Not all participants are equal, of course (Kickert et al., 1997: 33).  While no single actor 
has sufficient power to determine the actions of the other members of the network (Kickert et al., 
1997: 31), it is still assumed that participants occupying a central position in the network (i.e., 
ones that have more direct links to other actors) have more access to information, can get others 
to act in specific ways, and can mobilize more resources (Kickert et al., 1997: 32).  As 
policymaking has shifted away from top-down government to multi-sectoral Third Wave 
approaches, the managing participants’ role has become one of sustaining interaction between 
different actors, and uniting goals and approaches among them.  These central actors play an 
important role in managing networks that cross from one organization to another.  They facilitate 
tasks such as bargaining and compromise, changing the perspectives through which actors 
approach certain issues, and managing the bargaining context in a way that is more likely to 
produce agreement (Kickert et al., 1997: 148-149). 
 The network manager has been called a “boundary-spanner” (Williams, 2002), who knows 
“the art of walking through walls” (Trist, 1983).  Specifically, this agent acts as a catalyst across 
political boundaries, cutting down the communication cost between them and acting as a 
lynchpin between political organizations.  In doing these things, the boundary-spanner reduces 
information asymmetries and uncertainties, and facilitates discussions between people that 
otherwise would not talk to one another (Williams, 2002: 108).   
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Figure 2.4: Schematic of “Third Wave” Multi-Sectoral Networks 
  
Alpert, 2006: 152 
 The boundary-spanner’s role shares many of the attributes of another construct, the “policy 
entrepreneur,” and this study will usually refer to the two jointly as simply the “boundary-
spanner”—or the nonhuman “boundary-spanning agent” that performs this function.  (Since a 
person could play this leadership role, as could a chamber of commerce or an environmental 
group). The policy entrepreneur is someone or some organization that tries to alter the status quo. 
Some theorists describe this champion as a singular local or appointed official that exercises 
initiative (Parks and Oakerson, 2000).  Others define the policy entrepreneur more broadly, as 
someone willing to invest resources—time, energy, reputation, or money, hoping to gain some 
kind of future return. That could come in the form of policy successes, satisfaction from leading 
the process, or a sense of personal aggrandizement (e.g. job security or career promotion) 
(Kingdon, 1995: 122-123).  Some might take on such advocacy either because they want to 
promote pet projects, promote their values/affect the shape of policy, or simply because they like 
the game and enjoy being at the center of an important project (Kingdon, 1995).  Unlike the 
South Florida transportation-policy network, several actors were high-
lighted as key players in terms of having a large number of connections.
Three stakeholder groups share the highest number of ties (each with a
score of 90—meaning that they have 90% of all ties possible in this partic-
ular network): business associations, regi nal planning counci s, and
municipal government. These are followed by county government and tran-
sit operators (each with a score of 80). A large number of interactions take
place within this group.
Betweenness Centrality
Another type of centrality that identifies key players is betweenness cen-
trality, which is used to analyze how many pairs of actors an actor stands
between. Actors that stand between many pairs of actors in the network have
high betweenness scores. If two actors in the network can be reached only via
a third actor, this third actor is seen as possessing an ability to be a broker of
resources on either side, and the betweenness score for that actor will increase
(Burt 1997; Prell 2003). Betweenness scores are especially interesting
152 Urban Affairs Review
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boundary-spanner, the policy entrepreneur is usually described as acting within a single political 
unit (e.g. a county, state or national government), rather than acting in an intergovernmental 
space.  Yet for the purposes of this dissertation, the boundary-spanning person or agent is 
imagined to have the policy entrepreneur’s drive to change the policy status quo.  
 Boundary-spanners derive their role from a central position in the network they are 
managing, and their role can change, depending on several factors.  Formal policy can expand or 
reduce their power, providing/removing veto power over other actors’ decisions. So can 
designation of a particular actor as “lead organization,” or the division of resources within the 
network (Kickert et al., 1997: 51-52, 127-130).  This suggests a continuum of influence over the 
rest of the network for the boundary-spanning agent, depending on their particular role and 
connections. 
 It is important to note that the boundary-spanning agent is a particularly unique and 
idiosyncratic actor, difficult to replicate.  There may not be very many people or entities with the 
contacts, experiences/histories and motivation necessary to play the role of network lynchpin for 
a particular policy issue. The role may change, depending on whether it is taken up by a driven 
agent or organization, like a regional planning agency or a nonprofit organization. There has not 
been much study to date of barriers to a boundary-spanner coming along, and certainly none on 
LOTT measures.  However one study tries to determine the potential supply of policy 
entrepreneurs by estimating the costs and benefits to potential entrepreneurs, which might 
influence their decisions regarding whether to initiate a particular policy discussion (Schneider et 
al., 1995: 70).  Schneider reinforces the fact that the presence of a support network can lower the 
policy entrepreneur’s costs.  Assistance can come in the form of a political party, a business 
organization, etc., from which the entrepreneur can draw expertise, emotional support, 
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information and other resources that facilitate the policy entrepreneur’s quest to make changes in 
the system (Schneider et al., 1995: 177).  Perhaps the likelihood of an entrepreneur coming along 
for a multi-jurisdictional tax proposal might similarly be tied to the strength of their regional 
policy making network, and the authorization legislation, since this establishes the legal 
environment in which the policy entrepreneur can arise. 
Conclusions 
There is a strong need for regional transportation, which has been fulfilled by various 
attempts at regional governance. However all of these have come far short of providing regional 
planning across local jurisdictional boundaries.  Regional funding strategies have long been 
limited by state governments’ reluctance to authorize elected regional governments with funding 
powers, and while MPOs have been able to overcome this problem for many years with federal 
money, these funds are no longer sufficient to develop new regional infrastructure, and new 
strategies are needed.   
Collaborative planning has offered a possible solution to developing regional 
infrastructure in an environment where no particular local government is in charge.  However 
collaboration still depends on state authorization of planning and funding capabilities to 
implement the plans developed.  Nor have most state-sanctioned local governments, MPOs, 
COGs, or interstate compacts provided both the planning and the funding authorities needed. 
LOTTs have provided an additional funding source for transportation that has been 
helpful for building local projects, but they have made it more difficult to plan across 
jurisdictional lines, and they made cross-jurisdictional projects both less attractive to build and 
harder to plan.  However the existing literature has not examined multi-jurisdictional LOTTs 
sufficiently to say how such a process would develop, though it is clear that it would require a 
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great deal of collaboration both among local jurisdictions, and with the state government.  The 
process might need to be initiated by a policy entrepreneur/boundary-spanning agent as well, 
though this character’s role is likely to be dependent on the legislative authorization that exists at 
the time the process begins. 
Indeed, some policy entrepreneurs have attempted to overcome the limited options for 
funding regional transportation infrastructure projects by initiating their own planning processes, 
and proposing multi-jurisdictional versions of local option tax measures.  However MOTTs have 
occurred infrequently, likely because insufficient state legislative authorization of such taxes 
means that a policy entrepreneur/boundary-spanning agent needs to initiate them, and in cases 
where there is no previous legislation in place, lobbying the state legislature becomes another 
step in the planning process.  Existing research has not sufficiently explored the MOTT 
development process, nor the role played by the boundary-spanning agent in their development.  
Of course, the boundary-spanner’s role is likely to be complicated significantly by the state 
legislative authorization in place before the process begins.  More research is needed to 
understand this relationship, and how it affects the boundary-spanner’s role in the collaborative 
planning process, and the following chapter outlines the theory and research methods used in this 
study to better understand these relationships. 
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Chapter 3: Propositions and Methodology 
 
Chapter 3 Summary 
This chapter discusses how pre-authorized legislation, and the level of prescriptiveness of the 
language might affect the degree to which a boundary-spanner is needed to lobby the legislature 
for legislative provisions that make a multi-jurisdictional process compatible with local/regional 
political circumstances.  This chapter develops the study’s research questions, including how 
pre-authorization versus special authorization, as well as how the permissiveness of the 
legislation both influence the role played by the boundary-spanner when selecting projects to 
propose to voters.  This chapter examines how these two dimensions impact the ease with which 
the measure is able to move forward; as well as how special authorization affects the process’ 
ability to overcome differences in local versus state political imperatives.  
 
This chapter identifies potential costs and benefits of blanket versus special authorization. It 
similarly looks at costs and benefits of permissive versus prescriptive authorizing legislation 
language.  Based on this discussion, this chapter develops several hypotheses to explain potential 
relationships between the legislation and the process, which subsequent chapters examine 
further. Following this discussion, this chapter identifies methodology for studying these 
relationships.  
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Introduction 
Current research does not usually distinguish between multi-jurisdictional and single-
jurisdictional local option transportation tax processes.  Nevertheless, there are important 
differences, which mainly relate to state legislative authorization of each process (or lack 
thereof).  First, the local governments that participate in multi-jurisdictional measures may not be 
fixed.  This number can change over time, and in some cases local governments can opt out 
completely.  Additionally, there is uncertainty surrounding the rules for making decisions, which 
are often left to state and local governments, or require collaboration by local governments to 
come to an agreement.  Both processes require an agent to initiate and lead (who can be either a 
person, or an organization, like a chamber of commerce).  However the multi-jurisdictional 
process requires one that works on a much larger scale, with a larger and more complex support 
network.  And if new legislation is required, this network may require access to politicians at the 
state capitol.  Since this agent, referred to here as the boundary-spanner, is likely to be a key 
component of the process, this study is especially interested in how the unique characteristics of 
multi-jurisdictional option transportation tax (MOTT) processes influence the boundary-
spanner’s role in the collaborative policy development network. 
As research reviewed in the previous chapter indicates, a key factor is the set of rules governing 
each MOTT process—the state authorizing legislation.  Powers that states might grant to a 
regional planning authority (RPA) will affect its ability to develop a MOTT proposal in 
fundamental ways.  Some factors that were especially important in the cases studied here include 
(Table 1.1) the ability to choose the election date; authority to earmark which projects go on the 
ballot; the presence of a sunset date by which the region must hold a vote; the ability to choose 
which jurisdictions will be included; or an aggregate majority vote provision (so there is no need 
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to get every local jurisdiction to vote in support).  The presence of some or all of these and other 
autonomous powers should strongly shape the way multi-jurisdictional processes take place, just 
as it would single-jurisdictional processes.  The difference is whether a process has already been 
authorized by the state legislature, and most of the states that have authorized LOTTs have only 
done so for single jurisdictional processes, not multi-jurisdictional ones (Goldman et al., 2001). 
Table 3.1: Local vs. Regional Scales 
Local Regional 
Single leg trips, fewer transfers. Multi-leg trips, more transfers. 
Single operating agency. Multiple operators. 
Local funding sources approved in one 
jurisdiction. 
Coordination of many jurisdictions to 
approve non-federal/state monies. 
Policy entrepreneur needs access to key 
players within single jurisdiction, but not 
legislative connections. 
Policy entrepreneur/boundary-spanner 
needs access across region and at state 
capitol. 
Boundaries clear, government defined. Participating governments variable, opt out 
possible, regional government weak or 
nonexistent. 
Geographic equity issues in funding 
distribution, but tax rates imposed in 
uniform manner across the city. 
Geographic equity issues complicated by 
different per capita funding contributions 
and different per capita needs for each 
member jurisdiction. 
 
 Lack of authorization for multi-jurisdictional processes in most states sets up a situation 
where many multi-jurisdictional processes have occurred without the existence of legislation 
before the process began, requiring a special one-time authorization for the process to begin.  
The success of the process is likely to be tied to the existence of legislation, and the features in it.  
The question is how this affects the process in practice.  There are likely to be different 
advantages and disadvantages to having existing legislation in place, and to the permissiveness 
with which the legislation is written.  One would expect prescriptive legislation to be able to 
overcome parochial reluctance for local jurisdictions to participate in developing a regional 
transportation plan, by lowering the local cost of participation.  However, prescriptive legislation 
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may also run the risk of shaping the process based on state-level political priorities, which may 
or may not be appropriate at the local level, and could raise the cost of participation.  It is 
important to know what situations each of these possibilities becomes problematic or beneficial 
to the process.  Furthermore, it is important to know how each possibility compares to the costs 
and benefits at both the state and local levels for having legislation authorized in advance, versus 
reliance on special legislation. 
Theoretical Proposition 
This research focuses specifically on the ways authorizing legislation can both facilitate 
and hinder multi-jurisdictional processes, depending on how it is written. It is thought that 
regional cases fall along a continuum based on the degree to which the process is already 
authorized before it begins—referred to here as “pre-authorization,” and very similar to another 
concept, “blanket authorization” (legislation authorizing a local measure with no sunset date).15  
Without any legislation in place, separate local jurisdictions wanting to hold a joint tax vote 
would need to seek special legislation to do so—referred to here as “special authorization.”  This 
would afford the legislator writing the authorization bill a great deal of influence on key factors 
like the jurisdictions included, the rules of the process, the stakeholders included, and the 
projects selected.  Additionally, in the absence of existing authorizing legislation, a decision by 
voters to reject such a proposal may require a new authorization bill (depending on the language 
in the legislation).  This dynamic may give the author of the legislation a large amount of 
leverage, and thus, influence over the final language of the legislation, and the process that 
follows (Weinreich, 2015).  
In the absence of pre-authorized legislation, the entire process is highly dependent on the 
presence or absence of a single actor to champion a multi-jurisdictional vote.  The agent that 
                                                
15  The two often go together, but not all pre-authorized legislation lacks a sunset date. 
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organizes the process—the boundary-spanner—may sometimes be a person, sometimes an 
organization, but in either case, brings people from different jurisdictions, different policy 
sectors, together to initiate a multi-jurisdictional process. In many of the cases examined in this 
dissertation, the boundary-spanner’s role is played not by a member of the legislature, but rather, 
a mayor, a transit agency General Manager, or a civic organization, like a chamber of commerce.  
As discussed in the last chapter, while there are plenty of people to fill these roles in any U.S. 
region, few are likely to be interested in championing a multi-jurisdictional tax proposal.   
Another challenge lies in the potential for a difference of interests between local and state 
politicians.  Local politicians are primarily considering the needs of their district.  However state 
legislators also have to compromise with legislators from other districts, from other regions of 
the state, as well as the governor.  In addition to a broader scope of interests, they also have to 
account for state budgets, state agencies, state elections, and state political interests.  While these 
differences will depend on the case, it is fair to assume that local/regional governments would 
need to lobby for legislative provisions that support local/regional political needs.  
Legislation written in a prescriptive manner could create local/regional costs for 
undertaking a MOTT measure—for example if the legislation specifies an election date, a 
geography, or project selection process that does not take account of the local political 
necessities. Conceivably, a boundary-spanner coming from the legislature, or with strong 
legislative connections, would be able to overcome this inherent complication.  However as 
discussed before, there are not likely to be many candidates interested in being a boundary-
spanner, and even fewer with strong legislative connections. 
According to this proposition, the situation could be eased substantially with legislation 
authorized in advance, and/or blanket authorization to hold a process (i.e. legislation without a 
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sunset clause).  The law would already be written, and presumably, the boundary-spanner could 
initiate a process without the need to go through the legislature .  In this case, the boundary-
spanner would, presumably, serve a less essential role. Additionally, differences in local and 
state political imperatives would pose fewer challenges. With less legislative involvement, there 
would be less opportunity to add supplemental provisions specific to a particular process, like, 
requirements that the process happen during a particular election cycle or that the proposal 
contain specific projects.  Instead, such decisions could be left to local policy makers to 
determine, based on the latest political needs of their area. Blanket authorization would further 
allow local leaders to hold the vote again if they were to lose the first time.  This would make 
local policy makers less dependent on the legislature to repeat the process, without the need for a 
boundary-spanner to help gain a new legislative authorization.  As this example indicates, if the 
authorization was broad enough, local leaders would not face significant hindrances to 
developing the process in a way that they deemed optimal for their local political situation.  
As such, the presence of a boundary-spanner with legislative connections may be less 
critical to the process when there is a high degree of pre-authorization,16 since local governments 
might be able to initiate the process without one.  Furthermore, institutionalization of the process 
through pre-existing legislation may open the role of boundary-spanner up to a much broader 
group of people, likely making the process easier to initiate.  Finally, substantial pre-
authorization and blanket authorization could reduce the boundary-spanner’s influence within the 
group of parties collaborating to select projects for a ballot proposal.  If the boundary-spanner is 
not as essential to initiating and developing the ballot proposal, and is not as rare a commodity, 
then the other participants become less dependent on the boundary-spanner.  This could help 
                                                
16 Even in a pre-authorized process, the boundary-spanner may need to fend off new legislation that could halt the 
process, and would still be needed to initiate the ballot proposal. 
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level the power dynamic between the boundary-spanner and the other participants in the process, 
ensuring that the boundary-spanner does not have an inordinate amount of influence over which 
projects get selected (as happened in the case examined in Weinreich, 2015). 
As concepts, pre-authorization and blanket authorization differ in that pre-authorization 
refers to legislation authorized before the process begins.  Of course, in practice, it is certainly 
possible that legislation is authorized at different stages for different provisions governing the 
process, so one might think of pre-authorization as a process with a high degree of features 
governing the process having been authorized in advance, and without connection to any 
particular process.  Pre-authorized legislation is quite similar to another concept, blanket 
authorization, meaning the lack of a sunset date.  Blanket authorization makes it possible to 
repeat the process in case the first attempt fails, or if the board decides to propose a second phase 
to a voter-approved plan.  However in this study, both terms refer to legislation that is not 
specific to a particular process. 
Another important element is the specificity of the legislative language. The legislation 
may fall along a continuum between prescriptive and flexible, based on the limitations the law 
places on the following factors: taxing instruments and tax rates to be imposed, timing of the 
election process, geography of local jurisdictions to be included, and process for selecting 
projects.  (As in Table 1.1, one could add voting provisions to this list, like the percentage vote 
required; and whether the ballot is counted as an aggregate across the district, versus one 
jurisdiction at a time.  However due to the widely different local political contexts across regions 
and election cycles, the election process is considered only to the extent that it influenced the 
selection of projects.  However the election outcome is outside the scope of this study).   
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Each prescriptive factor can limit local governments’ ability to make decisions in 
particular ways, which can result in a local process that is better suited, politically, to the needs 
of state legislators than the political needs of the region.  Nevertheless, it is also possible that 
legislation written very loosely could result in local indecision, inability, or unwillingness to act, 
or inability to collaborate across jurisdictions.  The decision whether to make legislation 
prescriptive or flexible is a balancing act between the need to facilitate collaboration at the local 
level versus the need to ensure the process moves forward.  
Since state legislation can strongly affect multi-jurisdictional decision processes, this 
research focuses, especially, on points where the authorizing legislation hindered or facilitated 
the selection of projects to propose to voters.  This study examines how and when the degree of 
pre-authorization and/or blanket authorization indicates whether the process depends on a 
boundary-spanner to act as champion, and to put the necessary coalition together.  
The type of authorizing legislation will likely determine the role of the boundary-spanner 
and the degree to which this agent is needed for the process to occur.  This study examines how 
these different elements of prescriptiveness (Table 3.2) help or hinder local actors’ ability to 
agree on projects to include. The level of prescriptiveness could also determine how well the 
state legislation caters to local political imperatives—and consequently, the degree to which the 
boundary-spanner may need legislative ties in order mitigate state-local disjunctions in the 
writing of authorizing legislation. Thus, the instances where the process is too prescriptive to 
facilitate local actions could indicate places where the boundary-spanner needs closer ties to the 
legislature to ensure the legislation is written in a more helpful way, and perhaps, places where 
pre-authorization/blanket authorization might have overcome or prevented this disjunction from 
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occurring.  A comparison of cases with different levels of pre-authorization/blanket authorization, 
and different levels of prescriptiveness, should help answer this question. 
Table 3.2: Elements of Prescriptiveness 
Factors Explored 
1. Taxing instruments  
2. Tax rates to be imposed 
3. Timing of the election process 
4. Geography of local jurisdictions to be included 
5. Process for selecting projects 
 
Developing the Research Questions 
This study examines whether the presence of pre-existing, blanket and/or permissive 
authorization makes it easier to overcome the disparate political imperatives between local and 
state government, thus making it easier to bring together actors with different priorities from 
across the region; though it also considers the possibility that permissive legislation could do the 
opposite, in fact reducing pressure from above for local jurisdictions to move forward with the 
process, thus slowing its progress.   
An important question is what a boundary-spanner with legislative connections can do 
that a boundary-spanner without them cannot. Is such a boundary-spanner needed, and what 
elements of the process may reduce the need for such an agent?  To answer these questions, this 
study looks at whether it is more likely that a boundary-spanner with legislative connections (i.e. 
influence and connections at the state capitol) is needed to shape the authorizing legislation in a 
way that will be most amenable to cross-jurisdictional discussion. Is a boundary-spanner with 
such connections needed to make the legislation sufficiently permissive for local governments to 
develop a multi-jurisdictional measure that suits their political needs?  And if not, then what 
circumstances allowed the process to continue without such an agent?  
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Table 3.3: Summary of Variables for Analysis 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
1) Pre-authorization & blanket authorization vs. special 
legislative authorization.  
 
E.g. Is there a regional entity with previously existing 
authorization to place a multi-jurisdictional self-help 
transportation tax measure on the ballot?  Can it put similar 
measures on the ballot in the future, when this process is 
over? 
 
  
1) Role played by each group and 
degree to which each group 
managed to get its proposals 
passed.  
 
E.g. the boundary-spanner, 
nongovernmental stakeholders in 
the collaboration process, and 
actors from the state government. 
 
2) Degree of permissiveness of the authorizing legislation 
 
Maximum permissiveness for a state-authorized regional 
process means maximum flexibility for local governments or 
a regional agency to make decisions independent of the 
state. (See Table 3.2 for indicators of permissiveness). 
 
2) Ease with which process is able 
to move forward.  
 
E.g. How significant are the 
obstacles to it moving forward? 
 
3) Influence of differing state/local 
political imperatives. 
 
E.g. Instances where state leaders 
write laws that are appropriate for 
state politics, but incompatible 
with local political needs. 
 
 
Perhaps in a process with a high degree of the legislation pre-authorized and/or blanket 
authorized, there may be no need for a well-connected boundary-spanner.  Perhaps permissive 
legislation obviates this need. Or perhaps both factors do? To find out, this study investigates 
whether the RPA and the other stakeholders are free in such cases to start the process without 
legislative involvement, (making it easier to initiate one). Therefore, this study investigates how 
the levels of pre-authorization and permissiveness are related to the project selection process. 
Lack of pre-authorization and permissiveness could significantly increase the boundary-spanning 
agent’s leverage and relative influence in the collaborative decision network.  It is also possible 
that pre-authorized and/or permissive legislation helps the boundary-spanning agent overcome 
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the disjunction between local and state political imperatives, or bridge cross-jurisdictional 
differences—or, alternatively, that permissive legislation might make it more difficult for a 
boundary spanner to facilitate the collaborative process. 
Research Questions (Using Variables in Table 3.3) 
This study compares the processes for developing four multi-jurisdictional transportation 
taxes negotiated under different circumstances.  Certainly one commonly used approach for a 
study like this might measure each tax’s success at the polls.  However due to the vastly different 
scopes, political circumstances, state legal environments, and historical contexts, this approach 
would yield results that are not comparable.  Furthermore, this study is most interested in what 
features of the policy process make it possible for multi-jurisdictional funding decisions to be 
made, rather than which one succeeds with the electorate.  This is because success in election 
and implementation rests with political strategists and project managers, and is context-
dependent, so not easily generalized without a substantial quantity of cases to perform a 
statistical analysis.  However the number of MOTT elections since 1980 is well below the 
threshold needed for a quantitative study (Table 4.4). 
This study’s research questions (bolded) examine the benefits and costs for pre- 
authorization/blanket authorization versus special authorization (Table 3.4), and for permissive 
legislation versus prescriptive legislation (Table 3.5).  This study does this by examining how 
the presence of pre/blanket authorization and the level of permissiveness of the legislation 
influences the role played by the boundary-spanner when selecting projects to propose to 
voters.17 This study also asks how these dimensions, both separately and jointly, impact the 
ease with which the measure was able to move forward.  This is measured by the obstacles 
                                                
17 The participants examined include the boundary-spanning agent, the collaborative stakeholders, and the state and 
the regional government actors. 
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each case encountered due to prescriptiveness of: taxing instruments and tax rates to be 
imposed, timing of the election process, geography of local jurisdictions to be included, and 
process for selecting projects (Table 3.2).  Finally, this study asks how pre/blanket 
authorization versus special authorization affects the ability for each process to overcome 
differences in local versus state political imperatives.  
Hypotheses  
A. Pre-authorization or blanket authorization (rather than special authorization) could 
remove a potential place for the legislature to intervene in the process, potentially an 
opportunity to add projects or requirements that hinder the process.  This would be 
signified by the presence of prescriptive features in the legislation that hinder progress of 
the process, or conflict with local political needs (for example an election date favorable 
to state politicians but not in local polling).  
B. Pre-authorization or blanket authorization (rather than special authorization) would 
ensure that a tax proposal does not require the legislature to place the multi-jurisdictional 
proposal on the ballot.  This would reduce the need for a boundary-spanner with 
legislative connections to initiate a multi-jurisdictional process, reduce the importance of 
the boundary-spanner, and make the process easier to initiate and repeat, since more 
people or organizations could perform that role. This would be signified by stakeholders 
without legislative connections being influential in initiating the process, leading it, 
and/or choosing projects. 
C. Pre-authorization or blanket authorization, rather than special authorization, could result 
in legislation that languishes unused, since there would be no state deadlines to ensure 
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that local jurisdictions implement the process, and no state requirements to ensure that 
local jurisdictions work together to develop a multi-jurisdictional proposal.   
D. Prescriptive, rather than permissive, legislation may indicate a failure to coordinate 
between local and state policy makers.  This may be indicated by authorizing legislation 
following policy considerations that are important to state politicians, rather than local 
ones, potentially suggesting the need to have a boundary-spanner with stronger legislative 
connections to lobby for local concerns when drafting the legislation.  
Table 3.4: Potential Benefits & Costs of Blanket vs. Special Authorization 
 Benefits Costs 
Pre-
Authorization 
• Offers an institutionalized 
process through which local 
governments can propose a 
multi-jurisdictional tax. 
• Less state intervention in 
project selection and other 
issues when the legislation 
has been written in advance. 
 
• Legislation cannot guarantee use-
i.e. Locals may decide to never 
use the legislation, and the 
process would never happen (for 
example, in cases of inter-
jurisdictional political 
disagreement). 
 
Blanket 
Authorization 
• Process can occur repeatedly 
with limited involvement by 
boundary-spanning agent. 
• No time limit on when to 
hold the election, meaning 
less leverage for legislators 
writing the authorizing 
legislation. 
• Legislation cannot guarantee 
local governments will use the 
authorization-i.e. with no time 
limit, locals may never initiate or 
complete a tax proposal, 
especially in cases of inter-
jurisdictional disagreement. 
• Regional taxes could reduce 
potential tax revenue available for 
state and local programs. A 
maximum taxation limit is 
required on blanket authorization, 
to ensure sufficient resources for 
both state and local needs.   
Special 
Authorization 
• Legislative authorization may 
be an opportunity to gain 
political support for the plan. 
• Ensures that locals will not 
overstep their authority, and 
over-tax themselves. 
• Its passage in the legislature 
offers an opportunity for state 
legislators to impose 
requirements that may hinder the 
process. 
• Process cannot occur frequently. 
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 • Offers limited adaptability to the 
needs of the region at the time. 
• May require a boundary-spanner 
with legislative connections for 
the bill to be written favorably for 
local political needs. 
 
Table 3.5: Potential Benefits & Costs of Prescriptive vs. Permissive Processes 
 Benefits Costs 
Permissive • Easier to gather strong local 
support. 
• Easier to overcome state/local 
disjuncture. 
• Easier to find a boundary-
spanner to organize process, 
and less dependent on that 
boundary-spanner. 
• Can happen more often. 
• Possibly unable to move forward. 
• Locals may be unable to work 
toward common goal, especially if 
local governments have strong 
disagreements. 
• Locals may be unable to agree on 
cross-jurisdictional projects. 
Prescriptive • Happens on timeline set by the 
legislation. 
• Forces disparate local 
governments to work together. 
• Might force local governments 
to include multi-jurisdictional 
projects. 
 
• Disparate governments may 
develop a plan together, but it 
might not be one they like. 
• Mismatch between state and local 
political imperatives. 
• Dependent on boundary-spanner 
with legislative connections, which 
can be hard to find. 
 
Methodology 
Case Selection: Chapter 4 defines categories for multi-jurisdictional funding strategies, 
and organizes the 50 largest U.S. metro regions based on this typology.  This study selects 
regions from one of several defined categories, which have attempted to use multi-jurisdictional 
option taxes to fund their transportation infrastructure.  This dissertation targets all U.S. metro 
areas over 1 million people in either their 2000 Combined Statistical Area (CSA) or their 
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Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), chosen depending on the data available.18  Setting a 
minimum population ensures a complexity of inter-jurisdictional relations that requires multi-
jurisdictional planning to overcome.   
To select cases from the 50 largest U.S. regions, this study ascertains where the funding 
for transportation projects originates, or how the regional agencies get their funding.  It selects 
four regions from those identified in the typology as using multi-jurisdictional option 
transportation tax measures (see Chapter 4). Since this study is looking for patterns regarding 
how regions undertake their processes, it selects cases to represent different legislative 
conditions like pre-authorization and level of permissiveness, as well as outcome, and 
geographical balance (Yin, 2009: 54).  This study is limited to cases that have attempted to 
conduct a multi-jurisdictional process, rather than ones that have simply proposed it, or situations 
where the state has authorized such a process, but no region has tried to use the statute; this 
supports the study’s focus on how the legislation works in practice.  Note, however, that this 
does not suppose every region in this study succeeded in passing the statute at the polls. Indeed, 
this study includes cases that passed as well as those that failed, under the assumption that the 
outcome is a potential indicator of deeper differences across cases that should be represented in 
the sample.  It is also important to note that this study does not assume the same factor will result 
in the same effect in every region.  Sequences of events occur differently across time and space, 
and combinations of events are even more difficult to predict.  Yet by looking at a wide diversity 
                                                
18 These numbers are for case selection purposes only, so this study uses Combined Statistical Area (CSA) numbers 
in most cases.  This minimizes the possibility of excluding regions divided by census statistical boundaries.  
However this study uses MSA numbers in some cases, where CSAs encompass separate metro regions with separate 
transit systems.  (e.g. The Washington-Baltimore CSA encompasses two quite independent metro regions).  This 
study uses MSA numbers when CSAs encompass areas unreasonably far beyond the urbanized region.  
Additionally, this study uses MSA numbers when there is no CSA number available. 
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of cases chosen from within a narrow set of parameters, patterns should begin to emerge from 
the ways the factors play in each context. 
Case Analysis: This study leverages the rich variety of political processes present across 
U.S. regions as a means for comparison. A multi-case study design was selected to answer 
questions about how and why the processes happened the way they did (Yin, 2009: 8).  A 
qualitative approach is appropriate, as well, because there are only 13 potential regions that have 
used MOTT processes in the United States since 1990—too few to do a statistical analysis at the 
regional unit of analysis (Yin, 2009: 12).  The case study design allowed the collection of 
detailed data that was inseparable from its context—one of the strengths of this approach (Yin, 
2009: 18; Babbie, 1983: 244-245).  To avoid potential limitations of this method, multiple cases 
were included, and evidence is generalizable to theoretical propositions rather than all regions, 
meaning results are intended to expand theories, to develop understandings and predictions about 
other cases, rather than to count frequencies (Yin, 2009: 15; Lipset et al., 1956, 419-420).    
The author conducted interviews in the four selected metro regions.  Chapters 5-8 
determine how the collaboration took place in each multi-jurisdictional process, how ideas 
moved through the process from start to finish, and which parties were most influential.  In each 
case, the author assessed the boundary-spanner’s influence, how negotiations occurred, what 
venue they took place in (e.g. a public and publicized forum?  Behind closed doors?  At the state 
capitol?), and who set the rules for discussion.  The author identified the role performed by other 
stakeholders, and identified the extent to which various stakeholders were influential in the 
decision making, and tried to determine who was taking a leadership role in the process.  The 
author assessed the role of the regional agency and state politicians in each process, interviewing 
many of them in order to learn their motivations.  Finally, the author identified barriers to each 
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process occurring and moving forward (especially including the presence of differing local/state 
political imperatives). 
Defining the Cases Under Consideration 
This study defines cases to include metro areas that held a regional collaboration process 
aimed at developing a transportation funding proposal intended for consideration by voters 
across their region.  All cases are part of a multi-jurisdictional process occurring in 1990 or later.  
However the study is agnostic as to the election process, the types of projects selected (e.g. bus 
rapid transit, heavy rail, highways, etc.), or the quality of the project design. 
Collecting the Data 
Data consists primarily of interviews, complemented by public documents, historical 
information and archival documents collected from local sources.  This study includes interviews 
of bureaucrats, politicians, business leaders, and public advocacy groups that participated in 
putting together regional collaborative processes in each of the four regions (consisting of about 
15-20 interviews per region).  
The author determined who the boundary-spanning agent was through one of two ways 
(Table 3.6).  First he tried to find out who/which entity initiated the process, and/or was most 
influential in leading it.  Some of this leadership likely would include acting as champion and 
bridging jurisdictional boundaries in collaborative discussions.  Second, the author asked 
interviewees with whom they had interacted during the process, and if they could recall who 
initiated and/or led the process?  (Additionally, the author checked interviewee accounts against 
meeting minutes and archival accounts).  The boundary-spanners should be the people or 
organizing agencies with the most direct interactions.  Note that neither measure presupposes 
that the boundary-spanning agent was the most influential actor in the decision making.  
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Table 3.6: Indicators of the Boundary-Spanning Agent 
1) Displayed Characteristics of a Boundary-Spanning Agent (Developed in Chapter 2) 
• Initiated Process, or Most Influential Leader*  
• Acted as Champion/Policy Entrepreneur 
• Bridged Jurisdictional Boundaries 
2) Identified as Leader by Most Interviewees 
*Preference given for those who performed both roles,  
especially if there was more than one boundary-spanner.  
 
This research began with a historical analysis of the process for each case. The results 
were compared with primary sources and interviews through triangulation (Yin, 2009: 114-118).  
The interview process began by contacting key people identified in news articles, reports, 
websites and other easily obtainable public sources.  The author used a snowball sampling 
technique to learn who else was involved in developing the measure (Babbie, 1983: 251-252).  
Each interviewee was asked to recommend other participants involved in the process.  This 
technique is especially useful for targeting a specific group that underwent a shared experience, 
in this case the process of putting their region’s multi-jurisdictional transportation funding 
proposal together.   
In this study, the participants often remembered one another, this method facilitated the 
author’s ability to learn whom to contact.  The author stopped conducting new interviews when 
he had interviewed enough people that he was receiving the same information several times, and 
there were diminishing returns from each new interview. A possible threat to validity is this 
technique is not designed to be representative of all potential participants in the process, but 
rather to target the most active or influential participants (Babbie, 1983: 252).  Participants may 
not remember everyone involved, or may recommend the people who most agreed with their 
viewpoints. This issue is mitigated here by contacting every participant for whom contact 
information was available, by targeting a diverse group (some leading the process, some critical 
of it), and by checking against newspaper accounts as well as meeting minutes for other people 
  62 
who might have been involved.  The author then used these references as new points of contact 
for additional snowball processes. 
In several special circumstances, this study employed a multiple participant, rather than 
individual, interview format.19  In these cases, interviewees requested to conduct their interview 
in the presence of other participants who had worked with them on the process in question, in 
order to jog their memory.  This study employs multiple participant interviews for the following 
situations: 1) Three political consultants in the San Francisco Bay Area had worked together and 
requested to be interviewed together.  2) The Atlanta Mayor requested to be interviewed along 
with his senior transportation staffer, who helped him craft his regional transportation policies.  
The author had already interviewed the mayor’s senior staffer separately, on a previous date.  3) 
A top staffer at RTA/Sound Transit, in Seattle, had already met for a private interview two days 
earlier.  In a follow-up session, he requested to have another staff member from his department 
present, who had been at the agency longer, and could fill in particular details. 
Multiple participant interviews and focus groups run the risk of developing a ‘group 
think’ recollection of the case (Carey & Smith, 1994), which reduces opportunities for 
triangulation across interviewees—a potential threat to validity.  However this format also allows 
interviewees to recall more elements of the story than they would in a solitary interview 
(Morgan, 1996).  As Table 3.7 indicates, multiple participant interviews were the exception in 
this study, rather than the rule. 
 
 
 
                                                
19 Occasionally, researchers have referred to group interviews as focus groups, depending on the formality of the 
questions and relation of participants to each other.  Nevertheless, the “group effect” is present in both formats 
(Morgan, 1996). 
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Table 3.7: Interviews Conducted by Region 
 
*Number Interviewed includes all participants in individual and group interviews.  People that were interviewed 
more than once are only counted once in this column. 
**Logistical reasons for not meeting included: Could not find at least 15 minutes, moved to another state, 
health-related, now in prison.   
 
Within Case Analysis 
 For each case, this study includes a timeline and a narrative based on triangulation across 
interviews and documents.  Case chapters analyze the events and the chain of evidence, looking 
for places where one party might have blocked another’s ideas from inclusion in the final 
proposal (Yin, 2009: 122-124).  Chapters look for changes to the rules for deciding which 
projects to include, and decisions over which stakeholders to invite.  Chapters note cases where 
barriers to influence, and other obstacles, slowed down the overall process, and which factors 
made it harder to move the proposal to the voters for approval. Some potential barriers include 
those related to pre/blanket authorization versus a special authorization.  Barriers also include the 
level of permissiveness in the categories from Table 3.2 (i.e. taxing instruments and tax rates to 
be imposed, timing of the election process, geography of local jurisdictions to be included, and 
process for selecting projects). Finally, chapters look at whether these factors are best explained 
by the study’s hypotheses, by rival explanations, or by previously unpredicted explanations.   
 
 
Region No. 
Interviewed* 
Group 
Interviews 
Declined 
Interview 
Didn’t Return 
Calls/Emails 
Logistics/ 
Health 
Impediment** 
Deceased 
SF Bay 
Area 
17 1 session,  
3 participants 
1 5 3 0 
Atlanta 22 1 session,  
2 participants 
1 3 3 0 
Seattle 21 1 session, 
2 participants 
3 2 4 1 
Denver 21 0 0 4 4 3 
Total 
81 3 sessions, 7 
participants 
5 14 14 4 
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Cross-Case Analysis 
This dissertation compares across cases in a way analogous to how a researcher might 
compare several experiments, examining whether or not the results can be replicated across 
multiple tests.  This study examines whether the theoretical framework laid out in this chapter is 
replicated across cases (Yin, 2009: 54), and whether the factors identified in the hypotheses 
explain the process in the manner predicted. It looks at whether there was evidence for the rival 
hypotheses (Patton, 2002: 553; Yin, 2009: 134-135), or other unpredicted factors. It compares 
conclusions by matching patterns across cases (Yin, 2009: 136).  As one would do with 
quantitative data, it is possible to look at multiple dependent variables, and various potential 
outcomes across cases, and find patterns based both on what was expected to happen, and what 
was not (Cook & Campbell, 1979: 118; Patton, 553; Yin, 2009: 137). Using these results, this 
study asks what the cross-case differences say about its propositions, and the existing literature. 
The Interviews 
Interviewees all agreed to participate in this study, and were warned in writing about the 
risks of participation.  They were given the opportunity to opt out.  Participating interviewees 
were asked to note any portions of their interviews that would be off the record, up to and 
including the entire interview if they so chose.  These procedures were formally exempted from 
further review by the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board (IRB).20   
Some interviewees provided primary source documents, which have been included in this 
study.  These include reports, advocacy and campaign materials, emails and letters, faxes, 
memos, video & YouTube recordings, and meeting minutes. Most other the documents collected 
for this study were publicly available 
 
                                                
20 Study eResearch ID: HUM00072892, approved 4/30/2013. 
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Ensuring Internal and External Validity 
Perhaps the biggest challenge was collecting sufficient data for older cases.  The cases 
took place between 1993 and 2012.21  Interviews for the Bay Area case were conducted from 
2010 to 2011, with follow-up contacts, and additional interviews in 2013 and 2014.  Interviews 
for other cases were conducted in 2014.  The degree to which this affected the author’s ability to 
collect data depended on the case, and is noted separately in Appendix A.  Atlanta occurred the 
most recent, and had the most data available, while Seattle’s 1995 process (farthest back) had the 
least.  In cases where there was not sufficient interview data available, the analysis relies on 
written historical records to a greater degree. More recent cases also had new sources of data, 
like YouTube videos and opposition group blogs, while older cases required traditional sources 
like meeting minutes, archives and interviews.  The multi-case study design helped to mitigate 
against inadequate data in particular places.  However the analysis was similar across cases: 
timeline, historical narrative, triangulation and analysis using research questions as a guide. 
Sorting out inconsistencies in data was challenging in all cases. The author looked for 
instances where data sources conflicted—archival data versus interviews, or one interview 
against another.  In cases where data gathered from different sources were in conflict, the author 
conducted follow-up interviews, and sought additional documentation.  Likewise, this study 
sought to mitigate external validity issues presented from the dearth of regions from which to 
examine (using case study analysis).  There was also a great deal of variability between regions, 
especially political variability.  This study tried to use the regions’ variability to its advantage, as 
a source for comparison of conditions across cases, which were chosen for specific 
characteristics.  For improved generalizability, the typology developed in Chapter 4 defines 
which kinds of cases are comparable to those examined in this study, and which are not. 
                                                
21 The Seattle 1995 process began in 1993, while the Atlanta process ended in 2012. 
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Conclusion 
The theoretical propositions outlined in this chapter create a “replication logic,” which is 
based on patterns observed across cases in the data (Yin, 2009: 41, 54).  As this study builds 
towards the cross-case comparison in the final chapters, the question is not how each case 
compares to the exact conditions in the other cases.  Inevitably, the conditions in each case will 
be rather different.  They occurred in different political environments, legal environments, 
cultural environments and time periods.  Instead, the main question is how each case compares to 
the hypotheses discussed in this chapter (Yin, 2009: 136-140).  This study seeks to explain the 
costs and benefits of special authorization versus pre-authorization and blanket authorization.  It 
also seeks to explain the impact of permissive versus prescriptive legislation for governing multi-
jurisdictional processes.  The following chapters will examine how the level of state-granted 
autonomy in each process relates to the role of various participants, and how this impacted the 
ease with which each process was able to move forward—i.e. what obstacles were there? Finally, 
the following chapters examine how these factors affected the process’ ability to overcome 
potential disjunctures between local/regional and state political motivations in each of the 
cases—often referred to in this study as differing “political imperatives.” First, in the following 
chapter, this study will develop a typology of multi-jurisdictional funding methods used in the 50 
largest U.S. regions, which will provide the basis for identifying regions that have used a multi-
jurisdictional option transportation tax, and for selecting the four regions for further study. 
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Chapter 4: A Typology of Multi-Jurisdictional  
Funding Strategies & Selection of Regions for Study 
Chapter 4 Summary 
This chapter defines multi-jurisdictional option transportation taxes (MOTTs) and their place 
within a range of potential multi-jurisdictional funding methods. It does this by establishing key 
differences between methods for funding cross-jurisdictional service—for example the kinds of 
projects that are funded and the ability to overcome service gaps. This chapter identifies specific 
regions that have used MOTTs; this list forms the basis for selecting regions to analyze in 
subsequent chapters.  
This chapter compares legal codes and histories for funding transportation infrastructure across 
the 50 largest U.S. regions, in order to highlight important distinctions in law and 
implementation of funding methods.  It uses this information to build a typology that describes 
multi-jurisdictional funding structures present in U.S. regions today.  
Introduction: Developing a Framework for the Funding Policy Environment 
 This chapter identifies types of multi-jurisdictional transportation funding processes that 
have been employed in the United States over the last three decades, and the political situations 
associated with the development of each type. Finally, it identifies which regions have used 
MOTTs, and selects cases for analysis.  Categories of funding are designed to separate level of 
government from which the funding originated, while they distinguish degrees of centralization 
of funding decisions.  This ranges from state-directed funding to informal coordination.  
Proposed categories and descriptions are outlined below, which are later used to classify and 
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identify cases for selection: 
Multi-Jurisdictional Transportation Funding Types 
 
Direct State Funding  
The most direct form of state involvement in creating a regional service is where the state 
government pays for it.  States frequently delegate the power to plan, fund, manage and operate 
cross-jurisdictional transportation programs to local authorities. However in the absence of such 
delegation, states may perform this role by default. (See the discussion on home rule in 
Appendix B). Notably, many states that have used the state-directed approach are relatively 
small, and none of them has more than one metro region over 1 million people. Baltimore, 
Maryland, and Hartford, Connecticut are two such examples (Maryland DOT Budget, 2013; 
ConnDOT, 2014). This funding method has the potential to provide integrated funding and 
planning across a large number of local jurisdictions; for example the Boston region’s MBTA 
serves 178 cities (Massachusetts General Laws, §161A-8, 161A-9).   
State-directed Funding for Regional Agency 
This category represents cases where the state legislature authorizes a multi-jurisdictional 
agency to manage projects that cross jurisdictional lines.  The state may also approve funding 
sources for the agency, collected either from state-level taxes, or locally. For example, the six-
county Chicago Regional Transportation Authority is funded through a regional sales tax, but 
rates are set at the state capitol.  As of 2011, the state was providing a 30% match from the state 
general fund (Shields, The Bond Buyer, April 27, 2011).   While this approach ensures that all 
local jurisdictions participate (Washburn, Chicago Tribune, April 18, 1989), regional money in 
Chicago is also subject to state political fights, and funding reductions to balance the state budget 
(Washburn, Chicago Tribune, April 18, 1989). State legislation also specifies many details about 
operations, and shares of the funding from each county that should go towards each kind of 
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transportation (70 ILCS §3615, IC §8-24-2). This method, then, uses funds collected both 
regionally and from the state, while state laws manage it closely. 
Single Regional Body 
 While an unusual approach in the U.S., Oregon, Nevada and Colorado, in particular, have 
authorized at least one regional transportation agency with the ability to enact taxes in their 
district.  Additional measures aimed at making it difficult for local governments to exit the 
regional agency increase the regional entity’s long-term stability.  A revenue source collected at 
the regional level, in addition to local/regional election of board members, provides 
independence from both state and municipal governments (Orfield & Luce, 2009). 
Despite these benefits, this funding type is difficult to implement due to its scale and 
competition from previously existing governments.  It also appears to be confined to single-state 
transportation needs, since even if an interstate compact were developed, each state would need 
to fund its share separately (this arrangement is discussed below). Another challenge (described 
further in Chapter 2) is the difficulty of planning some issues on a regional basis if people do not 
feel a strong sense of connection to residents on the other side of the region (Foster, 1997).  This 
makes it challenging to set up a comprehensive regional agency, and to plan within it. 
Multi-jurisdictional Option Transportation Taxes 
This funding method employs the initiative process to let voters decide whether to raise 
taxes to fund their transportation needs.  Usually, balloting for transportation funding is 
conducted on a single-jurisdiction basis.  This can lead to poor coordination across jurisdictions 
(Goldman et al., 2001), and the need for an interlocal agreement to manage service gaps.  A 
multi-jurisdictional election avoids this problem.  Unlike a Single Regional Body, however, the 
multi-jurisdictional election occurs across more than one transportation funding jurisdiction, and 
does not require a regional board to initiate it (though this depends on state legislation).  Use of a 
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MOTT avoids a major hurdle to having comprehensive regional funding and planning.  However 
the multi-jurisdictional option initiative requires state legislation to authorize, which only exists 
in some states.  Otherwise, some regions have requested special legislative authorizations for 
their proposed process.   
A key disadvantage of conducting a multi-jurisdictional vote is the lengthy time it takes 
to develop a plan and campaign for its passage across a large region.  As with many other 
processes, this requires complex negotiations across several jurisdictions and actors serving local 
interests. However this process must reach out to the public and to special interest groups, in 
order to achieve their support.  
Bi-jurisdictional negotiations can be accomplished relatively easily through an interlocal 
agreement, and are therefore classified under the Memorandum of Understanding/Interlocal 
Agreements category. Thus, the MOTT funding type is defined here as limited to cases with three 
jurisdictions or more.   
It is highly unlikely that such a process would occur in a multi-state region, unless each 
state is willing to authorize and plan a separate campaign, which would be so complex, it is hard 
to imagine it happening.  This process may be most appropriate for regions with strong existing 
jurisdictional divisions and a political dynamic that precludes developing a regional body with 
tax powers—yet the citizens have a shared desire for a particular proposal that ties them together. 
This funding strategy has the ability to overcome many local political barriers but 
requires heavy investment in time, and may be difficult to repeat regularly.  Whatever projects 
are chosen will most likely be the region’s transportation plan for decades to come. 
Single Multi-Jurisdictional Agency Funded by Voluntary Local Money 
Under this funding model, the state creates a single multi-jurisdictional agency, which 
develops infrastructure funded on a voluntary basis by whichever local jurisdictions choose to 
 71  
participate. This arrangement can result in local pockets that never decide to opt into the agency. 
Or local agencies may join, but not pay for services to go into their jurisdiction, also leaving 
service gaps.  This funding type can overcome seemingly intractable political obstacles that arise 
when developing multi-jurisdictional infrastructure.  For example, this method is especially 
useful for crossing state lines, as the St. Louis Bi-State Development Agency has done.  
In the St. Louis case, each jurisdiction decides whether to participate, as well as the rate 
of taxation (MRS §67.700; §70.370; §94). This has meant that local governments in the two 
states have decided to build new capital projects at different times, at different speeds and to 
different levels of expansion, though they are in the same transportation agency.  Furthermore, 
the legal use of sales tax money varies by state.  In Missouri there are variations from county to 
county within the same state and the same agency.  For example, St. Charles County, MO has not 
passed its own sales tax, and no transit services go there, though other counties in the agency 
have paid for services (Bi-State Development Agency, 2014).   
Even when jurisdictions participate, they may not always pay the full amount agreed to.  
During lean budget years, payments into a regional transportation agency may be the first thing 
to go, as experienced by the San Francisco Bay Area’s Caltrain service in 2010 (DeBolt, 
Mountain View Voice, May 28, 2010). As a less hierarchical approach, this strategy requires 
negotiation across jurisdictions to ensure member discipline and participation over time.  On the 
other hand, the existence of a single multi-jurisdictional agency can ensure there is an 
institutionalized forum for coordination, even when there are such strong jurisdictional divisions, 
and cross-jurisdictional variations, that this might be the only way to coordinate.  
Memorandum of Understanding/Interlocal Agreements 
This is not a formal regional strategy but a combination of local agreements to develop 
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coordinated cross-jurisdictional infrastructure. This relationship must be secured with a 
contractual agreement or a memorandum of understanding between two or more jurisdictions.  
Perhaps one of the least institutionalized, least centralized multi-jurisdictional funding strategies, 
participation is entirely voluntary and no state-level involvement is necessary for negotiation.  
However there is also no structure and no guaranteed longevity to the arrangement.  
Consequently, it would be difficult to develop a comprehensive regional plan using this 
approach, especially in a region with many jurisdictions.  It would also be difficult for each 
interlocal agreement to cover more than one problem at a time, limiting the efficacy of this 
approach for large infrastructure development proposals.  This approach can be the germ from 
which future more centralized regional governance takes place (Savitch & Vogel, 2000).  It can 
also offer an avenue for governments to cooperate when they might have had too many cultural 
or institutional differences to contemplate a permanent relationship (Savitch & Vogel, 2000).   
 For example, interlocal agreements in Jacksonville, FL may be morphing into a regional 
transit authority.  The Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA) primarily serves its home 
jurisdiction, Duval County, FL. Its services, funding, and board members are almost entirely 
from Duval County, supported partly by a sales tax there (JTA, 2014).  However JTA offers 
additional services to neighboring Clay, Nassau and St. Johns counties through interlocal 
agreements.  Under the agreements, the other counties pay the cost of the service, though they 
can terminate for any reason with 90 days’ notice (Clay County, 2013).    
 The agency seems to recognize that this is not a stable long-term management 
arrangement, and discussion in its Annual Report and Consolidated Plan identifies the need to 
create a more permanent solution through a regional transportation authority.   However the 
interlocal agreement not only serves as a stopgap measure; it also has the potential to serve as a 
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‘proof of concept’ for developing a permanent regional authority. In fact, this is the same way 
Seattle began its process of developing a regional transit agency.  They also began with interlocal 
agreements, which were later formalized into a regional agency through state legislation (Sound 
Transit, 2007: 2). 
 This model can be especially useful for overcoming some of the most intractable funding 
divisions across jurisdictions, in cases where existing funding and structural differences foreclose 
the possibility of developing an integrated multi-jurisdictional funding source. In the Dallas-Fort 
Worth metro region, for example, neighboring counties have used interlocal agreements to 
overcome different political priorities and different taxation rates across the two counties.   
 The Dallas Area Rapid Transit authority uses a multi-jurisdictional option taxation 
method to fund its system, as does neighboring Tarrant County. Fort Worth was originally left 
out of the Dallas-Fort Worth area’s regional plan in order to maintain local planning control and 
gain support.22  In turn, Fort Worth decided to pursue its own transit plan in Tarrant County 
(TTC §452).  The two counties each went through difficult and time consuming processes to set 
up their multi-jurisdictional option taxes, but ended up with different tax rates, and different 
long-term plans. Nor did they raise taxes at the same time (Fort Worth Transportation Authority, 
2013: 17).  It would have been very difficult to integrate the two, since Tarrant County residents 
would have had to agree to double their transit tax.   
 In response, the two developed an interlocal agreement in 1994, in order to establish the 
Trinity Railway Express commuter service connecting their areas.  While this has allowed the 
introduction of a cross-county service, any future changes to that service, or any additional lines, 
would require a new or revised interlocal agreement (Trinity Railway Express, 2013).   
                                                
22 Texas law permitting multi-city referendums on funding transit infrastructure does not limit them to single county 
usage, but it does encourage this limitation by making a one-county vote the ‘default,’ and requiring a jurisdiction 
from a neighboring county to request to join (TTC §452.704).   
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 This is surely a solution with many limitations for developing comprehensive and 
integrated multi-jurisdictional service.  However it can overcome the jurisdictional barriers that 
would otherwise make cross-jurisdictional infrastructure impossible.   
Informal/Weak Coordination 
One can easily take the interlocal approach to the extreme.  The Informal/Weak 
Coordination regional funding model represents the least centralized, least formalized multi-
jurisdictional funding situation, and is really more the de facto result of poor coordination than a 
strategy.  The Weak Coordination approach can include the case where local jurisdictions within 
a region fail to coordinate at all, and have no agency capable of planning, funding and 
implementing multi-jurisdictional projects.  Sometimes, informal coordination fills the 
leadership vacuum, with both sides taking their cues from the other, but not forming a formal 
partnership. (Crisholm, 1989). In fact some authors (viz. Tiebout, 1956) do not see this situation 
as a bad thing, but rather an incentive for governments to improve their services through 
competition. 
The Informal/Weak Coordination funding type is used frequently for cross-county 
coordination in Southern California, where counties are exceptionally large, and formal 
coordination for cross-county projects is very difficult due to scale.  Several different institutions 
maintain planning at the county level, though many services are needed at the regional level.  For 
example, state transportation funding is distributed by county transportation commissions 
(Adams et al., 2001: 16), local option sales taxes are usually authorized at the county level (the 
metropolitan region covers five counties), and transportation operators usually offer services 
only within a single county.23   
                                                
23 The commuter rail agency, Metrolink, is the exception in Southern California, acting as a single multi-
jurisdictional agency funded by voluntary county-level money. 
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While Southern California has a Metropolitan Planning Organization (known as SCAG, 
or the Southern California Association of Governments) that makes long-range regional 
transportation plans, these are only carried out when county authorities vote to fund particular 
projects that meet county needs, usually limited to small projects.  Collaboration on larger 
infrastructure projects frequently begins when one side initiates, designs and builds its half, and 
the other side later decides to complete it—a ‘follow the leader’ form of governance.  For 
example, when the Orange County Transportation Authority decided to fund additional 
Metrolink commuter rail service, Los Angeles County, CA did not pay to have the new trains 
continue past the county line into Los Angeles, even though Los Angeles Union Station had over 
eight times the boardings of the Orange County, CA station where the line terminated (Fullerton) 
(Metrolink, 2014).  Similar disconnects have occurred with widening freeways, leaving 
bottlenecks at the county line for decades as the neighboring county decides whether or not to 
allocate money towards continuing a project into its territory (Molina, Orange County Register, 
November 4, 2011). While a cross-county project may eventually be finished using this funding 
strategy, the process appears to be slow, which is especially undesirable for capital infrastructure 
development.  
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Table 4.1: Advantages, Disadvantages of Each Strategy 
 Pros Cons 
1) Direct State • Integration across many local 
jurisdictions. 
• Integration with state policy goals. 
 
• May discourage local financial 
contributions. 
• Funding may get reduced due to 
whims of state-level politics. 
• Not conducive for multi-state 
projects. 
2) State-Directed 
Funding for 
Regional Agency 
• State funding with home rule. 
• State money ensures participation by 
local agencies. 
• Regional service integration possible. 
• Agency funds easily caught in 
state-level political fights. 
• Not likely for multi-state 
projects. 
3) Single Regional 
Body 
• Allows for control at regional level. 
• Coordinated regional decisions. 
• Minimizes state political interference. 
• Stable planning process allows region 
to make bold changes. 
• Rarely happens. 
• Threatens existing power held by 
state and local governments. 
• Not likely for multi-state 
projects. 
4) Multi-
Jurisdictional 
Option 
Transportation Tax 
• Can accomplish ambitious, well-
integrated regional projects despite 
jurisdictional divisions. 
• No need to change the existing 
governance structure. 
• Works well when strong jurisdictional 
divisions present, if sufficient citizen 
agreement on regional plan. 
• Difficult, time-consuming 
process that is hard to initiate 
very often. 
• Projects may be locked in for 
decades. 
• Unlikely it could happen at 
multi-state level. 
• May require special legislation. 
5) Single Multi-
Jurisdictional 
Agency, Voluntary 
Local Funding 
• Overcomes intractable local and state 
political barriers. 
• Good for multi-state regions. 
• Long-term structure. 
• Service gaps likely. 
• Jurisdictions dis-incentivized 
from paying their full share. 
6) MOU/Interlocal 
Agreements 
• No state-level involvement needed. 
• Easiest funding coordination strategy 
to arrange. 
• No long-term commitment. 
• Overcomes difficult jurisdictional or 
social/cultural divisions. 
• Can be a ‘proof of concept’ for more 
permanent regional transportation. 
• No guaranteed longevity. 
• Not comprehensive. 
• Hard to arrange in large regions, 
over many jurisdictions. 
7) Informal/Weak 
Coordination 
• Informal relationships ensure local 
autonomy, home rule. 
• Little setup necessary. 
• No political risk. 
• Slow process. 
• Poor coordination in road 
projects, transit schedules or 
fares. 
• Service gaps may persist for 
decades. 
• Especially undesirable for new 
infrastructure development. 
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Categorizing Programs for Case Selection 
Using the above typology, this chapter seeks to determine which programs fit into which 
category, so cases can be selected from within the same category, which will facilitate cross-case 
comparability.  This chapter examines sub-federal transportation funding programs in the 50 
largest U.S. metro areas over 1 million people, targeting the period from 1990 through 2014.  For 
each region, it ascertains the levels of government contributing to transportation funding, now 
and historically. This classification uses programs and facilities funded at local, regional and 
state levels as its scope for examination.  The categories help distinguish the level of autonomy 
for local governments to make decisions, and whether those decisions could be easily 
coordinated from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.   
Other factors used for classification purposes can be found in Table 4.2, and were 
developed iteratively from observing characteristics in the state authorizing legislation and the 
case histories.  These include: the National Transit Database information on level of government 
contributing the greatest funding (not counting fares); whether decisions are made by a board 
selected at the local/regional level, or the state level (data taken from authorizing legislation and 
news articles); whether local governments can opt in/opt out of funding the multi-jurisdictional 
service (taken from authorizing legislation); whether local governments can exit the multi-
jurisdictional funding arrangement at a later date (taken from authorizing legislation); and 
whether or not the funding decisions can be made directly by local citizens through ballot 
initiatives (from authorizing legislation).  Also included are two factors that directly represent the 
degree of political fragmentation: the number of local jurisdictions included (taken from 
authorizing legislation); and whether the boundaries used for the funding district are identical to 
those used for local governments (also taken from authorizing legislation).  This last factor is a 
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technical point, indicating how independent board members are likely to be from local politics, 
and, by extension, how likely they are to serve regional interests over local ones.   
Table 4.2: Features by Multi-Jurisdictional Funding Category* 
*Factors help distinguish differences across cases, but are not rigid criteria. Note that different funding types  
can exist for different transportation programs within a single region.  
         **Permanent board is not a prerequisite of a multi-jurisdictional option tax measure. 
Classification of Cases 
Factors for measurement are designed to distinguish the degree to which upper levels of 
government devolve decision making to local governments. Some regions, especially very large 
ones like Los Angeles, Atlanta and New York have more than one type of regional transportation 
Funding Type Government 
Level of 
Largest 
Funding 
Source  
Local/ 
Regional, or 
State-Level 
Selection of 
Board 
Members 
Opt-In Local 
Juris-
dictions 
May Exit 
Proposal 
Placed on 
Ballot 
No. of 
Juris-
dictions 
Board Member  
   Districts Same 
as Local 
Jurisdictions 
1) Direct State 
Funding 
State State No No No 1 No 
2) State-
Directed 
Funding for 
Regional 
Agency 
State and/or 
Region 
Local/Regional No No No 1 No 
3) Single 
Regional 
Body  
(elected or 
appointed) 
Regional 
Agency or 
Electorate 
Not Specified No No No 1 No 
4) Multi-
Jurisdictional 
Option 
Transport-
ation Taxes 
Regional 
Electorate 
Local/Regional No No Yes 3+ N/A** 
5) Single 
Regional 
Agency 
Funded by 
Voluntary 
Local Money 
Local Local/Regional Yes Yes No 2+ Yes 
6) MOUs/ 
Interlocal 
Agreements 
Local Local/Regional Yes Yes No 2+ Yes 
7) Informal/ 
Weak 
Coordination 
Local or State Local/Regional Yes Yes No 2+ Yes 
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funding within the same region at the same time. Some regions have used different strategies at 
different points in time. Making definitive classifications of entire regions would be a futile 
exercise.  However it is possible to classify particular policy programs within each region. At 
least one program in each of the 50 largest regions (using the 2000 regional census unit discussed 
earlier)24 was examined to ensure geographic diversity.  In some regions two strategy types were 
present in the same region, and are listed separately (Table 4.3), making the number of case 
samples 59. Informal funding relationships may exist that were not detectable through publicly 
available laws and reports.  This data was used only for case selection purposes, but a deeper 
analysis across cases would require surveys and interviews to fully understand the cross-agency 
relationships not represented in laws and public documents. 
Multi-jurisdictional funding programs were catalogued.  This was done using agency 
websites, newspaper articles, reports, state legal codes and other publically available documents.  
A summary of the final classification is presented in Table 4.3. Note that this study did not select 
cases based on transportation mode, and half the regions selected include road and transit 
projects.  However few MOTTs in Table 4.3 reflect exclusively road measures, due to state 
administration of highway improvements, and the fact that these were urban regions, with most 
having at least some transit in their project selections. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 Since these numbers are for case selection purposes only, this study uses Combined Statistical Area (CSA) 
numbers in most cases.  This minimizes the exclusion of regions divided by census statistical boundaries.  However 
for CSAs which encompass separate metro regions with separate transit systems, or encompass areas unreasonably 
far beyond the urbanized region (or simply didn’t have a CSA for their area) this study uses MSA numbers instead 
(e.g. Washington-Baltimore CSA encompasses two quite independent metro regions). 
  80 
Figure 4.1: Cases Represented 
 
Table 4.3: Multi-Jurisdictional Transportation Funding Strategies  
Observed Across 50 U.S. Regions 
 
Funding Type Cases of Use 
1) Direct State Funding 
 
Baltimore: Maryland DOT; Boston MBTA; Hartford: Connecticut Transit; 
Minneapolis: Metro Transit; Milwaukee: MCTS; Washington, D.C. metro 
region: State of Virginia 
2) State-directed Funding for 
Regional Agency  
 
Atlanta: GRTA; Albany: Capital District Transit Authority; Buffalo-
Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY; Chicago: RTA; Miami- West Palm Beach: 
Tri-Rail; Minneapolis: CTIB commuter rail; New York: MTA; Philadelphia: 
SEPTA; Pittsburgh: Port Authority of Allegheny County; Rochester-Batavia-
Seneca Falls, NY 
3) Single Regional Body 
(Elected or Appointed) 
Denver: RTD; Las Vegas: RTC; Portland, OR & Vancouver, WA: TriMet; 
San Diego: MTS 
4) Multi-jurisdictional Option 
Transportation Tax* 
 
Atlanta (Road & Transit); Austin (Transit); Columbus (Transit); Dallas-Fort 
Worth (Transit); Houston (Road & Transit); Seattle (RTA & RTID); San 
Antonio (Transit); San Francisco Bay Area (Road & Transit); N. Virginia 
(Road & Transit)/Virginia Beach & Hampton Roads (Road) 
5) Single Regional Agency; 
Voluntary Local Money  
 
Charlotte: CATS; Greensboro: PART; Indianapolis: IndyGo; Kansas City: 
Kansas City Area Transit Authority; Los Angeles: Metrolink; Memphis: 
MATA; Miami-West Palm Beach: Tri-Rail; Nashville: Regional 
Transportation Authority of Middle Tennessee; New Orleans: NORTA; Port 
Authority of New York & New Jersey; Orlando: LYNX; Phoenix-Mesa: 
Valley Metro; Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill: Triangle Transit Authority; 
Sacramento: RT; Salt Lake City-Provo: Utah Transit Authority; St. Louis: Bi-
State Development Agency; Tampa-St. Petersburg: TBARTA 
6) MOUs or Interlocal 
Agreements 
Cleveland: RTA; Dallas-Fort Worth: Trinity Railway Express; Jacksonville: 
JTA; Central Oklahoma Transportation and Parking Authority/COTPA 
7) Informal/Weak Coordination 
 
Atlanta: CCT/Gwinnett County Transit/MARTA; Birmingham: BATA; 
Cincinnati: Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority; Detroit/Southeast 
Michigan: DDOT/SMART/AAATA; Milwaukee: MCTS; Grand Rapids: 
Interurban Transit Partnership; Louisville: Transit Authority of River City; 
Southern California: MTA/OCTA/Foothill Transit/Omnitrans; San Francisco 
Bay Area: SFMuni/AC Transit/VTA/Samtrans/CCTA/GTA/BARTA 
See References section for citations. 
 
*Since MOTT measures include projects for multiple agencies, this table  
identifies the type of projects included (road or transit), rather than the agency. 
6	 10	 4	 9	
17	
3	 9	0	5	
10	15	
20	
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Selecting Regions for Study 
To ensure comparability, it is important for the regions selected for this dissertation to 
have used similar multi-jurisdictional funding types.  Using the criteria listed in Table 4.2 to 
define the types, case data was compiled from Table 4.3. 
All the regions identified as having used a multi-jurisdictional option transportation tax to 
fund transportation have conducted multi-jurisdictional elections across three or more 
jurisdictions.  For most regions, this meant three counties, but under Texas law that meant three 
cities, and in Virginia, that meant three cities or counties. For example, the Texas MOTT regions 
identified in Table 4.4 cover only one county, but still provide a multi-jurisdictional option 
transportation tax (MOTT) election across all those local jurisdictions. From the top 50 
metropolitan areas, the following regions were identified as having used a MOTT to fund 
transportation projects since 1990: 1) Atlanta, GA; 2) Austin, TX; 3) Columbus, OH; 4) Detroit 
Metro Area, MI; 5) Houston, TX; 6) San Antonio, TX; 7) San Francisco Bay Area, CA; 8) 
Seattle, WA; 9) Virginia Beach/Newport News, VA; 10) Northern Virginia/Washington, D.C. 
Notably, there were no bi-state cases of MOTTs, and all bi-state multi-jurisdictional 
funding agreements fell into the “Regional Agency, Voluntary Local Money” and the 
“Informal/Weak Coordination” categories.     
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Table 4.4: Regions That Have Attempted Multi-Jurisdiction  
Transportation Tax Elections*  
Region Election 
(Outcome) 
Jurisdictions Size (Year) 
Atlanta, GA 2012 (Failed) 13 counties $7.2 billion (2012) 
Austin, TX 1985 (Passed) 
2000 (Failed) 
2004 (Passed) 
10 jurisdictions 
(mostly cities) 
$210.4 million 
(2015)** 
Columbus, OH 1988 (Failed) 
1989 (Passed) 
1995 (Failed) 
1999 (Passed) 
2006 (Passed) 
2016 (In Progress) 
1 county, 11 
cities 
$118.6 million 
(2014)***  
 
Dallas, TX 1980 (Failed) 
1983 (Passed) 
21 cities $519 million (2015) ** 
Denver, CO 1997 (Failed) 
2004 (Passed) 
8 counties $5.89 billion (1997) 
$6.34 billion (2004) 
Detroit Metro, MI 2016 (In Progress) 4 counties $4.6 billion 
Houston, TX 1983 (Failed) 
1988 (Passed) 
2003 (Passed) 
15 jurisdictions $715.2 million 
(2015)** 
Northern VA, 
Hampton Roads  
2002 (Failed) 4 counties, 5 
cities 
$5 billion (2002) 
San Antonio, TX 1977 (Passed) 
2004 (Passed) 
13 jurisdictions $197.6 million 
(2015)** 
Seattle, WA 1995 (Failed) 
1996 (Passed) 
2007 (Failed) 
2008 (Passed) 
2016 (In Progress) 
3 counties $6.7 billion (1995) 
$3.9 billion (1996) 
$30.8 billion (2007) 
$7 billion (2008) 
$53.8 billion (2016) 
Bay Area, CA 1988 (Passed) 
2004 (Passed) 
7 counties $2.3 billion (1988) 
$3.1 billion (2004) 
                           *Regions listed here since 1970s, but cases are limited to those from 1990-present. 
                           **Ongoing Annual Intake for Texas cases (No sunset date on collection). 
                           ***Annual Intake for combination of permanent levy, approved in 1999, 
                                 and temporary ten year levy, approved in 2006. 
 
N.B. Some regions required a single vote across multiple counties, others across cities, 
depending on which unit of governance makes local transportation decisions in the state. 
 
Inclusion of Both Fees and Taxes 
It is important to define more precisely what kinds of funding measures should be 
included in the definition of MOTTs for this study.  This dissertation is agnostic as to whether 
projects are funded through a fee or a tax.  The Bay Area case, in particular, raises bridge tolls, 
and thus differs from the strict definition of local option taxes, since tolls are not taxes, but fees.  
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However this study argues that a proposal’s use of a tax or a fee is less relevant than the multi-
jurisdictional context.  This is primarily due to the fact that the research question here focuses on 
the process more than the particular funding instrument.   
 MOTTs should be viewed as closely related to local option transportation taxes, which are 
already well studied.  Goldman et al. (2001a: 4-5; b), which is probably the most extensive 
compendium of local option tax measures to date, excludes non-tax revenue sources from its 
definition, while including fees in the list of observed local funding sources. Their definition is: 
“A tax that varies within a state, with revenues controlled at the local or regional level, and 
earmarked for transportation-related purposes” (Goldman et al., 2001a: 5).  Their focus is on 
voter-approved local option taxes. The tolls studied here are also confined to a defined part of the 
state, revenues are controlled at the local level (decided on through the Toll Bridge Advisory 
process and administered by the regional agency BATA), and their purpose is tied to 
transportation use. The toll increase is decided through a tax election that is not held statewide, 
but regionally. The main differences are in the percentage of votes needed for passage under 
California law, and the requirement that the money be spent on projects that relieve traffic on the 
bridges, since money usage had to be tied to the source of funds. (See Chapter 5 for more on 
this).   
 These are important differences, but the question is whether local option taxes and fees 
should be seen in separate categories, and when looking across states, there are analogous legal 
distinctions between LOTTs between California, which require a two-thirds majority, and 
Florida, where they only need 51%; or the use of sales taxes in Colorado and property taxes in 
Michigan (Goldman et al., 2001b).  These are important legal differences between funding 
instruments that may affect the choice of projects, or the proposal’s ability to win political 
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support.  This study argues that the difference between a fee and a tax should fall into this 
category.  
 Indeed, the percentage vote needed to approve a fee in California has increased even since 
the 2004 process was conducted, posing the question whether these categories should change 
based on vote requirements. Furthermore, to the politician making the decision, the difference 
between a tax and a fee is instrumental, based on the legal and political advantages and 
disadvantages of each, rather than the way the nuances of the decision process per se.  Both taxes 
and fees are funding instruments, and the rules that govern them are more important than their 
categorical classifications.  Therefore, the inclusion of fees appears unlikely to be a significant 
confounding variable.  Consequently both fee and tax measures were included in this study if 
they were decided at the sub-state level, and the money is required to come back to the local 
level to fund local projects. 
Drawing the Line Between MOTT and Single Regional Body 
A few further refinements were made to typology of funding categories developed in 
Table 4.2 for the purposes of case selection.  While the distinction between a Single Regional 
Body and a Multi-Jurisdictional Option Tax is important and has been discussed earlier, it is a 
very fine line.  Las Vegas has been described as having a regional tax election in the literature 
(Sciara and Wachs 2007), and might be considered a MOTT in this study, if it had three counties.  
The same could be said for San Diego.  Denver has directly elected board members on the 
Regional Transit District (RTD) board, not bound to city jurisdictional lines.  However through 
preliminary interviews the author discovered that, in practice, city mayors and council members 
in the Denver region often had a significant role, alongside RTD board members, in developing 
each plan and deciding to present it to voters. 
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For the purposes of answering this study’s research questions, it appeared more helpful to 
consider these two categories together.  Therefore, this study includes regions that have a Single 
Regional Body, but use an optional taxation model.  However this study remained limited to 
regions that have at least three jurisdictions, to ensure complexity exceeding the capacity of an 
interlocal agreement to resolve.  
This allowed consideration of multi-jurisdictional cases where a single agency has an 
exceptional amount of autonomy to conduct a MOTT election.  This classification was useful 
because it could clarify differences between cases that had a great amount of autonomy and those 
with very little, thus adding Denver as a potential case.  (Las Vegas and San Diego were not 
included since their transportation planning jurisdiction encompasses the entire county, and 
Portland has not conducted a tax election).  Including Denver could make the role of the agency 
in the process more clear.  On the other hand, it is important to note the distinction of the agency 
role when comparing processes, and avoid equating the situations faced by regions without an 
integrated, elected regional agency along with those with it.  Many aspects of the processes will 
be comparable, but not all.  
Additional Selection Decisions 
For practical reasons, this study also confines itself to cases that occurred in 1990 or later, 
and to focus on more recent cases, when possible, since a key source was the interviews.  This 
was designed to ensure interviewees would remember the circumstances better, and improve 
chances of finding archives. 
 The Texas cases were excluded from this study because of the significant number of 
differences between them and the rest of the potential case list.  In preliminary studies of the 50 
largest metro regions, the Texas cases raised challenges for both analysis and comparison to the 
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other cases. First, in all four cases, the first multi-jurisdictional election occurred more than 30 
years before the study began (Austin 1985, Dallas 1980, Houston 1983, San Antonio 1977).  The 
Texas cases were also significantly more reliant on local decision making than the others, since 
they were the only cases where the local government unit was the city level.  Furthermore, cities 
under Texas law can decide to leave with each new election cycle (TTC §606). If jurisdictions 
are continually opting in and opting out, the effectiveness of state-granted autonomy can be 
eroded from below. This dynamic would have added two important confounding variables to this 
study, and the Texas cases were not easily compared to the others. 
A similar situation was present in the Columbus case, where most of the population was 
located in the central county, but outlying cities could participate in the levy if their voters 
supported the measure.  However the lack of an aggregate majority provision meant it was 
possible for some jurisdictions to vote against participating (ORC §306.49(C).  This local 
autonomy was not as extreme as the Texas cases, but could be a similar confounding variable. 
The Detroit/Southeast Michigan case had not progressed far enough at the time of this 
analysis to include, though the author was a direct participant in it, and it is likely to be useful for 
comparison in later research.25   
A final consideration in case selections was this study’s intention to examine how the 
authorizing legislation works in action, rather than only in theory. Therefore, cases were limited 
to those that have attempted to conduct a multi-jurisdictional process, rather than ones that have 
simply proposed it, or those that received state authorization, but never used the statute. For 
example Oklahoma City and several neighboring counties can hold an election, but have not 
done so (OS, §1370.7).  
                                                
25 Namely, the project selection process had not yet begun, and no key decisions had been made until the summer of 
2016, well after data collection was completed.  This would make it difficult to assess how the level of pre-
authorized local/regional autonomy affected the decision process. 
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The Bay Area, Atlanta, Seattle, and Denver included cases having varying levels of prior 
legislative authorization, as well as permissiveness (Table 4.5). The San Francisco Bay Area and 
Atlanta cases had no pre-authorization before the process began.  Seattle and Denver had varying 
degrees of pre-authorization over time, with possibilities for comparison within the same region. 
For example Denver began with no pre-authorization but highly permissive special authorization, 
prior to its first attempt at an MOTT; however the legislature offered a pre-authorization 
(including a blanket authorization as well) at a later point, prior to the beginning of a second 
process. As a key variable in the study, different types of authorizations provided the basis for 
interesting comparisons both within a single case, and across cases.  
Table 4.5: Pre-Authorization & Permissiveness in Cases Studied 
 
 
 
These cases are spread across several geographical regions—West, Middle, and 
Southeast.  Should the Detroit case be possible to add to the study later, there would be a 
Midwestern case.  There is not a Northeastern case, which is not surprising, since Local Option 
Transportation Taxes are not a popular way to fund transportation in this region.  Voter 
referendums are much more popular in the Western United States, though they are also used in 
the Midwest and South (Goldman, et al., 2001a,b).   
The four regions this study examines also represent a diversity of outcomes.  The Seattle 
case had four measures over 20 years, with some passing and some failing, and the potential for 
comparisons within the same region.  Denver and the Bay Area both had successful measures, 
while Atlanta was a well publicized failure at the polls.  
   No Pre-Authorization Pre-Authorization 
High Permissiveness Denver (1997 proposal) 
Seattle (2007) 
Denver (2004 proposal) 
Seattle (1995, 1996, 2008) 
 
Low Permissiveness Atlanta (2012) Bay Area (2004) 
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This is not a study of election outcomes or campaign strategies, though the electoral 
result is important to the extent that a process that failed at the polls may have had important 
differences throughout the legislative and project selection processes.  Therefore it was deemed 
important to ensure that this study included both cases that passed and cases that failed at the 
polls.  In fact, Denver and Seattle both include failed and successful election results within the 
same region. 
Also note that boundary-spanners (Table 4.6) in each case were either the one who 
initiated the process, or the one who led the process most prominently, and for the majority of 
processes, boundary-spanners were the one most interviewees remembered having playing an 
especially strong role. While reading the cases, please refer to Table 4.6 for the primary 
boundary-spanning agents. 
Table 4.6 Boundary-Spanning Agents Across Cases Studied 
 Bay Area, 
2004 
Atlanta, 
2012 
Seattle, 
1995 
Seattle, 
2007 
Seattle, 
2008 
Denver, 
1997 
Denver, Post 
2003 
Boundary-
Spanner 
State Senator 
Perata 
Metro Atlanta 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
RTA Board 
Chair Laing 
RTA Board 
Chair/ Pierce 
County 
Executive 
Ladenburg 
RTA Board 
Chair/ Seattle 
Mayor 
Nickels 
RTD General 
Manager 
Marsella 
RTD General 
Manager 
Marsella 
 
Now, with multi-jurisdictional option transportation taxes placed into a context of other 
multi-jurisdictional funding types, and the cases selected, the following four chapters will 
analyze the decision process in each case.  This will begin with the Bay Area and Atlanta, as 
examples of what can happen in a case where there is no state authorization at all, prior to the 
process beginning. This is followed by the Seattle and Denver cases, which had varying degrees 
of pre-authorization, blanket authorization and permissiveness of that legislation over time.  
These case studies will set the stage for the final chapters, which will compare the four processes 
to each other.  
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Chapter 5: San Francisco Bay Area Case Analysis 
 
Chapter 5 Summary: 
This chapter examines a seven-county bridge toll increase proposal that took place in a region 
that was pre-authorized to conduct a multi-jurisdictional measure, but where the authorization 
was so prescriptive that it was incompatible with local political imperatives, and infeasible to use.  
Consequently, a new authorization was needed.  This case finds that the area’s dependence on a 
boundary-spanner to initiate the process and achieve legislative approval for it made local 
politicians quite dependent on this figure, in order to initiate a regional transportation proposal.  
This situation made it unlikely for such a process to be repeated in the future, and provided 
opportunities for the boundary-spanner to add pet projects into the proposal as his ‘price’ for 
championing the passage of legislation to authorize the process. 
Introduction 
Multi-county funding measures are hardly a regular occurrence in the San Francisco Bay 
Area, but when they have happened, it has usually been through specially authorized legislation. 
For example, in 1962, voters in three counties approved the Bay Area Rapid Transit system in a 
bond measure using a special authorization (Goldfarb, 1982; Zwerling, 1974).  Similarly, in 1988 
voters approved an increase on bridge tolls targeted at bridge and transportation improvements.  
Both of these used special authorizations.  This pattern had the potential to change with 
legislative approval in 1997 of a nine county blanket authorization measure permitting the 
region’s Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) to place a ten cent fuel tax proposal on the 
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ballot (California Assembly Bill 595, 1997; California Revenue and Taxation Code §8502).   
However the requirements for passage proved politically infeasible, and MTC has still not 
proposed a tax using this measure.  Challenges posed by AB 595’s process included its use of a 
fuel tax, which is rarely a popular funding instrument (see Chapter 1), 26 as well as a requirement 
for each county’s Board of Supervisors to approve placement of a proposal on the ballot (a 
cumbersome process), and a two-thirds majority requirement for passage at the ballot box.  The 
last time the area’s MPO, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), conducted a poll 
on the subject, support was registering just 42% (Cabanatuan, San Francisco Chronicle, April 
12, 2012). Due to the limitations of the fuel tax authorized by AB 595, another special 
authorization was needed in order to propose a multi-jurisdictional option transportation funding 
measure in the early 2000s.   
This chapter will demonstrate that the absence of sufficient pre-authorization/blanket 
authorization necessitated the involvement of a boundary-spanner with strong legislative 
connections to champion such a proposal.  While the absence of legal controls over the process 
gave the boundary-spanner plenty of flexibility to make the proposal successful, this also made it 
harder to put together, slower to occur, and subject to the unique policy goals of the boundary-
spanner (whether or not other participants agreed with them).  The boundary-spanner’s immense 
influence over the process was mainly because multi-jurisdictional processes of this kind happen 
so rarely in the region and are not typically used to resolve regional transportation needs, due to 
the lack of permissive pre-authorized/blanket authorized legislation. 
This is not for lack of need.  Crisholm (1989) discusses strategies used in the Bay Area 
over many years in order to cope with a fragmented transportation governance environment, 
                                                
26 Fuel taxes target only a single item of sale, making their tax base far narrower than a sales tax. As a result, fuel 
taxes require a higher tax rate to provide the same level of revenue as a sales tax, and appear more ‘expensive’ to 
voters.  
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using longstanding personal relationships and inter-agency discussions, both formal and 
informal.  Much of this was facilitated by the MTC.  However he focuses on management issues, 
and the efficacy of these interagency relationships has been limited when attempting to solve 
larger inter-jurisdictional challenges that required programmatic changes or multi-jurisdictional 
funding.  This chapter looks at a measure that appeared on the 2004 ballot in seven Bay Area 
counties to raise bridge tolls by $1 on most Bay Area bridges.  This went well beyond 
interagency management issues, with the aim being to change the status quo in the region and 
improve cross-jurisdictional transportation.  
The Bay Area is tied together economically, but it is politically polycentric and 
fragmented, with nine counties and 26 transit operators.  This has created substantial strains on 
the existing agency structure, which is composed of county-based transit agencies, and 
transportation planning by county-focused Congestion Management Agencies (CMAs).  This 
planning regime means transportation solutions are designed to manage county transportation 
problems first, while regional MPOs simply amalgamate the results and ensure that 
inconsistencies across county lines are not significant enough to be problematic (California 
Government Code, §65088-65089.10). The decision making context has changed over time, 
however, as state and federal fuel tax monies have failed to grow with increasing needs (Figures 
2.1, 2.2, 2.3). This has been exacerbated in California since voters in 1978 required limited 
property tax collections, in a measure known as Proposition 13 (Green, 2006).  This induced the 
California Legislature to authorize county-level LOTTs in 1987, in lieu of increasing the 
statewide motor fuel tax (Green, 2006).  As with many other states, California has allowed 
counties to do this without the need for a special authorizing legislation for each election. But, as 
this case illustrates, a similar process has not become common practice at the regional level.  
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Case Outline 
The program examined here developed over five phases: 1) preparation and set up, 2) 
open discussion among transportation agencies and stakeholders over what projects to include, 3) 
the legislative process, 4) the campaign for voter approval, and 5) implementation.  This chapter 
examines the first three.   
Through all phases examined here, and the election as well, the boundary-spanner played 
an indispensible role in putting the process together.  As the history below illustrates, the election 
simply never would have occurred without him.  The history will show how this measure 
evolved in an ad hoc manner, to fulfill a policy need.  Since a boundary-spanner led the effort, it 
was much easier to overcome the divide between differing political imperatives at the local and 
state levels of government.  This history will show how the boundary-spanner planned the effort 
and had the final say in most key project decisions at the local level, before other state legislators 
got heavily involved.  Thus, the plan presented to the legislature was already one acceptable to 
both local politicians and advocacy groups who helped the boundary-spanner develop the 
proposal at the local/regional level.   
The Process of Developing Regional Measure 2: Setting It Up 
Discussion about holding a regional vote to increase bridge tolls began in 1999, during 
the Bay Area’s ‘Dot.Com’ economic bubble and a time when traffic was becoming a major issue 
in the region (Goulder, San Francisco Chronicle, January 22, 1999; Rapport, interview, August 
22, 2014).   
Largely because of the limitations from MTC’s fuel tax authorization, and the lack of 
other avenues for conducting a regional transportation vote, RM2 was spearheaded not by a 
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regional agency, but by a politician, State Senator Don Perata (D-Oakland), working in close 
collaboration with his senior staffer Ezra Rapport. 
According to Mr. Rapport, he suggested the idea to Senator Perata.  Rapport was 
unemployed at the time, but he had worked with Perata on previous projects before. Rapport says 
he had grown dismayed by the process for distributing funding through MTC. This is because he 
believed MTC had been favoring projects that benefitted each county, rather than the region. As 
Rapport said, MTC couldn’t develop a regional funding process because “it would have been 
very difficult for [the MTC board members from each county] to divide up the money among 
their own people...  They allocate a lot of money to a lot of different agencies, and they need to 
be seen as fairly neutral and providing those funds.”  By contrast, Rapport and Perata “were 
involved in planning, and …wanted to allocate those funds in accordance with the criteria we 
had for planning, which is not neutral” (Rapport, E., interview, September 17, 2010).  In 
Rapport’s eyes, the status quo created a systemic disadvantage for funding and planning cross-
county projects that improved the regional network (Rapport, E., interview, August 22, 2014).   
Figure 5.1: Timeline of Bay Area Events 
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Figure 5.2: The Final RM2 Proposal: A Focus on Cross-County Transportation 
 
Regional Traffic Relief Plan, Metropolitan Transportation Commission, 2003 
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Part of the difficulty stemmed from the region’s funding and management arrangement, 
with a different transit agency for almost every county (though several counties share agencies), 
separate Congestion Management Agencies, and separate local option sales tax measures for 
every county except Solano.  For each county representative on the MTC board, it was difficult 
to think about regional planning, and county transit agencies, in Rapport’s view, were another set 
of local constituents. Rapport believed MTC couldn’t develop a truly rational regional funding 
process because it had to divide the money according to the governments with seats on its board. 
MTC would amalgamate local option tax plans from each county into its Regional 
Transportation Plan, rather than develop a plan intended to solve regional issues (Rapport, E., 
interview, September 17, 2010; Goldman, 2003: 181-183).  Rapport says he was seeking to 
improve “system-level” services that crossed county borders (Rapport, 2010). As will be 
discussed later, not all the participants believed Rapport’s claim that he was devoted to these 
lofty goals (San Francisco Muni Staff Member, 2011; McCleary 2011; BART Staff Member, 
2011).   
At the time Rapport pitched the idea to Senator Perata, the legislator had been running 
into problems gaining support for a separate regional ferry proposal, which he was advocating in 
conjunction with the area’s chamber of commerce (known as the Bay Area Council), as well as 
land development interests in his district (Fimrite, San Francisco Chronicle, July 8, 2000; 
Cunningham, M., interview, August 20, 2014).  According to the San Francisco Chronicle, 
ferries were one such system-level transportation concept that lacked county and MTC support, 
since they would compete for money with the county-level transportation agencies (Fimrite, 
2000). (Express buses and BART were other prominent examples of regional transportation 
concepts).  Ferries performed especially poorly on a cost per mile basis.  Yet supporters argued 
  96 
water transit could increase long distance connectivity and provide system resilience in case of 
an earthquake. While both were desirable goals, they required a change in the region’s funding 
system.  As one political strategist noted, “None of the interests wanted a new transit agency, 
even if that new agency brought money, because ultimately, they viewed it… behind the scenes 
as a threat to funding” (Whitehurst, J., interview, February 9, 2010). Thus Rapport’s RM2 
concept appears to have made sense to Perata due to his own frustration advocating for ferries 
(Rapport, E., interview, August 22, 2014; Cunningham, M., interview, August 20, 2014; Fimrite, 
2000).  
Additionally, Rapport recounts that Senator Perata had concerns about how well the 
MTC decision process was representing diverse stakeholder groups, especially environmentalists 
and transit advocates (Rapport, E., interview, September 17, 2010).  
Strategizing & Assembling a Regional Decision Process 
Unlike a previously authorized measure, RM2 required a great deal of initiative and 
ingenuity on the part of its proponents.  Rapport recounts that at the very beginning Perata 
mapped out what it would take for such a measure to pass, and developed a multi-part strategy:  
It would be a process over the course of several years, starting with Mr. Rapport’s role as the 
Principal Consultant for the Senate Select Committee on Bay Area Transportation, of which 
Senator Perata was Chair.  Environmental groups had been instrumental in defeating an Alameda 
County LOTT measure in 1998 (Pimentel, San Francisco Chronicle, August 14, 2000).  Perata 
told Rapport early on that they needed to have the support of environmentalists, business and 
labor in order to pass through the legislature and at the polls (Rapport, E., interview, August 22, 
2014).  They would begin with “good government bills”—legislation aimed at better 
coordination across agencies and stronger performance criteria, but no new funding measures.   
 97  
According to the legislative record from this time, Perata introduced several good 
government bills.  For example, the committee analyses for SB 1995 of 2000 say it originated 
through hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Bay Area Transportation; and a newspaper 
article mentions both SB 1995 and SB 2017 (2000 legislative session) as products of the Select 
Committee (Vorderbrueggen, Contra Costa County Times, April 18, 2000).  Perata held hearings 
of the Senate Select Committee in late 1999; Senate select committees are not permanent 
standing committees, and there were no official records were available. However according to 
several newspaper accounts and the MTC newsletter, the committee met several times in 
Oakland over the legislature’s 1999-2000 winter recess (MTC, 2000).  They discussed 
“pragmatic” solutions to congestion, including infrastructure projects, consolidation of the 
region’s transit agencies, enforcement of smart growth zoning, and performance standards for 
MTC based on entire corridors rather than individual counties (Cabanatuan, San Francisco 
Chronicle, December 10, 1999).  These actions refrained from moving too fast, while also 
gaining the people’s trust in what the committee was doing before proposing a large increase in 
fees or taxes. 
Based on newspaper accounts, it appears RM2 became official in February of 2002, when 
Perata first announced that his consultants had conducted polling, and it looked like a bridge toll 
could pass (Gonzales, San Jose Mercury News, February 20, 2002). According to Rapport, this 
exploratory polling was designed to prove to transportation agencies and others that the proposal 
could succeed (Rapport, E., interview, August 22, 2014).  According to pollster Alex Evans, 
contrary to what many politicians believed at the time, 79% of respondents thought tolls would 
increase on Bay Area bridges within the next three years (EMC Research, 2001).  As Evans 
recalls, “We had to show elected officials that supporting a toll increase was not the equivalent to 
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touching the third rail of politics.  Which has been a strong belief in the Bay Area—that you 
couldn’t support toll increases, and expect to get reelected”  (Evans, A.; Linney, D.; Capitolo, 
M., Group Interview, February 10, 2011).  Using the polls, Perata built on a perception of voter 
support in April of 2002, proposing specific bills at a Senate Select Committee hearing in 
Oakland. To observers, this might have appeared to be a response to the findings of the 
December hearings  (Vorderbrueggen, Contra Costa County Times, April 18, 2000).  However 
based on Rapport’s interview, the hearings had been designed to justify the bills, and the bills 
were designed to lay the groundwork for RM2 (Rapport 2014).  It appears this worked.  Several 
newspapers reported on his proposals, and one editorialized: “State Sen. Don Perata’s push for 
regional planning in solving the Bay Area’s transportation problems is both ambitious and 
welcome” (Contra Costa Times, Editorial, 2000).   
 The polls helped in another way as well—with the selection of which counties to include 
in the measure.  Rapport claims the counties were chosen through a rational and criteria-driven 
process (Rapport, E., interview August 22, 2014). However Alex Evans of EMC polling, who 
conducted the poll for Perata, said they wanted to know “who should be in, who should be out?”  
(Evans, A. Linney, D.; Capitolo, M., Group Interview, February 10, 2011). His recollection is 
corroborated by the fact that polling data, collected in November 2001, was broken down by 
county, providing information about which counties were most supportive.    
Unlike a LOTT measure with pre-existing/blanket authorization, Perata and Rapport 
could choose which counties to include when they wrote the legislation, and polling helped 
indicate some important things to consider. Evans said that Santa Clara County, home to Silicon 
Valley south of San Francisco, had only one bridge on its very edge, and few bridge users, but 
about one quarter of Bay Area voters.  If Santa Clara County voters had appeared unlikely to 
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support RM2, then there would have been no reason to include them in it.  However, because 
they used few bridges, the toll increase was more like a free ride than an undue burden; the polls 
there looked favorable, so it was advantageous to include them (Evans, A.; Linney, D., Capitolo, 
M., Group Interview, February 10, 2011). 
Choosing the Funding Instrument 
There were several notable legal distinctions between raising a fee and raising a tax, 
which influenced Perata’s decision to propose raising bridge tolls rather than regional taxes, and 
influenced the subsequent project selection process in several ways. The toll was more desirable 
because the vote threshold was significantly lower than for a tax.  Proposals to increase fees 
required a majority vote, while tax measures needed to obtain a two-thirds supermajority at the 
time (this changed in 2010, under California Proposition 26, which required a two-thirds 
majority for most fees as well).  It was important for Perata to achieve a legal opinion from 
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer stating that the proposal classified as a fee in order to 
reduce the vote that would be necessary for it to pass when it eventually went to the voters.  
 Additionally, a toll measure was desirable because a precedent had already been set for 
raising a regional fee in the much smaller Regional Measure 1 in 1988 (California SB 45, 1988), 
and when gaining legislative support, this acted as a “proof of concept” which made it more 
acceptable to propose (Senate Pro Tem. Legislative Staff Member, interview September 15, 
2010; Toll Bridge Advisory Committee, minutes, June 21, 2002).  There was already a regional 
agency (the Bay Area Toll Authority) in existence to manage the bridges and administer the toll.  
Finally, bridges may have commanded an important symbolic connection between otherwise 
disconnected parts of the region. Poll results indicated voter support was greater when bridges 
were the basis for the measure, rather than ferries or buses, and political consultants would later 
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make sure to use bridge traffic as the setting for their campaign advertisements (Whitehurst, J., 
interview, February 9, 2011). 
The choice to make this a bridge toll measure meant projects had to adhere to a “nexus” 
requirement that fees be used in a way that benefits users of the facilities tolled. This mainly 
served to focus discussion on projects that crossed county lines, but also made it harder to obtain 
funding for counties with a low number of bridge commuters like San Francisco and Santa 
Clara/the Silicon Valley area (Toll Bridge Advisory Committee, minutes, October 18, 2002). 
This meant that projects like the Caldecott Tunnel and projects in San Francisco, which could not 
be easily linked to bridge congestion, had a much tougher argument to make; at times, it would 
become necessary to relax these standards in ways that allowed for political agreement across 
geographic boundaries.  
Gaining Legitimacy for the Project Selection Process 
 Following this initial preparation, the key parameters for the process were laid out at the 
pivotal hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Bay Area Transportation on June 21, 2002. 
(The Toll Bridge Advisory Committee, minutes, June 21, 2002). The meeting was led by Senator 
Perata and attended by Senators Torlakson and Spier.  The Select Committee heard Rapport’s 
vision for a ballot measure to increase bridge tolls by $1, in seven Bay Area counties (excluding 
Napa and Sonoma, which were not polling well).  Rapport proposed that transportation projects 
to be funded would be decided by a committee that summer.  It is notable that this meeting 
legitimized the process, but granted a significant amount of leeway for the participants to 
develop project proposals. This is evident in the four principles to which the committee was to 
adhere when selecting projects: 1) focus on new regional transit projects rather than roads or 
local projects, 2) nexus between the people served by the project and the bridge users paying for 
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it, 3) a 50/50 split between capital and operating funds, and 4) projects would be chosen based on 
specified performance measures.  The Committee asked Rapport how he would ensure 
inclusivity in the decision process, to which he replied that he intended to include major 
transportation agencies in the region and ensure they were notified. (However it is notable that he 
did not mention a process for publicizing the meetings).  Following his testimony, the Select 
Committee approved his proposed guidelines and project selection principles.   
Finally they created a Toll Bridge Advisory Committee, which Rapport would lead.  This 
committee was tasked with developing a specific plan, which was intended to be introduced as a 
legislative bill in January the following year (Toll Bridge Advisory Committee, minutes, June 
21, 2002).  The Advisory Committee process included stakeholders from county transit agencies 
across the Bay Area, MTC, county-level Congestion Management Agencies, Caltrans, as well as 
advocacy groups from the business and the environmental communities. Rapport made an effort 
to include a number of stakeholder groups from outside governmental institutions in the project 
selection process—groups that are often not directly represented in the process of developing 
policy through MPOs (e.g. no MTC commissioner seats are reserved for the environmental 
community). The Toll Bridge Advisory Committee met nearly every week for the summer and 
fall of 2002, closely following the parameters laid out by the Senate Select Committee. This 
process is one where the state, ostensibly, did not impose a significant amount of requirements 
limiting the decision making ability of local participants, though there were several important 
exceptions, discussed below. 
Establishing the Principles of Project Selection—And then Breaking Them 
One principle approved by the Senate Select Committee was the importance of ensuring a 
strong “nexus” between bridge corridors being charged the toll increase, and traffic relief in 
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those corridors from projects being funded.  This was important in order for the measure to stay 
within the parameters of a written California Attorney General opinion stating that, to be a fee, it 
needed to benefit the bridge users who pay it.  This could be challenged, potentially in court, so 
the strength of nexus was an important criterion for project selection; essentially, it asked for 
quantification of the reduction in traffic each project could produce on a particular nearby bridge.  
 Other performance measures included the cost per new rider, congestion relief, travel 
time savings, land use impacts, and project readiness.  Mr. Rapport noted: “there were people 
who didn’t like some of the criteria because they knew it kind of aced out some of the projects 
they were hoping to get funded some day” (Rapport, E., interview, September 17, 2010).  For 
example, the nexus rule made it more difficult for San Francisco Muni to argue that it was a 
legitimate recipient of bridge toll funds, since the area’s bridges mainly serve suburban 
commuters going to San Francisco (Toll Bridge Advisory Committee, minutes, October 18, 
2002).  
There was also concern over how meticulously the Advisory Committee would stick to 
its performance measures.  Dennis Fay, of the Alameda County Congestion Management 
Agency and Bob McCleary of the suburban Contra Contra County Transit Authority together 
complained that the decisions were being made behind closed doors, without full discussion on 
how the criteria would actually be applied (Toll Bridge Advisory Committee, minutes, 
September 18, 2002).  In this case, McCleary was certainly concerned that an important project 
to his county, the Caldecott Tunnel, would not be included because the project only relieved 
traffic on the Bay Bridge for reverse commuters, diminishing its effect on bridge traffic statistics 
(McCleary, B., interview, February 10, 2011; Rapport, E., interview August 22, 2014). One 
BART staff member, who asked to remain anonymous, also saw the performance measures as 
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unfair, recalling: “Ezra had a profound influence on the list [of projects] selected—he wasn’t just 
a moderator” (interview, February 23, 2011; emphasis in the original).  He called the nexus 
discussion “surreal,” essentially because he could not trust that the performance measures they 
developed would actually be used to determine which projects were included.  Yet, in the end, 
when asked whether it was a fair process, his idea of fairness was tied to how well his agency 
did, rather than how fair it was across agencies: “We got a fair amount of money out of it,” he 
concluded. There were a lot of competing opinions coming out of the 26 different transit 
operators, seven county-level Congestion Management Agencies, Caltrans and others.   
There was a constant geographical competition between the suburbs and San Francisco.  In the 
end, Ezra Rapport got to make the final call over which projects to recommend to Perata.  He 
even reminded the Advisory Committee of this at their last meeting.  As stated in the minutes, 
Rapport “...emphasized that he is a consultant to Senator Perata. The bill will be Perata’s and will 
reflect Ezra [Rapport]’s recommendations as well as those made by others” (Toll Bridge 
Advisory Committee, minutes, December 13, 2002).   
The big transit operators still participated, whether they agreed with the process or not, 
because, as one MTC staffer noted: “It’s money they didn’t have before.” This is an example of 
the win-win dynamic that drew diverse and competing stakeholders into the same room.  On the 
other hand, the process had to be designed to allow decisions to be made across so many 
competing actors. Perata’s role and the potential for new funds that he offered appear to have 
been key in bringing them together.  This begs the question just how collaborative such a process 
could be, with a powerful boundary-spanner watching over it. 
RM2 left the decision over inclusion in the project selection process to the organizers.  
However in the absence of authorizing legislation, the organizers were limited to the politicians 
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with the power and legislative connections to write the final bill, giving them great influence 
over all aspects of the process, from the implementation of project selection principles to the 
choice of participants for inclusion. 
 ‘Alpha Participants’ and their Impact on Collaboration 
Though Rapport had assured the Senate Select Committee the process would be 
“inclusive,” not all the participants were invited to be there from day one (Toll Bridge Advisory 
Committee, minutes, August 16, 2002), and this, in fact, made San Francisco’s representative 
perceive the entire process as an “East Bay-driven initiative” (SF Muni Representative, 
interview, February 23, 2011).  Participants mostly consisted of transit operators requesting 
funds for project proposals that they would present to the Advisory Committee—which would 
provide its feedback.  This dynamic certainly influenced the way participants viewed their role, 
in some cases limiting the influence of established agencies like BART, and in other cases 
empowering activist citizen groups like the Transportation and Land Use Coalition, or TALC.27  
In fact, Mr. Rapport made a concerted effort over the course of the process to bring in 
participants from outside.  However Rapport and Perata remained what one might call ‘Alpha 
Participants’ in all collaborative discussions involving the selection of projects, due to their 
status as organizers of the effort, designers of the principles for discussion, and their power to 
write the legislative bill, which would include the final list of projects proposed to the voters. 
The most poignant example of this is Perata’s support for ferries.  Despite the strong 
opposition to the ferry system from MTC and county operators worried about more competition 
for funds (Fimrite, San Francisco Chronicle, July 8, 2000), Perata used his influence in the RM2 
process to ensure ferries were a significant part of the proposal.  Indeed, rather than compete 
with other projects in terms of performance indicators, Rapport and Perata agreed right from the 
                                                
27 TALC, later renamed TransForm, was a Bay Area coalition of groups supporting smart growth. 
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start that 27 or 28% of the money would go to ferries. As Rapport recalls, “I pretty much had to 
make it non-negotiable with the other agencies; that the price of Senator Perata’s sponsorship of 
the overall bill was that this amount of money would be allocated to ferries. So if they had a 
problem with that, they should take it up with him” (Rapport, E., interview, August 22, 2014).  
The non-negotiability of ferries was apparent to one MTC staffer, who observed that the ferry 
transit proposal did not come to the committee from the agencies or stakeholders: “That was 
definitely… ‘Perata, you’re carrying this bill; you know—you’re the rainmaker.  Who are we to 
argue if you want to put in a whole bunch of money into ferries?”  
Maintaining Geographic Equity in a Multi-Jurisdictional Process 
The strong role of the boundary-spanner also helped RM2 overcome differing interests 
across the region through its performance measures, and raw politics.  Some participants saw the 
process as a tug of war between the two, as a compromised version of a rational process, in 
which the Alpha Participants heavily influenced the outcome.  As Contra Costa Transit CEO 
McCleary observed: “So they wanted to have goodies in there…—there’s the classic politics…. 
Other than the concept that it was for transit, I wouldn’t say that there was a real rational 
process” (McCleary, 2011). Rapport disagreed, however, arguing: “Very few people, I would 
say, knew about the fact that we had chosen these projects strategically.  Cause you had to have 
been there to experience it.  So there were people on the outside who said it’s just a bunch of 
typical Christmas tree things, chosen for political reasons” (Rapport, E., interview, September 
17, 2010).  
The San Francisco Muni Representative failed to see the connection between the projects 
and Rapport’s vision, and thought the process gave too little to the region’s historic center 
(though no longer its population center).  He was disappointed at not being included from the 
  106 
very beginning, and at the constant need to justify San Francisco’s claim to any bridge toll funds, 
being the destination for most rush hour trips (which ensured most city residents would be using 
the bridge as reverse commuters). In one exchange, Dennis Fay, of the Alameda County 
Congestion Management Agency asked why San Francisco should get anything when it doesn’t 
pay any tolls.  San Francisco’s representative responded by asking why San Francisco should 
pay those tolls when not all suburban areas (likely referring to San Jose) are heavy toll payers 
either? (Toll Bridge Advisory Committee, October 18, 2002).  San Francisco’s reservations 
about the process were only exacerbated when the city’s $1.3 billion in project proposals was 
rejected—though this figure represented more than a third of the entire budget available for all 
seven counties. In the end, the city relied on political might in hometown ally, Senate Pro Tem 
John Burton, to ensure that the city was treated “fairly” (Perata Legislative Staff Member, 
interview, September 15, 2010). In the San Francisco Muni Representative’s judgment, the 
Advisory Committee was: “A planning veneer on a horse-trading process—this list had sort of 
largely been put together.  That’s sort of a reverse justification, in a way, for the projects that sort 
of made it on the lists through the horse-trading process” (SF Muni Representative, interview, 
February 23, 2011).  Yet, whether he liked the way San Francisco was treated, he still thought 
Muni should participate.  “Any opportunity to get funding is better than none” (SF Muni 
Representative, interview, February 23, 2011). 
McCleary, from suburban Contra Costa County, questioned the rationality of the process 
itself (though not its mission).  He thought the performance measures were more of a show—or 
something he needed to comply with just to satisfy Mr. Rapport (McCleary, B., interview, 
February 10, 2011).  It appears McCleary strategically leveraged the performance measures to 
his advantage, for example, to classify certain express bus projects as serving the catchment area 
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for bridges with less competition for projects within their ‘nexus’ (McCleary personal email, 
2002).  Nor did McCleary hesitate to leverage political muscle outside the Advisory Committee 
to push for the agency’s project proposals, eventually contacting Contra Costa County’s own 
State Senator, Tom Torlakson, for support. McCleary recalls that the process, in its early stages, 
appeared to be focused on transit improvements. “We went along with that early on, but in the 
background, about halfway through the process – I don’t know exactly when – I began to hear 
that the Caldecott project was going to be added, but it was going to be added late in the 
progress, because they didn’t want to upset the environmentalists who were supporting [RM2] 
because it was a transit-oriented measure” (McCleary, B., interview, September 10, 2010).  
Overriding the performance measures completely, and doing so after the Advisory Committee 
had already concluded its work, Rapport explains: “I waited on the Caldecott Tunnel for 
everything else to clear before I inserted it, because it was going to be so controversial with the 
environmentalists, and because it didn’t really fit into the transit agenda that I had been so 
strongly promoting.  It was controversial because, while the nexus was strong, it served only 
reverse commuters, so it was hard to argue it reduced traffic and did not meet the performance 
measures.”  Rapport continued, “So I think I got everyone’s agreement on everything else, held 
some money back, and then inserted it” (Rapport, E., interview, August 22, 2014).   
On the other hand, Rapport appears to have held a sincere commitment to the 
performance measures.  Most crucially, he still used them as his primary tool to assess projects in 
private meetings away from the Advisory Committee, as exemplified by a January 27, 2003 
meeting between him and MTC Executive Director Heminger. 
Participants from outside the county transportation agencies saw a clear need for the 
performance measures as a way to select across localities and overcome parochial decision 
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making.  Executive Director Stuart Cohen, of TALC, agreed with Rapport’s emphasis on using 
performance measures as a tool to “knit together a region that was balkanized, into a regional 
one” (Cohen, S., interview, February 9, 2011).   
The performance measures, combined with political clout, helped the Alpha Participants 
overcome the region’s fractured politics.  They were able to persuade key politicians to support 
the proposal, and by working closely with environmental interests like TALC, they had enough 
support to pass the referendum in spite of the concerns by some county transportation agencies.  
The Alpha Participants didn’t throw their weight around gratuitously.  While the process 
could have benefitted from a more public vetting of the proposals, they made decisions designed 
to make cross-jurisdictional deals when these would have otherwise been difficult.  Furthermore, 
there was plenty of opportunity for public comment when the formal bill that resulted from this 
process was introduced.  However by then it would be too late to make serious changes. In the 
legislative process that followed, the Alpha Participants would need to translate the results into 
something the legislature could accept and vote for. 
Translating the Regional Proposal into Politically Acceptable State Legislation 
The legislative process involved making minor adjustments to the proposal in order to 
satisfy the political needs of particular legislators whose support was especially crucial for 
passage.  In these cases, the locally-developed legislation needed to conform to a combination of 
legislators from across the state, each representing their own local interests, not all of them the 
same as Perata’s.  In the aggregate, these legislators’ interests formed the state-level political 
imperatives. But they were not especially limiting for the Bay Area proposal.  Part of this is 
because the largest legislative limitation came from Perata himself—the unwritten requirement 
that the bill would contain a large amount of money for ferries. Like this issue, other areas of 
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state legislative involvement were limited to selection over projects. Other legislative features 
the state might specify (see Table 3.2 for prescriptive features) were in the initial version of the 
legislation and did not change over the course of the process, such as toll vs. tax, tax rate, date of 
the election, or which counties to include (California SB 916, as introduced, April 21, 2003).   
A staffer from Perata’s capitol office from that time commented: “The work had been 
done at the local level: talking with folks, hearing from folks” (Senator Perata Legislative Staff 
Member, interview, September 15, 2010). Ezra Rapport, as well, noted the importance of getting 
such a strong regional consensus across counties, agencies, and stakeholder groups, because “If 
anybody wanted to object, you could easily lose folks, and that would be the end of it.  So we 
first had to convince everyone that we either hang together or we fail” (Rapport, E., interview, 
September 17, 2010). 
 Despite this important local support, both interviews and archival records from the Toll 
Bridge Advisory Committee suggest there was some difficulty with the South Bay Assembly 
delegation over $2 million that SB 916 allocated to study a potential high speed rail corridor that 
upset nearby residents in Assemblyman Dutra’s district (Rapport, E., interview, 2014). In Ezra 
Rapport’s recollection, “The thing that was most controversial was the Regional Rail Master 
Plan, which allowed to study other forms of Bay Area access for high speed rail.” (Rapport, E., 
interview, 2010). As Chair of the Assembly Transportation Committee at the time, Dutra (D-
Fremont) didn’t support the RM2 proposal, and supporters were concerned as early as November 
22, 2002, that he could provide resistance to the bill (Meeting Notes, November 22, 2002).  
Assemblyman Dutra offered a series of amendments on the Assembly floor just before 
the final vote—eleventh hour changes that may have been necessary to secure his support, and 
passage through the Assembly. These doubled the money for a Warm Springs BART extension 
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to $105 million, bringing BART closer to Dutra’s district, added $50.5 million for the Caldecott 
Tunnel (satisfying legislators from Contra Costa County), and provided money for a project both 
favored by environmentalists (City Car Share), and supported by San Francisco (its Transbay 
Terminal project).  These changes appear to have been aimed at placating the most restive parts 
of a broad regional coalition of supporters.  While the bill passed with a comfortable majority in 
the State Senate, the Assembly vote of just 41 out of 80 was the bare minimum needed to pass 
(California SB 916, 2003). This underscores the importance of tinkering with the product of the 
local process in order to get the bill through the legislature.  However because the main decisions 
had already been made at the local level, the general contours of the proposal were designed to 
please particular advocacy groups, local politicians, transit agencies, and—of course—Perata.  
Thus, most conflicts between the political imperatives of local versus state-level politicians had 
already been confronted in the Toll Bridge Advisory Committee meetings, before the proposal 
even went to the legislature for final approval; and changes at the legislature did not present any 
fundamental challenges to the vision of the process; nor did they add language that would have 
stalled the process, or made it unlikely to pass at the polls (e.g. factors related to the 
permissiveness of the language, from Table 3.2).  Since the hardest work had been done within 
the region, legislators in the Senate saw it as the equivalent of a “district bill” (Senator Perata 
Legislative Staff Member, interview, September 15, 2010). That is, “For all of them outside of 
the Bay Area, it’s a free vote.  Because they’re not impacted by it” (Senate Pro Tem Legislative 
Staff Member, September 15, 2010).  On the Assembly side, clearly the record was not as 
accommodating, though changes were relatively minor, and (as noted above), limited to project 
selection. 
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Discussion: The Collaborative Dynamic of the Toll Bridge Advisory Committee 
 This case reveals ways where the collaborative planning process itself was compromised 
somewhat due to the lack of a neutral body empowered to convene it.  The Toll Bridge Advisory 
Committee resulted from a hybrid of successful collaboration between stakeholders, intertwined 
with old fashioned power politics. 
In its attempt to create a free-flowing dialogue capable of producing solutions that would 
change the status quo, this process followed a number of key principles from the collaboration 
literature discussed in Chapter 2. Notably, decision makers agreed with the process and the rules 
for discussion, even if they did not author them.  It was a win-win situation for participants, with 
no particular outcome in mind from the beginning, other than agreement on a regional proposal.  
Finally, participants had roughly the same access to information on projects’ performance.  
However they were likely not all aware of backroom deals taking place—for example the 
inclusion of the Caldecott Tunnel. 
Participants’ roles were not clearly defined from the beginning, and developed over the 
course of the process.  Transportation agencies’ presence on the Committee presented them with 
the challenge of working with each other more closely than they would have otherwise been 
inclined to do.  While the participants did not have the opportunity to define the process from the 
beginning, its win-win nature brought them to the table to negotiate, and strong adherence to the 
performance criteria offered guidelines for difficult negotiations across agencies. 
Participants from established county and regional transit agencies like Contra Costa 
Transportation Authority, San Francisco Muni and Bay Area Rapid Transit clearly disliked the 
performance criteria the Committee used, but cooperated nonetheless, due to the prospect of new 
money (San Francisco Muni Staff Member, 2011; McCleary, 2011; BART Staff Member, 2011). 
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Agencies presenting proposals to the committee also did not always trust that it would follow its 
own performance criteria (MTC Staffer, interview, September 10, 2010).  And, in some cases 
discussed above, it didn’t.   
The process also deviated from the best practices recommended by the collaboration 
literature in its lack of publicity about the early meetings (Helling, 1998: 346-347; Innes & 
Booher, 2003: 40). Some key stakeholders like the Sierra Club’s representative, and the one from 
San Francisco Muni, did not find out about the meetings until they had already begun.  The 
series of unofficial meetings was open to the public and notices posted (Toll Bridge Advisory 
Committee, digital files, 2002), but not heavily advertised, and some key participants were not 
invited until later in the process (Toll Bridge Advisory Committee, minutes, August 16, 2002).   
Finally, the collaborative nature of the process was circumscribed by a dynamic in which 
Senator Perata wrote the final legislative bill (viz. Toll Bridge Advisory Committee, minutes, 
December 13, 2002).  While interviewed stakeholders largely got what they wanted out of the 
Toll Bridge Advisory Committee process in terms of projects and policy, the legislative process 
occasionally overrode participants’ voices, which was especially true for the Caldecott Tunnel. 
This mix of informal collaboration and formal legislation was necessary to implement a 
regional transportation tax proposal in a situation where the proposed funding program was not 
pre-authorized, but it is a compromised version of Innes and Booher’s (2003) “authentic 
dialogue.”  In practice this meant the process may have limited the creativity of the committee’s 
proposals, and most certainly included proposals like ferries, which were not justifiable based on 
performance criteria. At the same time, the performance criteria played an important role, acting 
to ensure a result that bridged the parochial inclinations of many long-entrenched stakeholders.   
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The incentive for new funding from impending legislation appears to have been an 
especially effective way to bring local agencies into the process in a state where there was no 
viable institutional method for proposing a large scale project.   
 
Flexibility of the Process: Writing their Own Authorizing Legislation 
Since the pre-existing authorizing legislation did not grant flexibility to this process, the 
boundary-spanner had to make his own, using his political clout to write legislation that created a 
process exactly the way he needed it to be, in order for it to pass. Since it occurred in a legal 
environment that required special legislative authorization, the proponents of RM2 had a great 
deal of leeway to create a measure that would be successful at the polls.  They were able to 
define their electorate in advance, based on polling, and choose which counties to include in the 
final vote.  They were also able to decide the method for conducting that vote—requiring an 
aggregate majority for passage, rather than a majority of each county.  This avoided the potential 
for any one county to ‘veto’ the proposal, and allowed the Advisory Committee members to 
suggest a list of regionally-focused projects—many of them, like the Caldecott Tunnel, and 
seismic retrofitting of BART’s Transbay Tube, projects that had been left out of previous single-
county LOTTs (Goldman, 2003).  Thus, the lack of permissive pre-authorizing legislation made 
it possible for Perata to create a process the way he wanted it, and to select many of the projects 
he and his allies wanted.  But as discussed below, this may have come at the expense of making 
the process easy to repeat in the future. 
Findings from the San Francisco Bay Area 
Due to the lack of permissive pre-existing authorization to propose a multi-jurisdictional 
bridge toll measure, a boundary-spanner was required to bring many people together, and write 
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new special authorizing legislation. This offered the advantage of a process led by an outsider, 
free from the limitations of codified processes in terms of actors that could be included, projects 
that could be considered, methods for deciding on those projects, and other examples of 
permissiveness from Table 3.2.  Since the boundary-spanner was the author of the special 
legislation, he was free to write the law any way he felt necessary to make RM2 successful, and 
this offered many opportunities for creativity and cross-jurisdictional collaboration—albeit under 
important guidance from participants in the bill development process.  There was a close 
working relationship between a powerful state senator and politicians at the local level 
throughout the process.  This helped ensure that both sides knew why the projects needed to be 
decided as they were, and made advocacy groups into partners from the beginning.  This 
confined disagreements to individual projects rather than the ultimate goal of the plan, and while 
not all participants were happy with the process, everyone that was interviewed accepted it as a 
means to an end.   
Even the fight in the state capitol over the high speed rail corridor was over a project, 
rather than a more fundamental challenge to the purpose of the measure, the process for 
developing it, or the Toll Bridge Advisory Committee process. The extended dialogue between 
local, regional and state leaders during the Toll Bridge Advisory Committee eliminated most 
local-state disagreements in advance—in what amounted to an extended bill writing session.  
 Perata’s status as a state senator helped make this possible.  He used his role in the State 
Senate to initiate fact finding hearings, finance the polling necessary to bring transit agencies to 
the negotiating table, write the draft legislation, and gain the Attorney General’s opinion that 
allowed RM2 to be supported by a fee, not a tax.  The boundary-spanner’s legislative 
connections played a critical role both in ensuring the projects selected were to his liking, 
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limiting the legislature’s role in changing those projects, and in ensuring the processual issues 
like the measure’s status as a fee, were decided before SB 916 went to the legislature for 
consideration. 
 The lack of a pre-existing permissive authorization actually helped in achieving 
legislation written to suit the needs of the process.  Yet this informality also made the process 
quite dependent on a single legislator. This made it difficult to implement without important 
compromises to the political imperatives of the boundary-spanner who initiated it. (His desire to 
include ferries is a poignant example).  The boundary-spanner’s role was made that much more 
powerful by the scarcity of other legislators looking to champion a similar multi-jurisdictional 
effort, and the great deal of commitment and resources necessary to succeed. Writing a new law 
for this one case required someone who had a vision of how the process would occur; local and 
regional knowledge about what kinds of projects to consider for funding; political experience; 
connections with politicians at multiple levels of government, and a developed polling, 
fundraising and campaign apparatus—almost on his own.  Participants were well aware that few 
other politicians with Perata’s level of resources were willing to take this issue on as their pet 
cause. So they obliged the senator when they deemed it necessary to gain his support for their 
desired projects.  The result was a process where Perata and Rapport had a number of important 
demands that satisfied their own political needs, but were able to bring locals on board both 
through participation in a joint process, the promise of additional money, and the fear that such 
an opportunity may not come again soon.  
It is notable that this process took five years from the time the Senate Select Committee 
first conducted hearings on Bay Area transportation challenges (1999) to the time voters went to 
the polls (2004), and required many hearings and good government bills to make the case for 
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legislation before the project selection could begin.  The project selection process itself went 
rather smoothly and expeditiously, largely because there were not any strong opposing voices in 
the room. (And the public, and even some of the later invitees, still largely unaware these 
hearings were happening).  However these hearings required a substantial amount of preparation, 
and it is questionable how many other boundary-spanners in the region might have had the 
stamina or resources to see it through from start to finish.  
Interestingly, this case is not quite what was predicted in the hypotheses in Chapter 3.  It 
is, in fact, a case that benefited from flexibility, but in the absence of permissive authorizing 
legislation, rather than because of it.  In fact it could be said that the pre-authorization was so 
inflexible that the boundary-spanner had no choice but to write new legislation, and conduct his 
own process.  However, this case supports the hypothesis that the boundary-spanner’s legislative 
ties helped overcome any differences between state-level legislative imperatives and local ones.  
Or, one could argue that if Perata did not eliminate such differences (since his ferry proposal 
remained in the final bill), he helped ensure that local activists like TALC were aware of the 
realities of the legislative process (and accepted the ferries and the Caldecott Tunnel), just as 
most legislators accepted the bill as one that had already been negotiated at the local level. The 
flexibility of the process, due to a lack of permissive pre-authorization, and the boundary-
spanner’s personal ties to the state legislature ensured that the state legislation was crafted to 
reflect the product of the local process. However the lack of permissive pre-authorizing/blanket 
authorizing legislation came at a steep price in the significant compromises to the boundary-
spanner in the project selection process.   
This also severely limited the ability to repeat this process.  It is true that, had  
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Regional Measure 2 failed at the polls, SB 916 contained a mechanism to hold another vote, but 
a vote on the same proposal, for the same projects, with the same dollar amounts (California SB 
916, 2003 §72(e).  Doing another regional measure would be much more challenging, making it 
very difficult to continue to adapt to the region’s changing needs. As political consultant Alex 
Evans said, now that Senator Perata is termed out of office, “Why isn’t [a regional measure] 
happening again?  I mean, it was a successful effort that has helped fund a lot of projects, 
demonstrated the ability to raise tolls with a good plan for how you spend the money.  But, it 
really hasn’t been done again” (Evans, A.; Linney, D.; Capitolo, M., Group Interview, February 
10, 2011). 
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Chapter 6: Atlanta Case Analysis 
Chapter 6 Summary 
This chapter examines the case in Atlanta, where special legislation was necessary to begin the 
process for approving a regional transportation sales tax.   This caused several challenges. Most 
notably, the boundary-spanning agent did not have sufficient influence to ensure that the 
enabling legislation was designed to suit local political needs.  
The chapter documents the ways the legislation prescribed an unfavorable date for the election, 
prescribed the inclusion of peripheral counties with little interest in an Atlanta regional plan, 
provided too little time to prepare a plan to present to voters, limited the opportunity for a 
visionary plan, and made it difficult to respond to citizen comments.  State requirements ensured 
that the counties agreed on a mutual plan to present to voters, simply to avoid state financial 
penalties.  However this process was limited from developing a plan capable of winning broad 
voter support.   
Introduction 
 Atlanta is not known for its regional transit system.  However from 1998 to 2012, regional 
business and political leaders attempted to rectify this, ultimately asking voters to decide whether 
to approve a sales tax funding $7.2 billion in transportation improvements. This process was 
heavily influenced by the region’s long history of disagreement over what infrastructure to build, 
and strong racial fault lines that exacerbated the region’s suburb-city challenges (Bullard, 2000).  
 The Atlanta case was chosen for this study because it represents a case with little room for 
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local decision making.  As in the Bay Area, Atlanta did not have previous authorization to hold a 
multi-jurisdictional vote.  The legislation that permitted a ten-county tax vote used carrots and 
sticks to induce the ten counties surrounding Atlanta to vote on a package of transportation 
improvements in 2012.  This was referred to in the media as a “TSPLOST” measure, short for 
Transportation Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax.  Counties in Georgia have the authority 
to conduct single-jurisdiction “SPLOSTs.”  However doing this at the regional level was 
unusual.  Perhaps the only existing precedent was the Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority 
(MARTA), though counties must vote separately on whether to join, and the measure must pass 
in each county for an area to join (thus increasing its sales taxes).  This has been a major obstacle 
to integrating transportation in the region, as many suburban counties have declined to join.  The 
TSPLOST measure provided an aggregate regional vote and the prospect for a comprehensive 
city-suburb approach that included transit improvements as well as roads and freight.   
 This required special legislation to be placed on the ballot, in a process initiated by the 
Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce and its business community membership.  The case is best 
known for its spectacular loss at the polls, which was closely connected to the events that 
occurred in the project selection process and the legislation that authorized the measure.  This 
chapter argues that the TSPLOST measure’s failure was exacerbated by the state government’s 
reluctance to grant sufficient autonomy to local leaders, which made it difficult for them to 
develop a regional plan on their own terms.  Although state legislation did not limit local 
decision making with regard to the final decisions over project selection, the law carefully 
specified the process for developing the list of potential projects from which local policy makers 
could select.  It also specified the counties that were included, the tax rate, the year and date of 
the final election, and exactly how the projects would be chosen. This chapter will discuss how 
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these features of the bill tied the hands of local policy makers even as it left the final selection to 
local representatives. In a process so dependent on devolution of authority from the state to the 
local level of government, the legislature’s decision to offer a circumscribed autonomy became a 
crucial limitation, since the process depended on both local and state levels of government 
working in tandem. 
The boundary-spanner was unable to overcome the differences between state political 
motivations, and local ones.  State motivations included political motivations, and often differed 
from local political imperatives, leaving the participants in the subsequent project selection 
process to deal with the challenges that resulted.  This chapter demonstrates that without 
pre/blanket authorizing legislation in place, it was crucial for the Atlanta process to have a 
boundary-spanner with strong legislative influence.  However the boundary-spanner was not a 
legislator, as in the Bay Area case, but instead, a nongovernmental organization (the chamber of 
commerce).  This limited the influence of the entity leading the effort, and meant it was not 
possible to stop the state politicians from following political imperatives quite different from 
those that mattered at the local level.  This appears to have diminished the shared objectives that 
would be needed between local and state politicians for the process to move forward 
successfully. 
Case Outline 
This process occurred in six phases: 1) Business-led Metro Atlanta Transportation 
Initiative, 2) legislative process, 3) Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) decides 
which projects are acceptable and recommends selection criteria, 4) Roundtable of political 
leaders selects projects, 5) campaign and election, 6) implementation (if measure had won). 
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Figure 6.1: Timeline of Atlanta Events 
 
 The following history discusses how the boundary-spanner (Metro Chamber) initiated the 
process, how it lost control of the legislation, and the impact this had on the selection of projects. 
The authorizing legislation had a clause allowing future processes to occur.  But it should not be 
mistaken for a pre-authorization/blanket authorization because the 2011-2012 process studied 
here was this bill’s first usage, and the bill was intended for this particular process. A special bill 
needed to be passed in order for this process to occur.  This dynamic gave great power to the 
legislators who wrote the bill, allowing them to make a number of very specific requirements 
about the date of the election, the counties included and the manner for selecting projects.  This 
decision making at the state level restricted the ability of local politicians participating in the 
process to make decisions based on their local and regional political needs, and impeded the 
development of projects that could support a vision with the backing of all the counties. This 
history argues that in the absence of a pre-authorization/blanket authorization bill, a boundary-
spanner with legislative connections was needed to ensure a process that would be flexible 
enough to accommodate local political needs. 
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Origins & Motivations for the TSPLOST 
 The Atlanta Metro Chamber of Commerce first became involved in the regional 
transportation issue due to concern over the region’s poor air quality.  Following passage of more 
stringent federal air quality standards in 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency declared the 
region a “serious nonattainment” area.  Additionally, the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 linked federal transportation funding to compliance with the 
federal Clean Air Act.  Consequently, the Environmental Protection Agency withheld the area’s 
highway funding (Trelstad, 2000).  This drastic action induced many national newspapers to 
question Atlanta—not just for its air quality, but its suitability as a place to do business.  This 
induced the Chamber to become the chief champion for improving the region’s transportation 
system over the next decade and a half (Trelstad, 2000: 27).  
 This chapter argues that the Chamber acted as boundary-spanner through its role in 
leading the response to this problem.  Solutions needed to encompass the entire region, and soon 
focused on ways to improve transportation, as well as the process for planning and funding it. 
The Chamber launched its first major transportation initiative in 1998, known as the Metro 
Atlanta Transportation Initiative (MATI).  They sought solutions through a regional conversation 
of CEOs, university presidents and government officials, and hired a consultant to develop a 
draft set of recommendations to be presented to the Governor-elect in the fall of 1998.  The 
Chamber called for a single regionally focused agency that could integrate responsibilities over 
planning, funding and implementation (Trelstad, 2000: 34). Chamber representatives met with 
Governor-elect Barnes following his victory that year, and he adopted the MATI proposals as a 
key element of his legislative agenda.  The final bill, SB 57, created the Georgia Regional 
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Transportation Authority (GRTA), and gave this agency sweeping powers to overrule local 
decisions (Trelstad, 2000: 30 & 34).   
 However one serious flaw in the GRTA legislation was that the Governor got to appoint 
GRTA’s entire board—leaving it vulnerable to drastic swings from one administration to the 
next.  According to former Chamber President Sam Williams, GRTA ran into trouble in 2003, 
due to the election of a governor from a different political party.  This shift from Democratic to 
Republican was the first such change since Reconstruction, and the new Republican Governor, 
Sonny Perdue, was not interested in continuing many initiatives of his predecessor, regardless of 
their policy merit.  As Williams recalls: “Sonny Perdue appointed a new board and basically told 
them to slow down and look mainly at bus systems. ‘Don’t get into regional comprehensive 
plans, and don’t get into anything around transit.’  So the entire movement that came out of 
MATI was greatly diminished” (Williams, S., interview, October 29, 2014). With Perdue not 
providing any significant agenda on transportation, the business community felt the need to fill 
the leadership vacuum once again. 
A New Regional Process Begins 
 Like the MATI process, the Chamber’s next proposal began at the local and regional 
level, with solutions designed to work for the Atlanta region’s particular needs and politics, but 
as this history shows, the final proposal, the one known as TSPLOST, also changed over time to 
satisfy the concerns of state-level politicians.  This made it problematic for policy makers trying 
to implement its process in the Atlanta metro region.  
The TSPLOST proposal began in the fall of 2006, when the Metro Chamber made the 
case to the legislature for a new funding solution, and developed a group of local chambers and 
businesses that held regular meetings (Williams, S., interview, October 29, 2014). Based on 
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news articles from the time, the Metro Chamber worked to convince other chambers in the 
Atlanta region to join them in developing a proposal (Hart, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 
December 1, 2006). (Together, these were known as the Regional Business Coalition). The 
Metro Chamber began modestly, calling for a bill that would allow two or more interested 
counties to hold a tax vote together, introduced as HB 434 of 2007. 
However this idea ran into conflict with politicians at the state capitol, who came from 
many areas besides Atlanta, and were committed to providing transportation to their home 
districts.  Moving the tax vote from the state to the regional level offered two advantages.  It 
allowed state politicians to avoid voting to raise taxes directly (Hart, Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, October 24, 2006), and it ensured that money collected in the Atlanta region would 
come back to the region (Hairston, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, June 13 2002; Georgia Code 
§32-5-30; Harris 2006).  However lawmakers and businesses outside Atlanta grew concerned 
with this proposal. Georgians for Better Transportation, a lobbying group for road builders 
(Bookman, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, December 11, 2006) and the (state-level) Georgia 
Chamber of Commerce’s “Get Georgia Moving Coalition,” argued the regional method would 
only serve Atlanta (Hart, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, October 24, 2006). The statewide 
approach also won a powerful backer in House Speaker Richardson, who represented a rural area 
outside Atlanta.  His stalwart support for a statewide approach held up legislation for three years, 
with 14 separate bills. 
 In 2006, the Metro Chamber used its influence in support of HB 434, a bill that allowed 
local governments to join together and call a transportation tax election when they saw fit.  A 
rival bill, HB 442, proposed a statewide election on a 1% sales tax increase to fund transportation 
(Chastain, T., interview, June 27, 2014).  Then-Chamber President Sam Williams testified in 
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favor of HB 434 (Metro Atlanta Chamber, press release, July 11, 2007).  However there was 
tremendous discomfort in the House leadership over HB 434’s permissive, urban-focused 
approach.  Representatives in the Georgia House worried that rich counties would band together 
to fund their transportation needs, while poor counties, both urban and rural, would be left out. 
As Georgia Representative Sheldon recalls: “There was some of the Senate [that] wanted it to be 
just so one or two counties could join in together, just a couple counties.  You know, that’s not 
going to get your freight corridors addressed” (Sheldon, D., interview, June 26, 2014).  Both bills 
stalled in committee in February 2007, and creation of a Joint Study Committee took the place of 
direct legislative action.  
Metro Chamber Loses Control of the Legislative Process 
The Governor remained hesitant to take a stand on the issue, making it hard to break the 
impasse. The Metro Chamber lobbyist from that time describes the Governor’s lack of support as 
the single biggest reason the process kept dragging on without resolution.  In Georgia politics, he 
observes, “In the absence of that person weighing in, the House and the Senate just fight amongst 
themselves” (Chastain, T., interview, June 27, 2014).  
Other interviewees agreed with his assessment. Speaker Richardson does not remember 
the Governor driving the process; nor does Representative Sheldon (Richardson, G., interview, 
June 20, 2014), both from the Governor’s own political party. Chamber President Sam Williams 
recalls it took until Perdue’s second term before he talked to the Chamber about the 
transportation issue, partly out of a lack of experience, no agenda on transportation, a distaste for 
Atlanta in particular, and urban needs in general (Williams, S., interview, October 29, 2014).  
Over the next several years, the business community continued to lobby heavily at the 
state capitol, and the legislature continued to look for solutions.  But without strong gubernatorial 
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support, they were unable to make a decision. In 2008 they got close, as they almost passed 
Senate Resolution 845 and its companion bill, HB 1216.  This constitutional amendment would 
have allowed counties to enter into voluntary agreements with their neighbors to raise sales 
taxes.  This was similar to HB 434 of 2007, except as a constitutional amendment, SR 845 
required a two-thirds majority.  It passed the House, but came just a few votes short in the 
Senate.  In the wake of its failure on the very last day of session, some blamed the bill’s chief 
sponsor, the Metro Chamber, for not reaching out, or for having supported other unrelated 
initiatives that alienated several Democratic senators.  However the Metro Chamber President 
disagreed with this assessment at the time, saying it fell victim to a Republican leadership 
reluctant to move forward.  Perdue continued his pattern of tepid involvement in transportation, 
and refused to support the bill, calling for reform at the state’s transportation department, GDOT, 
before he would approve more transportation funding (Wheatly, Creative Loafing Atlanta, April 
16, 2008).   
Once again, the Chamber’s proposal for Atlanta fell victim to state-level concerns, and 
the Metro Chamber was not pleased. Chamber President Sam Williams was quoted at the time as 
saying: "What they can blame it on is petty fights about taxes and egos in both chambers. This is 
not going away…. We've been talking about this for the past six years. Every time we try to do 
something, we are told, 'Wait another year, wait another year.' People are fed up and we should 
let our elected officials know in the loudest voice possible." (Wheatly, Creative Loafing Atlanta, 
April 16, 2008; Saporta, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 24, 2008).   
As the sense of urgency grew over a shortfall in fuel tax money, the legislature tried to 
act; but instead, positions hardened into a Senate that supported a regional approach, and a 
House that supported a statewide solution.  In the process, the business community could do little 
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except lobby, and watch in frustration.  This resulted in a number of compromises that eventually 
made the final bill more restrictive and less politically viable than the Chamber would have liked 
(Williams, S., interview, October 29, 2014). 
Legislation Emerges from the Crucible 
 In 2009, the climate finally improved.  There was a new Speaker, who “just wanted to 
finish the battle” (Sheldon, D., interview, June 19, 2014). This, combined with a renewed push 
by the business community, and new engagement by the Governor, made it possible to pass a bill. 
It is not completely clear why the Governor suddenly became more interested, but most 
opinions have to do with state-level electoral politics.  For example, (Democratic) Senator 
Stoner’s opinion was that the Republican House leadership wanted to strengthen its party’s 
reputation on the transportation issue in case former Governor Barnes decided to run again in the 
2010 election—since Barnes had a very strong transportation record, as proponent of the GRTA 
legislation, during his previous tenure as governor (Stoner, D., interview, June 19, 2014).  
In this final decision process, the Atlanta Chamber failed to regain control of the dialogue, 
and the final outcome had many flaws that made the subsequent process problematic from the 
start. By all accounts, the Governor and the legislative leadership were thinking more about state 
issues and state politics than they were about local/regional transportation and political needs 
when they wrote the bill. The resulting legislation followed a template for compromise offered 
by the Governor, and was sometimes an odd marriage of the regional and statewide approaches.  
The final bill, HB 277, was written with state issues in mind, but was dependent on regional 
elections to approve the tax. 
Pitfalls of the Bill 
 By the time HB 277 went up for a vote, participants were simply too exhausted to iron 
out many technical issues that would prove to be pitfalls when the local funding processes began.  
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For example, the authors could not agree on regional versus state approaches, so they did both—
multi-county votes in separate regions across the state, all the same day.  For state level 
politicians, it was expedient to use MPO boundaries to draw the geographical boundaries 
between regions, since these existed statewide.  But these were arbitrary lines, and metro 
Atlanta’s MPO, (the Atlanta Regional Commission, or ARC), encompassed a number of rural 
counties far outside Atlanta, with very different priorities from the urban area. Yet they were 
expected to participate in the same process. Not surprisingly, many city and county leaders did 
not know why they were included, or how the outcome would help them. As Williams puts it, “If 
you’re in [exurban] Cherokee County why do you want to pay part of your sales tax to [Atlanta 
Mayor] Kasim Reed to build a beltline?” (Williams, S., interview, October 29, 2014).  By the 
same token, Atlanta residents had a hard time understanding why their money should go to build 
suburban freeway interchanges even though residents in counties participating in the 
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) had paid into their system for decades.  
As Georgia Senator Fort explains, “After forty years of keeping the faith, paying our [share], 
creating a mass transit system, and then Gwinnett and Cobb get the benefits of the TSPLOST… 
without having done what we did” (Fort, V., interview, June 25, 2014).  No tax measure, by 
itself, was going to paper over past animosities, and careful attention was required to choose a 
geography sensitive to existing inter-county relationships.  HB 277 did not do this. 
Another major problem was the Governor insisted on a July primary date for the election 
(Reed, K., interview, October 28, 2014; Williams, S., interview, October 29, 2014).  Kasim Reed 
understood the Republicans’ choice of election dates to be motivated by a desire to ensure that 
the transportation proposal maintained conservative principles (Reed, K., October 28, 2014). 
Since Republicans controlled the state government, and the July date was an opportunity to 
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ensure the TSPLOST initiative would be something they could support, though at the local and 
regional levels, there are both Democratic and Republican cities in the Atlanta metropolitan 
region, and the proposal was supposed to be nonpartisan.  It is impossible to say how the 
measure would have done had it been placed on a general election date, though local and 
regional politicians did not support the July date, since they feared it would increase the number 
of suburban, Republican and Tea Party supporters voting on TSPLOST (Stoner, D., June 19, 
2014). Either way, HB 277’s specification of the election date deprived regional leaders the 
opportunity to make this decision based on polling. In a similar manner, the bill specified which 
year the vote could occur, denying local elected officials the opportunity to choose the election 
cycle indicating the best opportunity for success. 
Written from the perspective of state leaders, it was advantageous for the bill to control 
the project selection process wherever possible, so local decision making had to come with clear 
parameters—a compromise between local decision making and state control (Roberts, J., 
interview, June 20, 2014). This part of the bill also emerged through compromise. Chair of the 
Georgia House Transportation Committee Jay Roberts recalls the Governor wanted GDOT to 
pick the projects directly.  Certainly a top-down process could be faster, with less intra-regional 
fighting. However Roberts says he wanted more local control. Representative Sheldon, then-Vice 
Chair of the House Transportation Committee, recalls the committee’s motivations: “We wanted 
to make sure that the voters had the confidence in the projects and … the people that are closest 
to the voters, I believe, are going to have a better pulse, a better feel for where the voters are, and 
just have more trust… with the citizens” (Sheldon, D., interview, June 26, 2014).  However they 
didn’t really trust local citizens to keep the process moving on pace.  The resulting compromise 
outlines a process for local discourse designed to achieve buy-in from local elected officials—
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but governed by stringent guidelines designed to ensure it moves forward.  As she remembers: 
“There was so much infighting between the cities and counties that we couldn’t just leave it 
open. We had to have hard deadlines so then you had to get certain things accomplished” 
(Sheldon, D., interview, June 26, 2014; also discussed by Roberts, J., interview, June 20, 2014).  
More stringent rules meant a very carefully specified process for selecting committee members, 
choosing criteria, choosing projects, etc.  This meant a more formal and public decision making 
process, and Chamber President Sam Williams noted the difficulty of implementing an open 
decision process in such a large metro area, fraught with persistent racial tensions between 
suburb and city.    
At the time, legislators were aware of some of the bill’s shortcomings.  However they 
were ready to pass something by this point.  As Atlanta Mayor Reed put it, “Legislatures have 
rhythms, and sometimes the body has given all it’s going to give” (Reed, K., interview, 29 
October 2014).   The polling at the time looked favorable, so the various participants acquiesced 
to the final bill, imperfect as it was. The Chamber was left to deal with the result.  As Chamber 
President Sam Williams recalls: “This is not the prettiest baby, but they gave it to us.  You know, 
it’s ours and now we got to figure out how to pass it” (Williams, S., interview, October 29, 
2014).   
The legislation created a process with many existential challenges—limited as it was by 
an undesirable election date and counties chosen for inclusion by state politicians, rather than 
local citizens. Although locals had the opportunity to make the final project selections, their 
options were limited in a number of ways by the process and the rules outlined in the bill. 
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Figure 6.2: Regional Transportation Roundtable Members 
 
Atlanta Regional Commission, 2011: 3 
Project Selection Begins 
 The Regional Transportation Roundtable (RTR) was the body of local representatives 
charged with choosing the projects to bring before voters in the 2012 election.  The 
representatives and procedures for decision making were meticulously defined in HB 277 
(known after its passage as the Transportation Improvement Act, or TIA), leading to a highly 
public process that was unable to articulate a clear vision to present to voters.  Each county had 
two representatives—its County Commissioner and one mayor.  The RTR chose five members to 
sit on an Executive Committee, which did the bulk of the negotiating, and developed a draft plan 
for the full RTR to consider.  Every participant the author talked to believed the Chair did an 
outstanding job.  Yet even before the process began, he was faced with the challenge of how to 
set up the committee, which was exacerbated by the legislation. 
Kasim Reed, as State Senator, had been a vital part of the approval process for HB 277, 
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yet was not chosen to sit on the Executive Committee in his new role as the Mayor of Atlanta, 
possibly because he wasn’t at the meeting where this was decided (Matthews, M., interview, 
June 16, 2014). One anonymous interviewee still felt upset about the incident, saying that  “…the 
Mayor of the Central City [in the region] not being on this Executive Committee was 
outrageous.” Georgia House Speaker Ralston eventually had to intervene, and ultimately, 
Executive Committee member Bucky Johnson, Mayor of Norcross in Gwinnett County, offered 
to give up his vote on the Committee, and be a non-voting Chair (Johnson, B., interview, June 
18, 2014).  In hindsight, Mayor Reed says “I’m not a sore winner.  I felt like the chief executive 
of the largest city in the state with the largest arterials [should be on the committee]” (Reed, K., 
October 28, 2014). 
The incident illustrates the extent to which this process was excessively formalized.  
Johnson observes: “[The legislature] didn’t take any input from the local people, but yet they told 
us how to do it.  You know what I’m saying?.... [The legislation] was onerous in that if we had 
picked how to do it we wouldn’t have picked that way.  [The legislature] kind of put us in that 
position but didn’t give us any, much latitude in how we did it… you know, you have a five 
member Executive Committee; it can’t be six, it can’t be four…” (Johnson, B., interview, June 
18, 2014). 
Though he was fully cognizant of the prescriptive nature of the law, and the challenges 
this presented, Johnson tried to make the process work, offering coffee breaks when things were 
about to get contentious.  These facilitated horse-trading across jurisdictions, despite the public 
nature of the process envisioned by the legislation.  Johnson also required speakers and staff to 
avoid acronyms, and put all key documents on the Internet, to ensure transparency and build trust 
with the general public (Senior Reed Staffer, interview, June 20, 2014).  
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Developing the Criteria for Project Selection 
As a compromise bill, the TIA limited local representatives participating in the project 
selection process to choosing from a range of possible projects, while giving them the final say 
over which ones to propose to voters.  The bill limited the potential projects the RTR could select 
by specifying that project selection criteria should be based on guidelines recommended by the 
Georgia Department of Transportation’s Statewide Strategic Transportation Plan of 2010.  This 
was (and still is) their “vision” document for the state transportation system (Georgia HB 277, 
§2-8-243).  However the document’s vision was not long-term in nature, limiting the RTR to 
selecting projects with a short-term impact.28  For example, GDOT’s Strategic Plan 
recommended against commuter rail because it was considered to be “more long-term and 
transformational in nature… and [has] a longer payoff period, especially given the development 
patterns metro Atlanta has today” (GDOT, 2010: 35). The potential to alter land use patterns was 
considered outside the scope of GDOT’s transportation recommendations, which is consistent 
with the short-term orientation GDOT Director of Planning Todd Long remembers from his 
meetings with Governor Perdue. “[The governor] harped on that [issue] all the time. ‘Make sure, 
Todd, they pick projects with outcomes.”29 Outcomes, of course, within the ten-year timespan of 
the Transportation Investment Act. 
The TIA ensured GDOT’s Statewide Strategic Plan would be the starting point for 
discussion over project selection at the Regional Transportation Roundtable. Projects outside the 
Strategic Plan that were proposed by local governments had to meet selection criteria 
                                                
28 The Strategic Plan measured this in terms of increase in workers within 45 minutes of work, increase in reliable 
trips, and decrease in congestion.   
29 When asked what an outcome was, Long clarified that it was a project that moves the needle on congestion (Long, 
T., interview, June 17, 2014). 
 
  134 
recommended by GDOT (Georgia HB 277, §48-8-243). Local governments and the public had 
several months to comment on these proposed criteria.  
Long and GDOT’s influence over this process was indirect in nature, and their ability to 
allow for local discretion over the project selection was heavily circumscribed by the planning 
regime in the TIA.  Many comments submitted to GDOT on their draft selection criteria called 
for greater local discretion in selecting projects. GDOT responded in many of these cases that 
this was not possible either because of the requirements in the TIA, or because projects needed to 
be included in planning documents previously developed by the MPO (e.g. a long-range 
transportation plan), and ready for completion within a ten year timeframe.   
Despite these strictures, GDOT made an effort to take comments by local elected officials 
into account when crafting its final set of criteria, adding a regional equity provision to ensure 
geographic equity of taxes paid and benefits received in each county.  GDOT also added a 
requirement that projects improve regional mobility, and made project selection categories less 
rigid (GDOT Draft Criteria, 2010; GDOT Regional Criteria, 2010). However the final criteria 
still limited project selections in several important ways. 
Proposed projects had to come from previously existing plans and/or studies (e.g. by 
GDOT, or in the Atlanta Regional Commission’s long-range or short-range transportation plans). 
While some of the selection categories were loosened, the criteria still required projects to be 
deliverable within ten years, i.e. the life of the proposed sales tax (GDOT Regional Criteria 
2010; Long, T., interview, June 17, 2014).  This provision would make it difficult for the RTR 
members to select projects that were large in scope, or unable to produce a short-term impact.  
Additionally, this made it difficult to leverage local tax dollars to obtain federal grant funding or 
private partnerships, which might require a longer timespan (RTR Meeting, audio recording, July 
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7, 2011).  One more implication of these criteria was they favored projects in less-developed 
areas of the region, without potential displacement, social justice issues, or existing infrastructure 
that might need to be relocated (GDOT Metro Area Deliverability Assessment, 2011), all issues 
which could have pushed projects past the ten year timeframe.  Finally, the regional equity 
provision reinforced a localist mindset, rather than a regional vision.   
Following the Criteria: Making the Unconstrained Project List 
Though the Roundtable was given the ability to pick its own projects, GDOT’s criteria 
limited the choices.  Additionally, HB 27730 provided the GDOT Transportation Director and, by 
extension, the Governor’s office, the ability to write the criteria for project eligibility (with local 
input), and allowed GDOT to guide project selection in a direction desirable to them, had it 
chosen to do so. 
Before the project selection could begin, the TIA gave GDOT Transportation Director 
Todd Long the power to decide what would go on the list of potential projects—a possible 
limiting factor for any regional proposals (Georgia HB 277, §48-8-241(11). According to the 
TIA, counties were expected to submit proposed project lists, and Long had the responsibility to 
select which ones to include. Long characterized his role at the June 9, 2011 Executive 
Committee meeting as creating a “menu” for the Roundtable to choose from (RTR Meeting, 
audio recording, June 9, 2011). In his interview, he said his involvement was limited to picking a 
very broad list that left the hard choices to the local politicians.  While this role gave him a 
reputation for being the one that “picked the projects,” he notes that the first list required 
“…three times the amount of money we had.  That was easy, right?  The hard job was trimming 
it down” (Long, T., interview, June 17, 2014).    
Long’s role went beyond just picking a menu of options, however. He recalls: “I had lots 
                                                
30 §48-8-243 
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of roles of kind of moving that process through the system.  I didn’t pick the projects in the long 
run, but I had a heavy hand in guiding and directing toward that area, right?”  (Long, T., 
interview, June 17, 2014).   
Long appears to have managed a constructive relationship with the Roundtable, even as 
he wielded the ultimate power to create the universe of potential projects from which the 
Committee could select.  At the February 17 Roundtable meeting he told the Committee “I am 
here to tell you that I’m willing to wear the black hat.  I’m the Director of Planning.  The one 
thing the Director of Planning has a lot of authority on in this bill… is not the final selection of 
projects; it is the development of the unconstrained list.”  However he also told the group how he 
planned to use that authority to do things they wanted to do, but couldn’t for political reasons: 
“So let me wear that black hat.  Don’t just try to appease somebody on your council, just to get 
them to shut up….  Let’s not make the list so exorbitant that it’s going to be an impossible task to 
pare it down” (RTR Meeting, audio recording, February 17, 2011; emphasis in the original).  
Long also told the Executive Committee that he wanted projects that met all the criteria, but 
wanted to work with them too, saying: “I’m not here to basically kill the process because I didn’t 
include a project you really wanted.” (RTR Meeting, audio recording, February 17, 2011).   
The selection criteria and the unconstrained project list, which Long and GDOT played 
such large roles in developing, set the course for the remaining selection process.  These criteria 
established methods for achieving geographic equity, the desired outcomes and the short-term 
timeline for measuring outcomes.  All of this would significantly influence the analytical process 
for determining which projects to include in the final list. 
Visioning in the Project Selection Process 
The law was developed from the top down, without asking whether there was local 
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interest in developing a regional transportation plan, or whether they wanted to participate in it.  
Some Executive Committee members hailed from rural jurisdictions that didn’t even understand 
why they were included in an Atlanta metro area taxation proposal.  Participants came to 
represent their local jurisdiction, but often did not have a clear sense of what they wanted a 
regional transportation system to look like.  Yet the Executive Committee also had freedom to 
select its own projects. When the Committee tried to develop a plan, it had difficulty, reverting to 
the mechanics of making cuts through the TIA’s ‘process of elimination’ articulated in the TIA 
(Figure 6.3).  This combination between a restrictive process with a Roundtable able to choose 
its own projects resulted in a slow process without a clear direction, that had trouble moving 
forward. 
Figure 6.3: TIA Project Selection Process 
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 Based on interviews and audio meeting recordings, participants’ visions at the 
outset were limited to vague ideas like cutting congestion, improving transportation, greater 
access to jobs and increased reliability.  The Metro Chamber did not provide any guidance at this 
stage (though its members returned to guide the campaign). As Chamber President Sam Williams 
said, “We decided early on that the business community could not get into the political process 
of advocating or picking projects because…. We felt that the political leaders had to come up 
with a compromise of doing them” (Williams, S., interview, October 29, 2014).  Without any 
idea how to get to achieve their goals, Roundtable members did not think as much about creating 
a regional system as cobbling together a set of locally desirable projects. While the process set 
out in HB 277 was not solely to blame for this, its ‘process of elimination’ did not help. As 
Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC)31 senior staffer Jane Hayse recalls: “The whole exercise 
was a matter of culling it down to a constrained list rather than building up from zero to eight 
billion… so just starting off, I think philosophically it’s more negative to have to cut than it is to 
add, right?” (Hayse, J., interview, June 26, 2014).  This led to a technocratic process that stifled 
the development of a regional vision at the Committee, and left interest groups upset their 
projects had been cut. “In hindsight, if we could have just built from this base of projects and 
then built up it would look like you’re adding projects rather than taking projects away” (Hayse, 
J., interview, June 26, 2014).  
A Very Public Process 
The process outlined in the TIA was quite public, creating a “fishbowl,” environment not 
terribly conducive to cross-jurisdictional deal making (Hayse, J., interview, June 26, 2014).  
There were eight Roundtable meetings and eight Executive Committee meetings (ARC website 
2014), many with over 100 people in attendance, including press.  Occurring in the digital age, 
                                                
31 The area’s Metropolitan Planning Organization, which provided the staff for the RTR process.   
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meetings were posted online.  There were telephone town hall sessions led by each mayor and 
county commissioner.  There were outreach sessions.  And towards the end, there were 
opposition groups in attendance. 
Unlike the backroom deals in the Bay Area, anything a politician said in the TSPLOST 
process could be in the press instantly: “So… if you were a representative from Cherokee 
County in the outer loop, and you suggested supporting MARTA,32 well it was in the newspaper 
the next day” (Floyd, B., interview, June 18, 2014).  
Crafting the Framework at the Staff Level 
As Hayse observes, “Public officials are not going to go on the record saying they don’t 
want a project… so they ask the staff to do that, to do their dirty work, right?” (Hayse, J., 
interview, June 26, 2014).  The Roundtable left the hardest work to the Executive Committee.  
And the Executive Committee continually asked the ARC and county staff to make the cuts that 
were too difficult to propose in a public forum. The TIA was not directly responsible for this 
decision, though the process it set up made this an attractive option, since the Committee was 
without a great deal of vision from its own membership (for the reasons discussed above). It was 
caught in a politically treacherous public forum. And, per the TIA’s process, the Executive 
Committee was charged with whittling down a large and unwieldy list.  These factors combined 
to make the selection process more technocratic and bureaucratic than it needed to be. 
The necessity of staff involvement became clear as the Committee had difficulty 
conducting its selections through continual cuts to the project list.  In one telling instance, the 
Executive Committee had a discussion about how it wanted to develop the initial project 
framework.  No one at the meeting articulated an outline for how they could connect the region.  
Without this, it became hard to decide what projects to include, The Committee focused, instead, 
                                                
32 The Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Authority (MARTA) has long been unpopular in the Atlanta suburbs. 
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on principles for how to cut the list down, rather than which cuts to make, and came up with 
several ideas.  For example, Douglas County Chairman Worthan suggested ARC come up with a 
first draft of what to cut, while Henry County Chairman Mathis wanted to use data on the 
projects’ economic impact to inform their decision.  There was debate whether to focus on big 
projects, along with small ones that have a large impact; or small projects spread across the 
region, supplemented by big-ticket items (to win voter support).   
There was little direction to the selection process, and some attendees recognized this.  
One Roundtable member in attendance (unnamed on the recording) suggested that as elected 
officials, they needed to prioritize which projects to include: “My only concern with having this 
done by staff as a first cut is that ultimately a lot of focus is going to be placed on very early in 
the process…. And too much emphasis in this discussion has been placed on having staff do 
everything.”  However another Committee member (name inaudible) disagreed, saying the ARC 
staff would offer their best professional opinion from a transportation perspective, and 
Committee members could always change the results if they were unhappy (RTR Meeting, audio 
recording, June 23, 2011).  However he made an important point.  The TIA’s process of 
whittling the list down one step at a time left them with no place to start, and the counties 
included were not all working toward the same goals for the region.  The list was just too big to 
work with, cuts were painful to make, and the Committee was loath to make them in the public 
process mandated by the bill—a recurring theme throughout the rest of the Committee process.   
The Committee decided to begin by voting to have ARC staff cut the list in half by dollar 
volume, based on defined parameters (expected deliverability, congestion relief, economic 
impact), and geographic equity (June 23, 2011). While there was a thoughtful dialogue, the 
Committee remained detached from the hard choices it had to make, even as it drafted the initial 
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cuts that would shape the final plan.   
Jayne Hayse and her staff at ARC ended up doing a lot of the work of this first stage of 
cuts.  This went through several iterations until there was a list the Committee was able to work 
with.  After the first list came back, the Committee still refrained from significant involvement.  
Mathis, of exurban Henry County, had the full support of other suburban county representatives 
when she requested the mayors from the urban counties meet to discuss transit projects, since 
clearly this was not her interest or expertise. Once again, the Committee directed staff to hold a 
summit to look at the latest information and develop a plan (RTR Meeting, audio recording, July 
21, 2011).  
Inevitably, Hayse was the one to convene this summit.  She did much outreach to the 
representatives and staff members from each county on a person-to-person basis to talk about 
projects.  Additionally, she convened local staff members to see how they could put a 
‘strawman’ list together (Hayse, J., interview, June 26, 2014; Senior Reed Staffer, interview, 
June 20, 2014; Matthews, M., interview, June 16, 2014).  
The ARC staff, left with no direction from the Executive Committee for how to cut, 
developed three scenarios, one focused on roads, one on transit, and one “balanced” approach.  
However some Committee members did not know what to do with the results, since the reasons 
for project selection were too technical for the electorate to grasp in a campaign sound byte. 
Mathis spoke for many at the Executive Committee when she opined: “What we saw a few 
weeks ago with the three scenarios was the most confusing thing I’ve ever seen in my life.  There 
was nothing that you could go back and explain [to voters]” (RTR Meeting, audio recording, 
August 4, 2011).   
Meanwhile the mayors from cities concerned about transit held a separate meeting, per 
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Mathis’ suggestion, and had better results than the staff-driven approach. Attended by the 
mayors of Atlanta, Decatur and suburban Kennesaw, among others, this conversation of elected 
officials outside the public Executive Committee meetings succeeded in turning the process 
away from purely technocratic methods for selection; however their discussion remained focused 
on a project-by-project approach.   
The meeting of the mayors appears to have been an important turning point for initiating 
a serious dialogue about projects. Several who attended called it the most productive meeting 
they had been to for the Roundtable process up until then (RTR Meeting audio recording, 4 
August, 2011). One Executive Committee member remembers this and other county staff 
meetings as matters of ironing out differences in projects proposed in each county’s state-
mandated long-range plan, and seeing how they could work together (Matthews, M., interview, 
June 16, 2014). The Executive Committee ultimately voted 3-2 to choose the top six projects 
from the meeting, totaling $2.85 billion. 
However the Executive Committee members continued to struggle with how to choose 
projects from such a big list, and make cuts they could explain to constituents. For example, at 
the next meeting, Chair Johnson proposed they set percentages for urban versus suburban 
counties, and ways to ensure geographic equity. Henry County Chairman Mathis favored such an 
approach because “This whole task of coming up with a project list is a beast, to put it 
mildly….You have to have some formula to choose projects from.  It has to make sense and it 
has to be simplified” (RTR Meeting, audio recording, August 4, 2011).  
Staff ended up making the majority of the major cuts.  There were not audio recordings 
of the staff meetings where this happened, but at the subsequent Executive Committee meeting, 
Chair Johnson referred to two staff meetings where county-level staff met with ARC’s staff, and 
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cut the list (RTR Meeting, audio recording, August 11, 2011).  Still, without more direction from 
the elected Roundtable members, the staff could not make the final cuts from $6.5 billion to 
$6.14. Without staff direction for how to make the final cuts, the Executive Committee had to 
make some at a public meeting, as the TIA’s deadline approached for the Committee to submit a 
financially constrained list to the full Roundtable. Cutting the list was more of a challenge than 
ever, as proposals to “share the pain” across counties alternated with suggestions by suburban 
members to make significant cuts to transit, which they considered wasteful.  The shared pain 
strategy won out, however, indicating how the principles of “geographic equity” and “process of 
elimination” combined to form the final list.  This process left a little bit for everyone, but also 
made it easy for voters to complain that one’s own jurisdiction did not get enough (RTR 
Meeting, audio recording, August 15, 2011).   
Local vs. Regional Projects 
The process set up by HB 277 and GDOT supported a decision structure based strongly 
on geographic equity and local needs, rather than regional ones. Certainly Chairman Johnson 
worked to overcome cross-jurisdictional divisions, for example directing staff to delete county 
boundaries from all public maps used in the discussion process because the TIA “was supposed 
to be a regional solution, not a county by county, city by city solution”  (Johnson, B., interview, 
June 18, 2014).  However from the beginning of the project selection process, it was cities and 
counties that proposed the projects, and representatives from each county on the Roundtable 
couldn’t help but think what they could do to defend their county’s interests. For example, the 
Atlanta Mayor’s representative says he came with a list of projects to support, and negotiated it 
down to the core list that they cared most about: “…I don’t know how other governments 
strategized, but… we went in with a list that was substantially larger than what we thought we 
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would get, but we knew what our target was, and we knew what our target projects were.  So …I 
think we knew how to negotiate” (Atlanta Mayor Senior Staffer, interview, June 24, 2014). 
Henry County Chairman Mathis thought locally too, when she brought up geographic equity 
concerns that outer ring counties were not getting their fair share (RTR Meeting, audio 
recording, August 15, 2011).  
The project selection criteria reinforced a focus on geographic equity that was already 
prevalent among Committee members.  Hayse, from ARC, recalls that the Roundtable members 
supported this criterion in order to help win the 2012 vote.  The Executive Committee ultimately 
agreed to ensure that at least 80% of the money each county put into the tax would come back to 
them (Johnson, B., interview, June 18, 2014). This had important impacts on the projects 
selected. The Roundtable asked Hayse and ARC to try to balance the money spent with the 
money collected in each county. For example, when considering the Clifton Corridor and the I-
20 East transit project, which were both in Fulton and DeKalb counties,33 Hayse recalls: “…we 
couldn’t put both in—if you had put both in then you had the issue of geographic equity of the 
ten counties, and that was the other thing we were trying to preserve is the fact that someone 
paying their penny in Cherokee would be getting back… I mean, from a planning stand point 
both of these projects were good.  But when you start looking at all these political concerns…” 
(Hayse, J., interview, June 26, 2014).  Geographic equity concerns were on display in an 
especially obvious way at the August 15 Committee.  As that discussion indicated, each county’s 
representatives had a sort of ownership over the projects from its jurisdiction.  In one case, an 
unnamed representative says he would be willing to cut more from his county’s list, but only if 
everyone else did the same: “I want to echo the [Atlanta] Mayor’s comments, with regard to 
shared sacrifice.  That’s why I’ve asked for that $47 million to sit on the table.  I’d like to see 
                                                
33 Considered the central counties in the region. 
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that same kind of sacrifice come around to each of you… I’d like to see others do the same.  If 
it’s not, then that $47 million doesn’t do anything” (RTR Meeting, audio recording, August 15, 
2011). In a similar way, Mayor Reed argued against a proposal that would have cut funding to 
essential maintenance to the MARTA rail system.  He did not argue against it because it was 
detrimental to an important regional transit provider, but because “I would just urge our team to 
try and resolve the last $130 million collaboratively, rather than balancing it on the backs of 
Atlanta and DeKalb” (RTR Meeting, audio recording, August 15, 2011).   
In some cases the geographic equity process was not sufficient to include regionally 
important projects, and the legislation had one helpful feature for overcoming this, as it allowed 
GDOT Transportation Director Todd Long to personally add projects to the “menu,” when they 
were not important enough to any one county to support them (Hayse, J., interview, June 26, 
2014).  However the legislation also supported local projects by requiring that 15% of proceeds 
for the Atlanta region’s tax collections be distributed to the counties for use on projects of their 
choosing (Georgia HB 277, §48-8-249(e). 
Clearly everyone there knew they needed to think about the region as a whole.  Several 
interviewees saw a direct benefit to being part of a regional process, including things they could 
do that would not be possible had their county continued to propose ballot measures that were 
confined to its borders. For example, Mayor Reed’s senior transportation staffer says in Atlanta 
they saw a benefit to doing projects that cross county lines, too large for a single-county tax.  For 
example the Northwest Corridor to Emory, the corridor to South Cobb County, and the I-285/I-
20W interchange, which was Douglas County’s highest priority project, though it wasn’t in 
Douglas County. “You know, I think people really realized that ‘Oh, we really do have some 
cross-jurisdictional things in common, and cross-jurisdictional goals that we can try to achieve” 
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(Senior Reed Staffer, interview, June 20, 2014).   
 By the same token, from Douglas County’s point of view, Chairman Worthan recalled: 
“A lot of people said… why a regional vote when we could do a [local sales tax] our self and we 
can keep all the money?”  However he believed his county was getting more money in projects 
than it was putting in, because the I-285/I-20W interchange was essential to getting to Douglas 
County, though it was located in Atlanta (Worthan, T., interview, June 19, 2011).  Yet it was 
hard for the Committee to come to these types of agreements. 
Attempts to overcome localism were constant throughout the process, though local 
concerns kept coming back.  Mayor Johnson ensured the Committee members discussed projects 
according to different dimensions, which spanned city and county boundaries, and allowed for a 
cross-jurisdictional dialogue.  These included inner/outer counties, transportation corridors, and 
activity centers.  
The Roundtable Chairman thought of the region as entirely connected: “Any relief you 
could give to one part of the system helped the entire system” (Johnson, B., interview, June 18, 
2014).  His thinking contrasted sharply with the constant transit vs. highway, inner vs. outer, 
black vs. white divisions cited by almost every interviewee in the Atlanta metro area.  There 
were many attempts to overcome these divisions, and consensus was important to the Chair, in 
order to present a show of unity to the public, and help the measure pass in the subsequent 
election.  This included a gentleman’s agreement among inner and outer counties to make sure a 
certain percentage of the money collected at home was returned (Floyd, B., interview, June 18, 
2014).  
Nevertheless, it was hard to overcome decades of disagreement and division in Atlanta. 
There was a fault line at the “perimeter” highway, i.e., Atlanta’s beltway between the urban and 
 147  
suburban areas. Representatives either came from the “outer loop” or inside it. The inner/outer 
and black/white divisions did not always coincide neatly, and sometimes racial divisions 
manifested themselves within cities and counties (Floyd, B., interview, June 18, 2014).34  This 
made it difficult to make decisions on where to build (Stoner, D., interview, June 19, 2014), and 
senior ARC staff member Jane Hayse remembers having to broker many city-suburb agreements 
(Hayse, J., interview, June 26, 2014). 
 These longstanding problems were not helped by the way the process was set up.  A pre-
authorization/blanket authorization process at the county level would be expected to have a pre-
existing county governmental structure on which it could rely to develop the plan and implement 
the proposal once approved. For the TSPLOST measure, there was no analogous groundwork for 
a regional process in place—no regional government to plan, build, and operate the system when 
completed.  And projects ‘belonged’ to the counties, not the region. It is not surprising that the 
Roundtable representatives used the “peanut butter”35 approach to planning, spreading projects 
evenly around the region, even though they knew all its pitfalls both for transportation planning, 
and for ensuring a vision that could appeal to voters. 
Input from Outside the Roundtable 
The Roundtable participants remained focused on local concerns, even though vocal 
citizen groups persistently demanded multi-jurisdictional thinking with long-term outcomes.  In 
one sense, the Committee found it difficult to know exactly what citizens wanted. There was a 
conflict between constituents focused on local concerns and large regional organizations like the 
Sierra Club and the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People (NAACP), 
which favored a regional approach.  
                                                
34 Concerns by south DeKalb County about insufficient transit funding were rampant and racialized to a high degree. 
35 A term used frequently by interviewees across the four regions, similar to the “Christmas tree” approach to 
providing something for everyone. 
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This choice was made more difficult by the lack of reliable polling information. There are 
intermittent references throughout the process to the need to pick projects that voters could 
understand, using methods comprehensible to voters.  However local leaders did not have the 
opportunity, under the TIA, to make other important choices like the year to conduct the election.  
HB 277 passed in 2010, and by 2011 the Roundtable was deciding on projects.  This short 
timeline meant there was no time to do adequate polling that could have aided project selections, 
and the Roundtable process had to move ahead without this vital information.  This was evident 
at a February 2011 Roundtable meeting, as a representative from the Metro Chamber told Long 
there would not even be a Request for Proposals (RFP) on polling data until April.  Long replied: 
“It’s kinda happening so fast, it would be nice to have that on board now…”  (RTR Meeting, 
audio recording, February 17, 2011). But by law, a public agency cannot run the campaign, and 
depended on outside groups like the Chamber of Commerce’s “First Friday Group” to conduct 
polls.36 Committee members did not regard these polls as being very useful because they 
revealed that voters strongly supported projects located near them, but not away from them 
(Williams, D., interview, June 23, 2014).  However, while participants disregarded the data as 
not useful, it might have been an early warning that the projects on the unconstrained list were 
too local to attract regional support.  In fact one MARTA project did have support across the 
region, but was disregarded because it was too costly (Williams, D., interview, June 23, 2014). 
In the absence of adequate polling data, one might expect the public comment at 
Roundtable meetings to have provided another important method for the Roundtable to identify 
citizen concerns and craft a proposal that could satisfy them.  However the process designed by 
                                                
36 ARC conducted limited political data gathering, like focus groups, unscientific straw polls, and telephone town 
halls, but the Executive Committee did not consider these reliable sources of information (RTR Meeting, audio 
recording, May 24, 2011).  
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the TIA did not leave enough room for citizen groups to contribute in its early stages. Projects 
were selected by representatives from each county, with no direct input from advocacy 
organizations, other than from the public comment section of each meeting.  As State Senator 
Sheldon recalls, most people didn’t really engage until after the project list was posted (Sheldon, 
D., interview, June 26, 2014).  By this point the Executive Committee had completed its most 
intensive horse-trading, and projects requested by citizen groups had, in many cases, been 
deemed too costly, too long-term and outside the selection criteria that GDOT had developed 
almost a year before.  
Without early participation, it appears there was insufficient buy-in from many important 
constituencies. Though several groups spoke throughout the process,37 the speakers in the public 
comment sessions did not become very critical until after the first draft of the list was published.  
Only then did major concerns from the Sierra Club and the NAACP become apparent to the 
Committee (RTR Meetings, audio recordings, September16 & 28, 2011).  (It is notable that the 
Sierra Club, Tea Party and NAACP later formed the coalition that opposed the measure during 
the 2012 campaign). However few spoke at Roundtable or Executive Committee meetings.  
The Georgia Chapter Director of the Sierra Club says she was never asked to contribute 
to the development of the list early on.  Although she went to every meeting,  “It was like every 
time I was speaking I was talking to a wall.  They were just like uh huh, uh huh, uh huh.  ‘Cause 
it was they just didn’t really care… They were going to do whatever they were going to do.  And 
the public input and what was happening at the Roundtable were like almost in two different 
universes” (Kiernan, C., interview, June 23, 2014).  Indeed, based on the audio recordings of the 
meetings, the responses to public comment presentations sound very pro forma.  Dooley, from 
                                                
37 This included disability rights groups in favor of a call center providing information on accessible transit services. 
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the Tea Party Patriots Board of Directors, similarly recalls going to the outreach meetings, but 
never spoke: “You could tell by the look on their faces that they really didn’t care what they 
were saying.  They would have public hearings but they wouldn’t really listen” (Dooley, D., 
interview, June 19, 2014).   
Once the Sierra Club and the NAACP did begin making their concerns known, there was 
little the Roundtable did to accommodate them.  This appears to be due, in part, to the late stage 
at which these groups brought their concerns to the Committee.  By this time, the principles for 
project selection had been developed almost a year earlier, and the Committee had spent months 
working to achieve agreement on the financially constrained list. In the audio recordings, there is 
a palpable reluctance to make any changes to the list at the Committee meetings following the 
approval of the draft list (RTR Meetings, audio recordings, September 16-October 13, 2011).   
While the Committee was willing to entertain amendments, its members agreed that any 
amendments had to be revenue neutral, ensuring these would be minor in scope, and dependent 
on agreement among a number of local elected officials whose projects might be disrupted.  For 
example, Fayette County’s Chairman achieved unanimous approval of a road project funded by 
switching it for a different project on the draft list. The county agreed to make up the minor cost 
differential by allocating some of its 15% designated for local projects (RTR Meeting, audio 
recording, September 28, 2011).   
By contrast, a proposal by the DeKalb County Chairman to fund a MARTA extension 
eastward was unable to gain the Committee’s support.  DeKalb County’s proposal was much 
more ambitious than Fayette County’s, and the DeKalb Chairman Burrell Ellis proposed 
defunding a major highway interchange project to pay for it.  Atlanta’s Mayor Reed, from the 
neighboring county, strongly supported the project’s potential to bring rail towards many lower 
 151  
income communities in South DeKalb County.  However he withdrew his support when the 
project sponsors failed to identify another way to fund it.  Cutting the money from a key 
interchange was a nonstarter for Mayor Reed, and everyone else on the Committee. 
Consequently, the motion to amend the list died without a second (RTR Meeting, audio 
recording, October 11, 2011).  While the NAACP was upset with this (DeKalb NAACP, blog, 
July 3, 2012), the dynamic of the Committee process made it too difficult to make a big change 
at this late date. 
Analysis of the projects that the Sierra Club and the NAACP questioned shows that these 
were largely decided before the August 15 draft list was approved.   Funding for Sugarloaf 
Parkway, the road the Sierra Club was most concerned with, remained fairly constant throughout 
the process.  The MARTA North extension was cut in late July.  The MARTA East extension 
was reinstated August 11, with $250 million.  The only project advocated by these groups which 
was added after August 15 was the Commuter Rail to Griffin, where the Committee decided to 
provide $20 million to do preliminary environmental studies, in preparation for future 
development of the project (RTR Project Lists: 4/15/11, 6/8/11, 7/7/11, 7/21/11, 8/11/11, 
8/15/11, 10/13/11).  
The advocacy organizations certainly had enough time to make their complaints known. 
However the process did not offer sufficient involvement for outside groups, especially in its 
early stages.  Public comment during meetings was clearly not enough to create real buy-in for 
organizations not directly represented on its board.  This may have been a lost opportunity to 
discuss what the ideal system could be from multiple perspectives, and to appeal to citizen needs.  
To groups that were disengaged from the process, like the Tea Party, the carefully crafted list 
looked like “a big slush fund” (Dooley, D., interview, June 19, 2014). Several groups that were 
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not integral to the project selection later became opponents leading the campaign against 
TSPLOST. 
Findings from Atlanta 
The special authorization provided by HB 277 made it difficult to develop a proposal that 
appealed to a broader regional sense of purpose, which contributed to an unsuccessful campaign 
to sell the plan that the Roundtable produced.  The prescriptive features (see Table 3.2) of the 
legislation included the choice of a sales tax set at 1%, the July primary election held in the 2012 
election cycle, the decision to include ten counties using the ARC boundaries, the short timeline 
for holding the process, the criteria for selection, the limited project list, the public process with 
carefully specified membership, the hard deadlines, and its process of elimination. All of these 
features followed state-level political imperatives. These were not always the same as local ones, 
and at times, these features were at odds with the way local leaders would have organized the 
measure on their own.  Although state politicians gave locals a degree of leeway over project 
selections, these decisions had to be made in accordance with a carefully prescribed set of rules 
and criteria. 
The law’s language made it difficult to have a geography or election date conducive to 
passage.  It established a rigid regime of rules that required projects to provide short-term 
outcomes, follow the state vision already in place, and draw projects from existing ‘off-the shelf’ 
proposals. It set up a process based on continual elimination of projects (Georgia HB 277, §48-8-
243), decided in a public forum where these choices were hard to make (Georgia HB 277, §32-9-
14(i). These limitations were reinforced by asking local governments to come forward with local 
project proposals, rather than beginning with a discussion of what the region needed.  
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These strictures made it hard for the participants in the Roundtable to move the process 
towards projects that would have better matched public desires.  For example, without a single 
narrative or reason for doing the tax, the locals’ decision on projects was selected from an 
unwieldy list that needed to be whittled down one step at a time.  These were easily criticized as 
local ‘pork’ in the subsequent campaign—especially when the projects were in another 
jurisdiction. In sum, the prescriptive legislation had a pronounced effect in limiting the role 
various leaders could play to ensure the TSPLOST proposal would succeed at the polls. 
The Atlanta case required the introduction of special legislation to place a tax on the 
ballot across multiple counties at once.  This translated into a process that involved both local 
and state-level politicians, each with different political imperatives.  The Atlanta process was 
originally spearheaded by the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, which did not have members 
directly elected to state-level office.  Its state ties were indirect, and it was unable to wield the 
same level of influence on the state process as the boundary-spanner in the San Francisco Bay 
Area case, who was himself a state senator.  Furthermore, the legislature was reluctant to offer 
the region much leeway in how or when it conducted the process.  Authorization to do future 
processes was made unlikely by a provision requiring a majority of county governing bodies to 
approve a second vote, in addition to obtaining legislative consent. HB 277 was written specially 
for the 2011-2012 process (Georgia HB 277, §48-8-245(c)(1). Consequently, the state political 
imperatives over issues like the election date, the counties included, and every other aspect of the 
bill, had a direct influence on the way this process was conducted, ensuring that state politics 
colored many key aspects of it.  
For example, state legislators had great concerns about whether the locals could make 
their decisions in time for the 2012 election, and felt the need to include many requirements that 
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kept it on schedule (Sheldon, D., interview, June 26, 2014; Roberts, J. interview, June 20, 
2014)—which they succeeded in doing.  For example, the Executive Committee would not have 
met for a final round of horse-trading on October 15, 2011, were it not for a deadline in the 
legislation.  It is also very possible there would have been no Roundtable process at all had it not 
been for the substantial financial incentives in the bill for counties to participate (Georgia HB 
277, §48-8-244).38  However despite these goals, the rigid rules governing the process combined 
with the large amount of freedom locals had to select projects within those tight guidelines.  
Consequently, it took a very long time to complete all the steps, and it was very difficult to go 
backward when citizen groups complained about particular projects at the very end.   
It does appear the process needed some legislative direction to proceed on time.  But 
proceed to where?  Few people quite understood why they were doing this or where they wanted 
the process to go.  They were following a prescription, with its final goal (less traffic, more 
transportation) predetermined at the capitol—a goal, but not a vision for how a regional 
transportation proposal might look.  While Committee members developed a consensus, as ARC 
staffer Hayse observed: “It’s hard for the public to understand how 150 projects fit into a 
coherent vision” (Hayse, J., interview, June 26, 2014). In fact, Johnson acknowledged: “…It was 
a complex product just for the people who were part of the whole process” (Johnson, B., 
interview, June 18, 2014).   In fact, at a Gwinnett County telephone town hall meeting, Hayse’s 
own explanation for the plan reveals the lack of local support for doing the plan in the first place:  
“Well, why are we doing this? Because the Georgia General Assembly passed the 
Transportation Investment Act in 2010, that allows regions of the state to enter into a 
referendum on a penny sales tax for ten years to fund regional transportation projects”  
(ARC, audio recording, June 20, 2011). 
 
                                                
38 Should the measure lose, local governments would be required to pay a 30% match for maintenance and 
improvement grants from GDOT, for a two year period; however if the tax were to have passed, governments would 
have been offered 10% match rates (Georgia HB 277, §48-8-244). 
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As her statement indicates, Atlanta’s elected officials were conducting the Roundtable process 
not because anyone came with a plan they wanted to fund, but because the state initiated a 
process they had to follow.  
This was a very cumbersome, political and technocratic process.  Most participants 
imagined it as nothing more than a single, extraordinary process, unlikely to be repeated.  It was 
simply too challenging, too stressful, and took too long to do it again. The Chair himself said he 
would not participate in it if it were to occur again. “It was basically about a two year time frame 
by the time you put the committee together, you know, there was almost a year lapse.… So it 
was just a long, stressful time….” (Johnson, B., interview, June 18, 2014). 
As noted above, HB 277 provides that the process can reoccur on any statewide general 
primary election date, if a majority of counties vote to do it (Georgia HB 277, §48-8-245). 
However it would be very cumbersome to attempt this process a second time.  Hayse 
commented, “I’ve heard, and know, that many, many regions, it fails the first time. And then it 
maybe passes the second or third time.  I don’t know what the time frame is between those 
chances, but in our case it could be once a decade at the worst.  And how can you plan and work 
in that environment?” (Hayse, J., interview, June 26, 2014).  Several other interviewees agreed 
the HB 277 process is simply too difficult to repeat in its current form (Reed Senior Staffer; 
Worthan, T; Johnson, B, interviews, 2014).  It requires too much time and political capital.  And 
that means a hefty investment by a boundary-spanner to initiate it. Even if this were to occur, the 
process would still have all its same legislative flaws—too many counties, too bureaucratic, 
projects that are too localized, and too hard to incorporate full citizen participation, among 
others.  It would still be the same state process, the same group of counties, the same procedures 
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for project selection—not in alignment with local needs.  And local needs are likely to change 
over time, while the bill may not.   
Some changes have already manifested themselves.  When the bill was written in 2010, 
the legislature assumed the economy would improve by the 2012 election.  When it didn’t, there 
was no way for local governments to simply reschedule the vote, since the timing of the election 
was written into the bill (Sheldon, D., interview, June 26, 2014).  And most politicians would 
agree, it’s not a good idea to ask voters about raising taxes during a recession.  
The TIA process is not sufficiently malleable and resilient to accommodate these 
changes, and it is unlikely anyone will try to do so for many years to come.  As Chairman 
Johnson said, “I wouldn’t be involved in [a transportation funding process] if, you know, it was 
another legislative type thing like that.  I would only be involved in this if a group of people 
could get together and, you know, make a proposal and do it like that.  Because it was just too 
onerous working under all those, you know, conditions…. Under the legislation.”  (Johnson, B., 
interview, June 18, 2014).  Interestingly, Johnson’s suggestion is similar to the MATI process the 
Chamber first began with, and closer to the processes discussed in the following two chapters.  
In conclusion, this case supports the hypotheses of the dissertation.  In the absence of 
state authorizing legislation, a boundary-spanner with legislative connections was needed to 
develop a process that could bridge the local and state political imperatives.  While the Chamber 
acted as a boundary-spanner in Atlanta, the business community did not have sufficient 
legislative influence to win the region-driven proposal it originally sought.  While the Metro 
Chamber initiated the discussion, the legislature continued it, and developed a bill that did not 
respond to local political needs—not to mention cumbersome, time consuming and restrictive as 
well. As this case suggests, it is simply too difficult for legislators to know all the things locals 
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will need to make the process work well and legislation with a more permissive structure would 
have left greater opportunities to develop a project list that could gain support from a large 
portion of citizens. 
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Chapter 7: Seattle Case Analysis 
Chapter 7 Summary 
This chapter examines a series of regional processes in Seattle, which relied on pre-authorized 
legislation that was also highly permissive.  This created an environment where most decision 
making was made at the local and regional level.  The boundary-spanner acted as one facilitator 
among many committed participants, and was not singularly essential to the process. This 
chapter also identifies and analyzes the level of permissiveness of the various elements of the 
authorizing legislation, and discusses their impact on the process.  The discussion compares the 
role of the authorizing legislation in shaping the decision process to the role played by local and 
regional policy making frameworks.  All together, this chapter finds that the process in Seattle 
facilitated decision making that supported local political needs ahead of those tied to state-level 
political imperatives. 
Introduction 
Today, Seattle has a strong reputation for its public transport system, with a light rail 
system undergoing ambitions expansion to the University of Washington, Sea-Tac Airport, and 
the technology clusters in the eastern part of the region.  One could easily assume it was always 
that way.  However before 1990, public transit in the region was largely local and single-county.  
This chapter examines several of the referendums that changed this situation.   
It was by no means a foregone conclusion that the process would succeed.  The region 
was more conservative in 1988.  Snohomish County voted for President Bush in the 1988 
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election (Washington Secretary of State, 2016).  Several early board members from suburban 
parts of King County were Republicans (Nickels, interview, September 10, 2014). And the 1995 
ballot measure went down in defeat due to staunch opposition from anti-tax groups, led by a 
powerful local shopping mall developer (Foltz, 2010; Butler, interview, September 4, 2014).   
Seattle makes an interesting case for this study due to the extent of its pre-
authorization/blanket authorization, and the law’s unusual level of permissiveness.  Out of the 
regions studied in this dissertation, Seattle’s legislation is, in fact, the most permissive.  Unlike 
Denver, which is also a pre-authorized case, Seattle leaves much of the decision making to local 
governments, especially counties, allowing them to decide whether to create a Regional Transit 
Authority (RTA). The law gives counties the power to appoint Sound Transit board members, 
and to select boundaries.  And it gives counties the final say over whether to approve the 
Authority’s proposals and call a tax referendum (Washington HB 1825, 1990 & Washington HB 
2610, 1992).    
This chapter analyzes how this locally driven regional process worked, and looks into the 
relative influence of local versus state authority in that decision making.  This has been a highly 
inclusive process, with strong pre-existing legislation and little necessity to fight for new 
authorizing powers.  Boundary-spanning agents have existed, but bore a diminished role, acting 
mainly as facilitator, and occasionally, defender of existing legislative authorization, rather than 
lobbyist for new authority. Sound Transit has relied strongly on regional decision making 
frameworks, which were not prescribed in legislation, but emerged, instead, from the Regional 
Transit Authority’s own policies.  Finally, the Regional Transit Authority has been more 
concerned about local approval of its plans than extensive state oversight.   
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Case Outline 
In 1992 the legislature in Washington State created a Regional Transit Authority for the 
three county metro area, known since 1997 as “Sound Transit” (Washington HB 2610, 1992; 
Sound Transit, 2007).  The Regional Transit Authority/Sound Transit board was to be appointed 
by county executives from each county, rather than elected.  Under this law the board was given 
the power to place transportation funding plans on the ballot across the District’s member 
counties (which could change over time), raising taxes to support a multi-county transit 
investment plan.  As summarized below, RTA/Sound Transit boards did this four times between 
1995-2008, and voters approved its proposals twice.  This long timeline requires a brief history. 
Figure 7.1: Timeline of Seattle Events 
 
 
A County-Driven Process: Overview of Regional Processes 
   
The Seattle metro area had long discussed the possibility of building a regional rail 
system, but had little history of working on collaborative cross-county projects. King County 
voters had rejected single-county rapid transit proposals in 1968 and 1970 (Foltz, 2010: 23-24). 
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With time, however, the need to reduce congestion became apparent.  State Representative Ruth 
Fisher, in particular, is credited with bringing this topic to the fore at Washington State’s capital, 
Olympia.  In an effort to accommodate the state’s rapid growth, she sponsored HB 1035 of 1987, 
which created the Rail Development Commission, charged with examining comprehensive 
solutions to the state’s growth (Washington HB 1035, 1987).  The Commission’s 
recommendations became the basis for legislation providing a framework for the development of 
so-called “high capacity transit” in the state’s urban areas.  A key finding was that one solution 
would not work across the state, due to highly divergent needs between Washington’s growing 
Puget Sound region and the state’s rural eastern half.  Consequently, the Committee 
recommended funding at the local level (Baxtrom, from McCleod, Oral History, 2007: 153-154).  
The bill resulting from the Commission’s recommendations created a regional process 
propelled by bottom-up decision making and local consent to each major progression into a new 
agency, a new plan. HB 1825 provided a framework for interlocal agreements among county 
transit agencies in the Puget Sound Region, and led to the creation of a tri-county committee, 
known as the Joint Regional Policy Committee (JRPC), which was charged with investigating 
the possibility of constructing a multi-county transit system in the region.  County leaders 
increased their involvement after the JRPC process highlighted some weaknesses of a county 
transit agency-driven regional plan.  These issues included an inability to make the cross-agency 
compromises they needed to make in order to develop an affordable plan (Foltz, 2010: 27-28), as 
well as the daunting task of holding a separate vote in each county jurisdiction, and the 
difficulties of staging and bonding projects through collaboration of three separate agencies 
(House Transportation Committee Bill Report, HB 2610, February 6, 1992).  
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HB 2610 of 1992 resolved these issues by formalizing the establishment of a Regional 
Transit Authority (RTA) to develop a plan and implement it (Baxtrom, from McCleod, Oral 
History, 2007: 154), but maintained local control of the process by requiring county councils to 
consent to the JRPC’s initial plan and approve the creation of an RTA to continue the process. 
And it required further consent to any plan the RTA might bring to bring to voters. It was not 
always easy to get this support.  As former King County Council Member Nickels recalls, “We 
had to go through each county council and have them authorize the creation of the district, and 
that was quite a fight.  There was significant opposition to that.  People saw it as a place where 
they could kill it before it was born”  (Nickels, interview, September 10, 2014). Suburban Pierce 
County and Snohomish County were not seriously interested in opting out.  However King 
County—home of Seattle, and center of the region—was more difficult.  “I think the King 
County Council was actually the toughest of the three.  We had a Republican majority, some 
members of whom were anti-rail, and if it hadn’t been for Bruce Laing [a Republican], frankly 
we would not have gotten to the ballot.  [It was] his leadership and the respect that some of his 
Republican colleagues had for him” (Nickels, interview, September 10, 2014). 
All three counties ultimately decided to proceed with JRPC’s plan and begin the planning 
process.  Following JRPC’s recommendation, the new RTA proposed a 0.4% sales tax increase 
and an increase of 0.3% of vehicle value.  They developed an extensive regional proposal, 
dubbed “Sound Move,” which failed to gain enough voter support in 1995; however with major 
revisions and reductions, a regional plan passed with 56.5% voter approval in 1996 (Sound 
Transit 2007).  
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Figure 7.2: Sound Move Plan, Approved 1996 
 
 
Moving Forward, 1996 
 
HB 2610 of 1992 left RTA with more taxing authority than it had used in the first plan, 
and it was now authorized to seek voter approval for up to a 1% sales tax and a 0.8% motor 
vehicle excise tax (MVET), with no sunset date on its use.  Board members discussed using the 
additional taxing authority for a future “Phase 2” as far back as the 1995 process, and, in fact, 
used this possibility to assure outlying counties not immediately served by the first phase of its 
light rail plan (e.g. RTA Meeting Minutes, February 25, 1994). By 2004, there was talk of going 
back to the voters for the funds needed to begin expanding the system. However once again, 
county support was needed to proceed, and there were too many difficulties agreeing on a single 
plan (Seattle Times, Editorial, December 14, 2003), while polling showed any proposal was 
unlikely to pass that year (Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, May 20, 2004). By 2006, the 
board was preparing for a November election, but state elected officials had other plans.  The 
Legislature, through HB 2871 of 2006 and HB 1396 of 2007, mandated that, for Sound Transit’s 
2007 ballot vote only, the measure needed to be tied to a separate proposal on a series of road 
Sound Move -- The 10-Year Regional
Transit System Plan
As adopted May 31, 1996
Sound Move 
http://www.soundtransit.org/soundmove/map.html (1 of 2) [7/22/2000 3:59:07 PM]
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improvements, then being developed by a separate road improvement authority from the same 
region, the Regional Transportation Investment District (RTID).   
The two regional authorities did not have coterminous boundaries, but HB 1396 specified 
that a simple majority of voters in both districts needed to approve a unified ballot measure for it 
to pass (known as Proposition 1).  This provision confused voters, and the combination of an 
already massive $30.8 billion transit measure with a $16.4 billion highway improvement 
measure was simply too large for many voters.  Additionally, the combination of transit with 
road proposals elicited opposition from environmentalists like the Sierra Club, concerned with 
the global warming effects of roads (Lange, November 6, 2007).  Consequently, the measure lost 
by a 56-44% majority (Sound Transit, 2007).  While this may seem to be an example of strong 
state intervention in the regional process, even in this instance, the state left intact the system of 
requiring county approval to join the regional authority and place either measure on the ballot 
(Washington HB 2817, 2006; Washington HB 1396, 2007 §2).  And Sound Transit’s planning 
process was also left largely untouched.  It is more accurate to describe this as an involuntary 
pairing of two agencies, with separate planning processes, for the duration of the election. 
2008 Proposal 
This failure elicited dire predictions in 2007, but RTA/Sound Transit was able to come 
back only one year later with a new regional measure, again using its remaining taxing authority 
under HB 2610 of 1992 as the basis for a second phase—a process that relied on each county’s 
stamp of approval, just as in 1995 and 1996. 
Identifying a Pre-Authorized/Blanket Authorized Proposal for Analysis 
Although Seattle metro area voters considered four different ballot measures between 
1990 and 2008, for the sake of brevity, this chapter considers only one of the two processes from 
the 1995-1996 period, in order to understand the patterns of decision making that emerged for 
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future Seattle processes. (Several more decision making patterns arose in 1996, and will be cited 
periodically, but they developed out of the same attention to local needs described for 1995).   
 
Figure 7.3:  Sound Transit 2 Proposal, 2008 
 
 
Sound2 Making Connections, 2008, pg. 5 
 
Being the most recent processes, many interviewees remembered the 2007 and 2008 
proposals the best.  Both processes relied to some extent on authorizing legislation approved in 
the 1990s, though the 2008 process, in particular, provides a unique perspective on a process 
governed by legislation pre-authorized long before. All four processes, in fact, could be 
described as pre-authorized, though they defy easy categorization. One could see the 1995 
process as a new stage of the JRPC process, coming right on the heels of new legislation that 
created a long-term implementation instrument.  However the legislation was also quite 
permissive, and essentially left RTA and county councils to act on their own. Though the 
legislation was approved just before the 1995 process began, it was not tied directly to a single 
election year, and is therefore identified here as pre-authorized.  The same can be said for the 
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1996 process.  This legislation contained a sunset clause, but one that allowed enough time for a 
second ballot attempt, following the 1995 defeat.  Thus, the process took place, again, using 
legislation that was not written expressly for it. 
Another complication came in 2006, when the legislature passed HB 2871, preventing a 
2006 process from taking place.  Even this interference, however, was confined to the date of the 
election, which the legislature required to occur in 2007, as well as the requirement to pair 
RTA’s transit measure with a roads measure being developed by a separate authority. These 
specifications had a strong impact on the vote, but RTA was largely able to keep its project 
selection process intact, keep the same tax rate, tax type, and other essential features, though the 
transit and highway proposals were now joined.  This study classifies the 2007 process as 
specially authorized, since the legislation was directly targeted at the 2007 ballot measure.   
Yet the 2008 process was quite different.  Though it stemmed from the same legislation 
that authorized the state’s intervention in 2007,39 that legislation also introduced a blanket 
authorization provision, by not specifying a sunset date to RTA/Sound Transit’s ability to go 
back to voters should the 2007 proposal fail, except in 2008, the provision requiring the joint 
roads-transit measure was no longer in force. Therefore the 2008 proposal should be seen as a 
blanket authorized proposal.  And since none of the four bills that supported it were written with 
specifically to allow the 2008 measure, it should be considered pre-authorized as well.   
For the sake of simplicity, the earlier processes will be discussed to the extent possible, 
based on archival details, providing background for the many decision patterns that continued 
into the post 2004 proposals.   
 
 
 
                                                
39 Washington HB 1825, 1990; HB 2610 of 1992; HB 2871, 2006, HB 1396 of 2007. 
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Permissive Legislation 
Clearly, several pieces of legislation governed the various regional processes over an 18 
year timespan, but HB 1825 of 1990, and HB 2610 of 1992 provided the majority of the powers 
RTA/Sound Transit used throughout its four planning processes, and these bills formed the basis 
for the 2008 process examined in this chapter, though its blanket authorization came from HB 
2871 of 2006.  Since the 2008 process was pre-authorized almost 16 years before it took place, 
legislative features, rather than legislators’ intentions, are this chapter’s primary concern. 
Both bills have an extraordinary degree of deference to local decision making. This was 
partly due to the different needs on each side of the state (Baxstrom, from McCleod, Oral 
History, 2007: 153-154), and a desire to involve local governments in the decision process 
(Haugen, from McCleod, Oral History, 2007: 84). This is apparent right away when reading the 
1992 bill’s statement of legislative intent, “…to empower counties in the state’s most populous 
region to create a local agency for planning and implementing a high capacity transportation 
system within that region.”  In fact, the bill states explicitly that it”…is not intended to limit the 
powers of existing transit agencies” (Washington HB 2610, 1992).  
This can be seen in the choice of geography for the regional planning agency.  Rather 
than prescribe this in the legislation, both bills let local governments decide whether to be a party 
to the regional planning process.  This is done in HB 1825 of 1990 through interlocal agreements, 
which county transit agencies must join voluntarily, which lead to the creation of a regional 
process led by a “Joint Regional Planning Committee” (JRPC).  HB 2610 modifies this, while 
creating a long-term Regional Transit Authority, and requiring county councils to vote on 
whether to join the new agency. Additionally, the 1992 law ensures robust local participation by 
providing that each county council appoints its own members to the RTA.   
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Once created, county councils maintain strong control over the process, and must vote to 
ratify the RTA’s proposed plans before the proposal can go to the ballot. If unsuccessful within 
two years of its creation, member counties may leave, or with a 2/3 vote, the RTA board may 
dissolve itself.  However despite these local powers, RTA maintains its stability, due to a 
provision that prohibits counties from unilaterally withdrawing from the RTA once voters have 
decided to create it (Washington HB 2610, 1992 §3). While the measure uses an opt-in, rather 
than an opt-out strategy, in practice, it was challenging but not daunting to assemble local 
support, since there were only three counties, and all three voted to participate within months of 
the Legislature’s action.40  
Lack of a Sunset Date 
HB 2610’s lack of a sunset date on the taxing authority allowed RTA to return to voters 
several times for additional approval.  This was not entirely a ‘blank check,’ particularly in 1995 
and 1996, because another provision required voters to ratify both the formation of the RTA and 
its regional transportation proposal within two years of the agency’s formation (Washington HB 
2610, 1992 §3).  Furthermore, HB 2871 of 2006 prevented RTA from exercising its authority 
before 2007, and then, only in combination with a highway package approved by the separate 
Regional Transportation Investment District (Washington HB 2871, 2006 §8, 12).  As mentioned 
above, this provision only applied to the 2007 election, and in following years, the agency was 
again free to offer a proposal at the ballot following the 2007 defeat (Washington HB 2871, 2006 
§5, 12).  Notably, none of these bills discussed here limited the period over which taxes could be 
collected, or the time period for implementing the proposed construction, which provided 
additional flexibility when developing a set of projects desirable for the electorate.  
                                                
40 Counties participated by interlocal agreement under HB 1825 (1990), and by voting to join the RTA, after passage 
of HB 2610 (1992).  
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Geography 
The bills are highly flexible on determining the boundaries for the RTA.  Both HB 1825 
and HB 2610 allow counties to join as long as they are contiguous (Washington HB 1825, 1990 
§17; Washington HB 2610, 1992 §3, 5).  Both bills allow additional counties to join later.  
Finally, HB 2610 clarifies the procedure for drawing boundaries at the local level, leaving a great 
deal of the decision making to the RTA board.  While the bill offers the JRPC boundaries as a 
starting point for the new RTA, board members had discretion over whether to move those lines, 
as long as they kept entire cities inside the borders, and followed precinct lines.  In fact, the new 
board spent several meetings developing maps and fine tuning its borders in advance of the 1995 
vote (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, July 8, 1994). 
No Projects Specified 
Neither HB 1825 nor HB 2610 requires specific projects or even corridors for inclusion 
in regional plans by RTA or the JRPC, following Washington State’s preference for local 
decision making. RTA and the counties have the flexibility to choose the main projects. To be 
sure, there were other challenges, like geographic equity, which was a difficult ongoing 
challenge when developing RTA’s plans.  However state legislation does not specify projects, 
and leaves these decisions up to local leaders. Instead, HB 2610 provides a very general 
framework for resolving geographic equity matters during project selection, requiring that the 
final plan contain an equity element identifying revenue collections and revenue returns, as well 
as the schedule by which jurisdictions are likely to see benefits (Washington HB 2610, 1992 
§3.7C).  
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Tax Instrument & Rates 
The legislature leaves a great deal of discretion to RTA board members on one of the 
most basic issues—tax instruments and tax rates.  The tax instrument could be either a Motor 
Vehicle Excise Tax (MVET) or a sales tax.  The MVET tax rate could be anywhere from 0-0.8%, 
while the sales tax could be anywhere from 0-1% (Washington HB 1825, 1990 §42, 43; 
Washington HB 2610, 1992).  Potentially, this would allow such a decision to be made based on 
polling and citizen input, enabling the board to find a tax instrument and rate that makes the 
measure more likely to pass. 
Voting Requirements 
One final permissive element of the legislation is the provision for what kind of voting 
majority should be required at the polls. HB 1825 and HB 2610 require a simple majority of the 
total number voting across the district (Washington HB 1825, 1990 §25.3; Washington HB 2610, 
1992 §3.7C; Washington HB 2871, 2006), with no requirement to win in every county, which 
incentivized the selection of projects with a regional, rather than local, appeal. The simple 
majority provision, in tandem with approval by a county legislative body, follows the practice 
used for other local tax measures in the state of Washington (Goldman et al., 2001: 210-212). 
HB 2871 of 2006, discussed later, created a number of special concerns by preventing 
voting in 2006, and created confusion by placing measures from two different authorities on the 
same ballot (Washington HB 2871, 2006 §8).   
Decision Making in RTA’s First Planning Process, 1993-1995 
 An examination of the minutes from the first RTA decision process reveals little 
dependence on a single boundary-spanning agent, and few legislative limitations to the decision 
making process.  RTA held its first meeting in the summer of 1993, the year after passage of HB 
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2610 (1992). This continued an existing multi-county planning process, but under the auspices of 
a new regional agency, the RTA, which was intended to have the longevity needed to implement 
any voter-approved plan. While JRPC had offered a vision for developing transit in the region, 
RTA would institutionalize it. 
A Free Hand to Change the Existing Plan 
As RTA’s new board soon discovered, HB 2610 did not require that they kept the JRPC 
plan intact, giving them significant freedom to select projects.  However this was not so certain 
in the fog surrounding the creation of a new agency.  The fledgling board, with little budget or 
staff guidance, was unsure what to do with the JRPC plan it inherited.  At an October 1993 
workshop session to discuss the possible directions for the new agency, the board did not believe 
RTA’s authorizing legislation required them to use their predecessor, JRPC’s, plan, but this was 
not yet clear. Many RTA board members had clear reservations about using it, with one member 
concerned JRPC had rushed its work towards the end of the process, and noted, “After the plan 
went through the EIS process… commuter rail was suddenly added” (RTA Board Workshop 
Minutes, October 16, 1993).  
RTA board members were unsatisfied with JRPC’s final conclusions as well, but were 
unable to articulate a coherent alternative.  It is true, they were not in complete disagreement 
that, as Board Member Madsen pointed out, “The [RTA] board hasn’t settled on a single goal 
[yet], other than the fact we plan to build a rail system” (RTA Board Workshop Minutes, 
October 16, 1993). Indeed, Ms. Gates, of King County, spoke for many when she noted the 
existing plan was “…a good starting point for discussion purposes…[However] if I were asked 
to actively endorse the JRPC recommendations to my area and help sell them on a public ballot, I 
couldn't do it.”  Even as a starting point for discussion, the existence of JRPC’s plan came with a 
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potential pitfall for RTA. As Seattle Mayor Rice put it, “Sending out the JRPC plan for public 
comment may mislead the public into thinking it is the RTA’s plan, rather [than] a RTA device 
to generate public input about what RTA should develop” (RTA Board Workshop Minutes, 
October 16, 1993).  
This workshop left open the question of whether RTA could or should modify the JRPC 
plan, and at a November RTA board meeting, Board Member Nickels of King County expressed 
his belief it was RTA’s “…responsibility to finalize that plan and see that it is implemented” 
(RTA Board Meeting Minutes, November 12, 1993).  However many other board members were 
not so sure, and RTA’s new legal counsel settled the uncertainty over the role JRPC’s plan might 
play in constraining RTA’s decision making. RTA could, in fact, make minor changes to the 
JRPC plan, with a two-third majority, and could make very significant changes as well, but these 
would require a new environmental impact study, thus slowing down the process. The 
supermajority did not appear to be a major obstacle, and would be desirable in any case, when 
bringing a measure to the ballot.  However the board was still uncertain about changing the plan, 
because HB 2610 failed to provide a definition for ‘major’ and ‘minor’ changes (RTA Board 
Meeting Minutes, November 12, 1993) (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, February 25, 1994).   
Indeed, the RTA board’s ability to depart from the JRPC plan is an example of the level 
of flexibility RTA was granted in HB 2610.  The JRPC plan’s elements certainly continued to 
color RTA’s decision making throughout the 1995 process, and all three plan alternatives 
initially offered by staff were based on the JRPC plan (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, March 25, 
1994).  However the board was not constrained by the plan either, and quickly made significant 
changes to the staff proposals based on it. As early as January 1994, the agency’s newly hired 
Executive Director Matoff was recommending the board consider a scaled down plan, in stages, 
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including bus service (rather than just rail), and segments that were not fully grade separated, as 
JRPC had envisioned (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, January 28, 1994).  This was a major 
departure, but RTA kept the JRPC version as its master plan, while labeling the RTA plan a 
“phase” of implementing it. As Matoff put it, “I am not viewing this as a new planning process, 
but a way of defining and focusing on an increment we can move ahead with” (RTA Board 
Meeting Minutes, February 25, 1994).   
By May, the board was making further changes to the JRPC version, and even Board 
Member Nickels, who had once argued for keeping it in its entirety, was now suggesting 
amendments to serve residential communities, a departure from JRPC’s focus on employment 
centers (May 27, 1994).  This was not the only example, and indeed, in its final planning 
meeting, the board made additional major changes, including $100 million for a trunk regional 
bus line, and several changes attempting to ensure geographic equity to outlying parts of the 
region, which feared they would not receive service funded by the proposed tax for many 
years.41 In the end, the board approved a $6 billion plan, which was far more reliant on surface 
light rail, trunk express bus routes and commuter rail than the JRPC’s $13 billion heavy rail plan 
had envisioned (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, October 28, 1994).  
RTA’s Freedom to Change JRPC Boundaries 
 As with project selection, RTA did not need to keep the boundaries drawn by JRPC.  HB 
2610 of 1992 specified that RTA use the boundaries already set by the JRPC as a basis for 
discussion, but gave RTA the authority to “…make adjustments to the boundaries as deemed 
appropriate” (Washington HB 2610, 1992 §5).   Board members changed boundaries little from 
the JRPC lines, which had already been vetted by the public (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, 
                                                
41 This included $200 million for Pierce County transit to spend on local feeder service, $25 million for North King 
County for local service, and $100 million to the I-405 corridor, serving the Eastside, for the study of future 
commuter rail between Bellevue and Renton (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, October 28, 1994). 
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September 23, 1994).  RTA used the same uncodified practices for drawing boundaries as JRPC 
as well, using urban growth boundaries as a starting point, except in Pierce County, which didn’t 
have an urban growth boundary designated at that time.42  
 Though the legislation did not require the use of urban growth boundaries as a basis for 
discussion, the JRPC provided a convenient system to follow, and RTA board members did not 
discuss any ways that this practice might force them to include areas that did not want to be 
included, or limit their development of the plan.  Indeed, county councils’ original vote to join 
RTA had confined boundary selection decisions by the RTA board to refinement.   
Legislative Interventions Post HB 2610, and Impact on Decision Making  
RTA did not see significant active legislative interventions in its first process, freeing 
RTA to pursue its planning without state-level obstacles. New legislation was constructive, and 
not intended to limit RTA’s decision making process in a significant way. For example, 
legislative interventions between summer 1993 and fall 1995 were technical in nature, and best 
seen as ‘clean-up’ legislation to HB 2610 and HB 1825. Even the most consequential bills during 
RTA’s process merely allowed county executives to appoint themselves to serve on the RTA 
board—a change proposed by State Representative Fisher, the original sponsor of the RTA 
legislation (Washington HB 1825, 1990 & Washington HB 2610, 1992).  This change gave local 
decision makers more flexibility, not less, helping some county executives join the board, and 
ensuring greater participation from local leaders in RTA’s process—the same county executives 
who would be influential in deciding whether to approve RTA’s plan and send it to the voters 
(RTA Board Meeting Minutes, January 14, 1994; RTA Board Meeting Minutes, February 25, 
1994; Washington HB 2169, 1994).  Other legislative changes were even more technical.  For 
                                                
42 Instead, the board drew the line to approximate the county transit operator’s boundaries, and simply following the 
board’s “…gut feeling on where growth is likely to happen”  (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, September 30, 1994). 
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example, one bill clarified whether RTA could offer the JRPC master plan to voters in phases, 
rather than all at once—clarifying that, indeed, RTA could offer just a small, affordable part of 
the original JRPC vision to voters (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, January 28, 1994; Washington 
SB 6491, 1994).  These bills had no problem passing; nor did a third that merely clarified 
activities eligible for RTA funds (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, January 28, 1994; RTA Board 
Meeting Minutes, February 25, 1994).  These bills could be seen as the legislature’s attempts to 
ensure the RTA it had so recently created would succeed at its plan, and are a sign of the 
legislature’s commitment to RTA’s success. Without significant state-level obstacles, the new 
RTA board was free to concentrate on overcoming the cross-county differences among them, and 
develop a regional plan. 
Minimal Obstacles From RTA’s Authorization Legislation 
 The pre-existing authorization legislation, HB 1825 and HB 2610, did not significantly 
limit RTA’s planning process either, leaving most of the decision making to local processes. One 
example was the lack of legislative limitations on the selection of an election date, tax rate, or tax 
instrument.  Much of the decision making over the election date was influenced not by legislative 
limitations, but, instead, by contextual factors occurring on the same election date. For example, 
in early 1994, the board discussed its concern over holding the election in the fall of that year, 
fearing that ballot would be too crowded with issues and candidates, possibly confusing voters 
(RTA Board Meeting Minutes, January 14, 1994). However the board tried to avoid holding an 
election in May 1995, fearing the prospect of holding a tax election just after voters had finished 
their April tax returns, and at a time of year when “…tax and spend issues will be in the 
newspaper” (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, September 9, 1994).   
Ultimately, the board favored early spring, in hopes that, should the proposal pass, it 
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would come early enough in the legislative session to win support for voter-approved projects 
(RTA Board Meeting Minutes, October 14, 1994), and after weighing the dates when particular 
constituencies friendly to RTA’s plan might be more or less likely to vote (RTA Board Meeting 
Minutes, July 8, 1994).   
As with the election date, the RTA board met few legislative limitations on its choice of 
tax rate or tax instrument, and considered an array of tax rates, ranging from 0.4% to 0.6% sales 
tax, as well as two potential tax instruments (sales tax and MVET), in different combinations of 
higher/lower rates for each tax instrument. The board was not limited to a particular timeframe 
for the tax to sunset, and while they first assumed it would be ten years, during project selection, 
they decided to consider a longer time period, in order to fund more projects (RTA Board 
Meeting Minutes, October 14, 1994).  Remarkably, the board had so many options under HB 
2610, they had to use a nine-cell matrix to help them sort out the possibilities (RTA Board 
Meeting Minutes, September 9, 1994). Even then, Board Member Sutherland still expressed 
frustration narrowing the choices, though polling certainly helped make this decision as well 
(RTA Board Meeting Minutes, October 14, 1994).  
Of course there were certainly funding options the board wanted to consider, but couldn’t 
because of legislative limitations, though they almost seem excessive, given all the other choices 
before the board. For example, the board discussed a desire to have access to a sales tax on 
gasoline (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, October 14, 1994).  However ultimately, while the board 
could not do everything it wanted, it had enough taxing options that it was able to develop a 
strong funding package within the limitations of the pre-existing legislation (RTA Board 
Meeting Minutes, October 28, 1994). 
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Geographic Equity in the 1995 Process 
Participants in the Sound Move process struggled to grapple with how to ensure 
geographical equity across local areas. This was an issue since the process first began, and the 
legislation itself had called for some kind of broadly defined equity element in the final plan, 
which “Identifies revenues anticipated to be generated by corridor and by county within the 
authority’s boundaries… identifies phasing of construction and operation of… facilities, services 
and benefits in each corridor… [and] Identifies the degree to which revenues generated within 
each county will benefit the residents of that county…” (Washington HB 2610, 1992 §3). The 
legislation left a number of important decisions to the area’s local leaders, requiring difficult 
choices. For these calculations, the board followed JRPC’s practice of using “subareas,” derived 
from county boundaries for the two least populous counties (Pierce and Snohomish). King 
County, far more populous than the other two, was subdivided into three parts, drawn at the local 
level.  These units would remain over time, throughout the four processes examined here. 
With subareas agreed on, board members faced the challenge of equalizing ‘benefits’ 
across jurisdictions. As RTA’s first process, a number of questions remained to be considered, 
and board members were forced to confront seemingly technical issues like whether their idea of 
equal ‘benefits’ for each subarea should only count projects located in that subarea, or whether 
subareas could receive benefits from projects built in other parts of the region as well. This issue 
was problematic because not all subareas could, realistically, receive their benefits at the same 
time.  For example, Board Member Boekelman, of Pierce County, grew concerned by the 
potential that her county, located 35 miles from Seattle, might wait years for any rail projects to 
reach her area. Casting for an equity solution, she moved that the board require geographic 
equity for every project. This immediately concerned King County Board Member Nickels, who 
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worried, “…If we are building anything we will be building from the center out, in which case 
[under Boekelman’s proposal] funds will initially be spent in the outlying areas... Do we want a 
system with that kind of a flow to it?” (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, May 27, 1994).   
This discussion failed to resolve the problem, and the board continued to grapple with 
how to allocate benefits to geographical units.  The issue included concerns that some benefits 
could not be counted in dollars and cents.  As board Chair Laing noted, “I think the proposition 
of equations, sources of revenue with reinvestment in a particular area of capital and operating 
costs is an artificial means of equity in a regional system.  There are components that benefit 
everyone” (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, October 14, 1994).43 While other board members 
understood this problem and recognized the need to resolve it, they were hampered by the lack of 
an apparent politically viable solution, and, as Board Member Miller quickly pointed out, it 
would be hard to explain to his constituents “…why we are the only subarea shipping dollars out 
and not getting them back”  (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, October 14, 1994).  These concerns 
lingered to the very end of the planning process, though the board still agreed to settle on an 
equity calculation based on revenue collected and received, simply because they couldn’t come 
up with anything better.  As Board Member Nickels put it, while he had concerns over the ability 
to develop regional lines through a subarea equity model, “I guess subareas may be something 
that we can all agree on as the definition” (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, October 29, 1994).   
The board tried to paper over these problems using a Transit Development Fund, which 
would support local projects that feed into the regional system, and could easily be distributed to 
each subarea.  This would ensure equity by making up the difference for subareas that were not 
                                                
43 Board Member Nickels illustrated the problem, noting: “North commuter rail is not something King County 
[which Nickels represented] asked for.  It is something intended to provide a meaningful service to Everett and 
Snohomish County... All capital costs occur in Seattle and are 100% attributed to North King County…. Costs from 
Northgate to 205th [Street] are allocated to North King County, but the benefit is not 100% North King County…” 
(RTA Board Meeting Minutes, October 15, 1994).   
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receiving as many ‘benefits’ as they paid in, or not receiving them as quickly.  But this solution 
was also not very transparent, making it unclear what each subarea was getting, and whether they 
could trust they were receiving equal benefits.  One board member noted this concern, stating “I 
don’t think you can move very far from local dollars generated and local investment without 
having the public question our explanations” (RTA Meeting Minutes, September 9, 1994).   
This left even some board members unsatisfied.  Most prominently, Mayor Hansen, of 
Everett in Snohomish County, who had said little against the plan at earlier meetings, 
unexpectedly brought his concerns just before the final approval of the plan (RTA Board 
Meeting Minutes, October 28, 1994), and actively campaigned against it after the board 
approved it, trying to convince his county to withdraw (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, December 
2, 1994).  Hansen’s concern was that the proposed light rail line would not reach his city until the 
very end—though this is not surprising, considering Everett sits at the far edge of the region, 28 
miles north of Seattle.  He hoped to remedy his concern by adding language to the proposal 
guaranteeing Everett would be “the” first priority in a potential Phase 2 of the plan, rather than 
simply “a” first priority, as contained in the proposal’s language.  Hansen’s last minute request 
disrupted the process, and highlighted the distrust people had in RTA’s precarious equity balance. 
Hansen could not be sure he could count on the rail making it to Everett in a future, still 
unfunded, plan. And the Transit Development Fund did not provide tangible, transparent, 
benefits to present constituents. Conversely, other board members were concerned Hansen’s 
request would mean disproportionate benefits for Snohomish County.  For example, Board 
Member Madsen of Pierce County spoke for many when he noted, “I encourage Mr. Hansen to 
trust me, I am with you but I cannot in all diligence go back and ask voters in my area to support 
projects outside Pierce County.  We have a relative balance on equity; this would totally disrupt 
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it” (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, December 2, 1994). 
Hansen ended up becoming one of several prominent opponents of the plan when it 
reached voters in 1995, and clearly, a better solution was needed for establishing geographic 
equity in future plans. RTA’s methodology for ensuring geographic equity grew more 
sophisticated when the agency came back to voters in 1996.  Eventually, board members decided 
to resolve the issue by providing voters with more information, including a full accounting of the 
revenues expected, and projects allocated for each planning subarea, as an appendix in the 1996 
Sound Move plan.  As discussed more for the post-2004 plans, not all projects listed as ‘benefits’ 
by subarea were located in the area where the money was collected.  Additionally, some projects 
were counted as benefits for both subareas, and costs were charged to both as well.  This 
approach represented a hybrid between locating projects by subarea and by corridor, and has 
provided the flexibility needed to develop a regional system, while ensuring that costs and 
benefits were distributed relatively evenly across local geographies. 
Figure 7.4: RTA & Subarea Map 
 
 Sound Transit, Sound Transit 2 Benefit-Cost Analysis Methodology Report, 2008, pg. 8.  
Subareas Include: Snohomish County, North King County, East King County, South King County, 
Pierce County. 
Sound Transit 2:  Benefit-Cost Analysis Methodology Report 
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Exhibit 6 — Study Region Map 
 
4. Travel Data Sources and Forecast Years for Transit and Highways Benefits 
Travel Demand Models 
The Sound Transit and PSRC travel demand models are used in tandem to forecast future travel 
patterns by mode, and to estimate transit and highway user benefits, respectively.  The ST Transit 
model provides the transit ridership and cost data for calculating direct transit user benefits as 
changes in travel time between the ST2 investment case and the no-build basis of comparison.  
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Legislative Role in Post-2004, Phase 2 Processes 
Many of the patterns developed in the Phase 1 proposals continued into the Phase 2 
planning, which began in 2004. These are especially interesting because they occurred long after 
the HB 1825 and HB 2610 had been approved, separating the legislative sponsor from the 
leaders of the process.  That is not to say the legislature left the process to happen on its own.  
Quite the opposite.   
Sound Transit had authorization to raise up to 9/10 cent sales tax, and by this point, 
voters had only raised sales taxes 4/10 cent, in 1996.  Technically, Sound Transit (renamed from 
RTA in 1997) could go to the ballot at any election, and propose a Phase 2, without the need for 
new legislation.  In fact, the Sound Transit board was making preparations to do that as early as 
the May 2005 election (Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, June 10, 2004).  Based on this 
understanding, the Sound Transit board developed an updated long-range plan and a Phase 2 
proposal, and by spring 2006, the board was ready to send that plan to voters for the November 
2006 election (Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, March 23, 2006). As discussed earlier, the 
legislature passed HB 2871 instead, which required Sound Transit and a previously existing road 
funding district known as the Regional Transportation Investment District, to coordinate their 
activities and offer a joint road and transit measure in November 2007; furthermore, the bill 
specifically prohibited Sound Transit from going to voters before 2007 (Washington HB 2871, 
2006).   
This bill apparently caught people at Sound Transit off guard and disrupted the planning 
process that had been advancing toward a fall 2006 election.  Although Sound Transit CEO Joni 
Earl was on medical leave and unavailable for interviews during the course of this study, one 
study quoted her discussing her staff’s reaction as Governor Gregoire issued a press release 
  182 
announcing she had signed HB 2871—just as Sound Transit was nearly complete with its Phase 
2 plan for the November election. “People were furious… my staff was devastated,” she said 
(Foltz, 2010: 64).   
There were some early warning signs of impending legislative action, to be sure.  The 
summer before, Sound Transit Chair Ladenburg read a letter to the board from Regional 
Transportation Investment District (RTID) Chair Shawn Bunney, proposing the two agencies 
work together on a joint ballot measure for the 2006 ballot.  Chair Ladenburg and Sound Transit 
CEO Earl agreed to meet Bunney and consider whether to pursue a joint ballot measure (Sound 
Transit Board Meeting Minutes, June 9, 2005).   Sound Transit’s project selection process 
continued essentially independently, though Bunney came back to Sound Transit in January 
2006 to offer a more specific plan, including methods for establishing criteria for a joint ballot 
measure, a list of potential projects, and letters addressed to Governor Gregoire, and the Chairs 
of the Washington House and Senate Transportation Committees (Sound Transit Board Meeting 
Minutes, January 26, 2006).  In the time between this meeting and March 8, 2006, the legislature 
considered separate legislative proposals from each Transportation Committee Chair, meaning 
that by at least February 3, there was an increasingly real possibility of legislation delaying the 
process to 2007, and combining Sound Transit’s ballot measure with one by RTID (Washington 
SB 6599, 2006; Washington HB 2871, 2006; Washington House Committee on Transportation 
Bill Report, February 21, 2006; Washington Senate Committee on Transportation Report, 
February 27, 2006).  
Still, this happened very suddenly, and many interviewees from Sound Transit remain 
unsure what took place. As Greg Nickels, who was, by this time the Mayor of Seattle,44 
                                                
44 Previously a Council Member from King County, Nickels was elected Seattle Mayor in 2002, and is thus referred 
to as Mayor here, serving until 2010. 
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remembers, “It was a very strange year… and I don’t know exactly what happened other than we 
all got screwed. And I have my hunches as to who screwed us, but I’m not, even at this date, 
entirely sure” (Nickels, interview, September 10, 2014).  To Sound Transit staff, it appeared the 
legislature moved the election to an odd numbered year out of legislators’ fear, rational or not, 
that a tax increase would jeopardize their own reelections (which occur on even numbered 
years).  As Sound Transit Executive Director of Policy, Planning, and Public Affairs, Ric 
Ilgenfritz, puts it, “They just had this fear that people would put two and two together and take 
punitive action and, it was just mind boggling” (Ilgenfritz, interview, September 12, 2014).   
However Pierce County Executive Ladenburg, who was Sound Transit’s Board Chair at 
the time, was not quite so surprised.  In his mind, the drive to put transit and road projects 
together in one referendum came from a combination of the House and Senate Transportation 
Committees, the leadership from both houses, as well as the Governor.  As he recalls, “I think 
the political thinking was, if we marry these two together, the roads which are not as popular 
here in King County, will get passed because, [voters will] want this big Sound Transit package” 
(Ladenburg, interview, September 9, 2014). Every interviewee approaches the story slightly 
differently and it is hard to know exactly what motivated people behind closed doors, but 
Governor Gregoire was likely responding to advocacy from the business community (Johnson, 
interview, September 4, 2014) and some county executives—particularly King County Executive 
Ron Sims (State Senator Clibborn, interview, September 11, 2014).  Rob Johnson, who lobbied 
against the legislation on behalf of the Transportation Choices Coalition, describes the Governor 
as “…the biggest champion for this process,” and in his recollection,  
The governor really thought that this was a good move.  She got in early on this 
issue and she really rallied sort of two big champions at the legislative level to be 
all in on this, and that’s the former Senate Transportation Committee Chair, her 
name is Mary Margaret Haugen, and then the former and still current House 
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Transportation Chair. And that’s Judy Clibborn.  Between the two of them, the 
Governor, and the State’s DOT Secretary at the time [Hammond], those four 
women were very powerful in convincing other legislators that this was the right 
idea for the region  (Johnson, interview, September 4, 2014). 
 
Even after the legislature’s decision to prevent a 2006 referendum, the impact was 
stronger on the election process than the selection of projects.  While it was delayed by a year, 
Sound Transit continued to select projects based on the same evaluation criteria selected before 
HB 2871 passed.  Though the legislation did not limit Sound Transit’s ability to select projects, 
Sound Transit Chair Ladenburg made a modest effort to coordinate with RTID. And the 
legislation’s role was primarily confined to governing boundaries, the election, and developing a 
procedure to include RTID in the same vote as Sound Transit.  However it did not integrate the 
two into the same agency, did not affect Sound Transit’s tax rate, or choice of projects, and it 
allowed voters to cast ballots based on which district they lived, but did not attempt to reconcile 
Sound Transit boundaries with those of RTID (Washington HB 2871, 2007), causing much 
confusion for voters but leaving Sound Transit’s planning process intact. Even HB 1396, the 
following year, was seen in Sound Transit board meetings as ‘clean-up’ legislation, designed to 
consolidate the Sound Transit measure and the RTID measure into a single ballot question 
(Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, April 26, 2007), even as the two processes continued to 
run in parallel, under different management, using different procedures, different planning 
assumptions, and approving their draft plans a month apart from one another (Sound Transit 
Executive Committee and Regional Transportation Investment District Executive Board Joint 
Meeting, October 5, 2006; Ladenburg, interview, September 9, 2014).  
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Lack of a Hegemonic Boundary-Spanning Agent 
 Despite the presence of such strong state-level power politics in instituting HB 2871 and 
HB 1396, it is striking that no particular person or agent emerges as a pre-eminent champion in 
Seattle. Instead, different agents took a leading role at different points in time.  Based on 
interviewees’ recollections of the post 2004 processes, different agents took lead roles from year 
to year, and sometimes there were multiple people at the same time, whom one might term 
boundary-spanners.   
Sound Transit’s Chair, John Ladenburg, certainly stands out as one who led for a long 
period of time.  He was Chair for four years, and guided the process through 2007—an especially 
complicated year.  He covered most of the long-range planning and the selection of projects for 
the joint “roads and transit” measure. Thinking back, Sound Transit staffer Ilgenfritz recalls 
Ladenburg’s great imprint on the process, saying, 
“He extended a term because, which is unusual; usually our chair serves a two 
year term; he had a second term because people recognized that he was a strong 
leader.  He was very forceful and meticulous.  He was a former prosecutor, a real 
imposing guy” (Ilgenfritz, interview, September 12, 2014).   
 
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, Ladenburg was “…helping the board through the 
decision on whether to consent to the legislature’s directive to be on the ballot in 2007” 
(Ilgenfritz, interview, September 12, 2014).   
Certainly Ladenburg was championing projects from his own county while in his 
position. Most notable among these was the region’s light rail extension down to Tacoma 
(Ilgenfritz, interview, September 12, 2014). However he also championed construction of the 
environmentally controversial Cross-Base Highway, which he viewed as critical to his own 
county’s economic growth (though it won him opposition from many environmentalists like Rob 
Johnson’s group and the Sierra Club).   
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At the same time, there were other leaders who played crucial roles impacting the 
process, especially the politicians at the state level, but also King County Executive Ron Sims, 
and even the Sierra Club. Ladenburg was not a hegemonic boundary-spanner, and legislatively, 
he found himself on the defensive, with HB 2871 impeding on Sound Transit’s authority.  
Nor did Ladenburg continue to act as boundary-spanner after the 2007 election.  
Ladenburg was running for state Attorney General, and the board elected a new chair, in Seattle 
Mayor Nickels.  Though Ladenburg remained on the board representing Pierce County, he took a 
back seat in the 2008 process.  Most poignantly, Ladenburg was no longer rallying other board 
members to support the proposal to place their Phase 2 plan on the 2008 ballot, and he even 
declined Mayor Nickels’ request to do the same.   In Nickels’ recollection, Ladenburg was facing 
a difficult election against his Republican opponent for Attorney General, and “…had some 
anxiety about being the 12th vote for a tax increase.  So he said, I’ll be with you. But I won’t be 
the 12th vote”, which was the deciding vote (Ladenburg, interview, September 9, 2014).   
A Defensive Boundary-Spanner: The Role of Pre-Authorization 
An important reason for the boundary-spanner’s limited role was the pre-authorization of 
the process.  Sound Transit did not need to go to the legislature to request authorization for 
holding a vote, and consequently, legislative advocacy was a less important role for the 
boundary-spanner than facilitating decision making within the agency, and defending existing 
legislative authorizations from unwanted legislation.  With no new legislation necessary, the 
Sound Transit board forged ahead with developing a new long-range plan (Sound Transit Board 
Meeting Minutes, June 10, 2004; September 23, 2004; April 22, 2005; June 9, 2005), and Phase 
2 plan (Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, October 12, 2005; June 8, 2006).   
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During 2006-2007, the boundary-spanner’s role became one of facilitator, as Ladenburg 
worked closely with RTID Executive Director Shawn Bunney, holding joint meetings with 
RTID, and meeting frequently with Governor Gregoire to develop legislation that would fix 
some of the technical flaws in HB 2871 (which became Washington HB 1396), all in an effort to 
make the 2007 vote a success. (Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, October 26, 2006). Of 
course, a number of important legislative decisions came down from Washington’s state capitol 
during Ladenburg’s time as Chair, especially HB 2871 and HB 1396. 
  However his role was defensive.  He did not seek new powers for Sound Transit, and 
the planning process could proceed until the legislature said otherwise—an unlikely scenario, 
considering each county had initially voted to join, meaning the agency’s authority came not 
only from the state, but from local government members as well.  What the legislature did in HB 
2871, then, was not revoke Sound Transit’s authority, but redirect it, in an attempt to find a 
comprehensive multi-modal transportation solution that would be attractive to the business 
community.  Of course, this also made for a confusing proposal for voters, and a loss at the polls. 
Nickels as Boundary-Spanner in 2008 
After the 2007 electoral loss, many people at Sound Transit, the business community and 
the legislature were understandably exhausted. Seattle Mayor Nickels, however, was not.  He 
accepted the charge to be Chair, following Ladenburg, and immediately set about convincing his 
board colleagues to go back to the ballot in 2008.  As Ilgenfritz recalls, “It wouldn’t have 
happened without [Nickels].  He was instrumental. …He came in convinced we needed to be on 
the ballot again in November.  And he had a very skeptical board, a very skeptical political 
establishment. And he took them all on and gave us, you know, not carte blanche, but he gave us 
just full support to retool the plan and get it back in front of the board, you know, for 
reconsideration” (Ilgenfritz & Beal, group interview, September 12, 2014).  
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Ostensibly, nothing stood in the board’s way legislatively.  However, as with Ladenburg, 
Nickels assumed a defensive posture, using the threat of legislative action as reason to act.  This 
pre-existing authority gave the Sound Transit board the upper hand, and made it possible for 
them to act before the legislature did—therefore reducing the potential legislative threat.  As 
Nickels recalls, “The legislature couldn’t do anything to us in ‘08 because they had just suffered 
this huge defeat with the roads and transit [measure], so they were not in a position to act quickly 
to put us down” (Nickels, interview, September 10, 2014).   Moreover, Nickels believes the 
legislature would have prevented a 2009 vote if Sound Transit didn’t act first. The Governor was 
not a strong supporter of a transit-only measure (Hammond, interview, September 3, 2014). 
Moreover, Johnson, of the Transportation Choices Coalition, recalls, “There were folks that were 
actively lobbying for legislation to be created to [prevent a vote].  We never saw a bill, but we 
actively lobbied against that [possibility], and were convincing enough with enough legislators 
that it didn’t end up happening” (Johnson, interview, September 4, 2014).  
While legislation blocking a vote the following year was a concern, Sound Transit’s pre-
existing authority gave them the ability to move quickly, and the legislature’s part-time sessions 
made it difficult for them to act fast enough.  Nickels feared the legislature could block his 2008 
proposal if he acted while they were in session. However, “I think it was too late by the time they 
realized that we might be serious about going to the ‘08 ballot” (Nickels, interview, September 
10, 2014). Nickels meant this literally.  By the time the Sound Transit board voted in late July to 
place the measure on the November 2008 ballot (Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, July 24, 
2008), the legislature had adjourned for the year (March 13, 2008).45  In fact, when the 
legislature adjourned in March, the Sound Transit board had still been reviewing its new plan 
                                                
45 Washington State Legislature, 2016 
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based on the work done in 2007.  At that time, a 2008 vote was a possibility, but it was still far 
from certain whether Nickels could secure enough votes to place it on the ballot (Sound Transit 
Board Meeting Minutes, March 13, 2008; Nickels, interview, September 10, 2014). It is far from 
certain whether this was actually a motivation for the legislature, but for Nickels and the board, 
fear of losing their authority to hold a referendum was a primary reason to act. 
Boundary-Spanners and Subarea Equity 
Sound Transit’s decision making in the post 2004 processes was primarily a product of 
deal making across local jurisdictions, guided by the subarea equity framework developed in 
1995 and 1996, and passed down from the 1996 Sound Move plan (RTA, 1996), complete with 
the accounting architecture used to make local costs and benefits transparent to the public.  This 
framework played a large role in the Phase 2 decision process because the legislation was so 
permissive.  The legislature continued to stand as an omnipresent threat; however even in 2007, 
their impact was limited to Sound Transit’s choice of election cycle, not the project selection 
process itself.  
Subarea equity acted as a framework for cross-jurisdictional agreements that Sound 
Transit board members needed to make anyways. However it did not create a significant 
limitation on decision making in its own right, and as Washington State Secretary of 
Transportation Hammond puts it, “In the end the subarea doesn’t get to dictate what happens. 
[Locals] just get to advocate at the board.  And so the money is measured and weighed and 
parceled, but in the end the guiding principle is that the transit system has to fit together”  
(Hammond, interview, September 3, 2014).  Sound Transit’s Finance Officer Brian McCartan 
concurs, describing subarea equity as a means to ensure transparency for the voting public: 
“Some politicians here think subarea equity has really been terrible. But in my 
experience it hasn’t.  The board members have still thought regionally, they’ve 
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divided up projects, they’ve made the right investments.  It’s just been a way to 
sort of quantify who gets what…” (McCartan, interview, September 3, 2014, 
emphasis in the original). 
 
Indeed, McCartan compared the situation at Sound Transit with the way equity decisions 
are made in other cities, where voters are insistent they are not getting their fair share, but 
do not have a concrete framework by which to judge.    
 Furthermore, the subarea equity framework has, in fact, been tested for the most 
challenging circumstances, where projects cross from one subarea to another.  Even then, board 
members have learned to negotiate across subareas and still represent them in the subarea 
accounting.  This is where Sound Transit’s board chairs were useful in facilitating negotiations, 
but in the mind of Ilgenfritz the agency has also “…been very lucky in that our board has often 
been very pragmatic about these things, recognizing that there needs to be some give and take to 
develop the system they all ultimately want. Now when that give and take is to the tune of $2 
billion, well that definitely engenders conversation. When it’s a relatively smaller amount they 
get comfortable very quickly” (Ilgenfritz & Beal group interview, September 12, 2014). 
 Cross-subarea deal making was certainly a feature of earlier proposals, but became much 
more common in the post-2004 plans.  As in 1995, a project is supposed to “benefit” the 
constituency that pays for it, but as Ilgenfritz notes, “…there’s nothing in the law, or our 
agency’s policy, that requires a project paid for by another subarea, to be in that subarea.  It 
could be elsewhere.”  Indeed, King Street Station is a prime example, located in North King 
County, but paid for by South King County, and serving commuter rail lines from four subareas.  
Ilgenfritz recalls, it was “…originally paid for by South King, because as we put the first plan 
together, they had some money, and of course they needed the project, and they were willing to 
say ‘We Benefit”  (Ilgenfritz & Beal, group interview, September 12, 2014).  This reasoning 
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seemed like simple common sense to one board member and mayor from the suburban East King 
subarea.  As she puts it, “You have to have a central hub of some sort, right?  And that’s what 
Seattle is.  It’s a central hub, right?  And so if they have a station in downtown Seattle, do we use 
it?  Yeah.  So we’re 'benefitting” (Burleigh, interview, emphasis in the original, September 8, 
2014). 
 There were numerous other examples of cross-subarea deals from the 2007 and 2008 
plans, which illustrate how this system provided a framework for regional negotiations, while its 
limitations on decision making have been more subtle.  Perhaps the most prominent case was the 
final deal made between Nickels of Seattle, and Snohomish County Executive Reardon, which 
was crucial to gaining the votes needed to approve the 2008 plan. As County Executive, Reardon 
appointed the other two Snohomish County board members, and Nickels recalls, Reardon 
“…clearly wanted to put himself into a position where he could get what he wanted, so he waited 
me out a bit….” Ladenburg’s unwillingness to be the deciding vote made some kind of deal with 
Reardon vital to passage in 2008.  As Ilgenfritz recalls, “…come to the final hour, Nickels and 
Reardon cut the final deal… to extend the light rail line all the way to Lynnwood [in Snohomish 
County]” (Ilgenfritz & Beal, group interview, September 12, 2014; Sound Transit Board Meeting 
Minutes, July 10, 2008; Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, July 24, 2008). Ilgenfritz 
remembers that Nickels and Reardon toyed with the idea of having the City of Seattle assume 
responsibility for a proposed streetcar project. Staff analyzed the idea, and agreed it could save 
money since the city could create synergies from city-owned utilities—a cost savings which 
Nickels traded over to the Snohomish County subarea to win support for the plan (Illgenfritz, 
group interview, September 12, 2014).  
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Overcoming Parochialism 
 As the Nickels-Reardon agreement highlights, the subarea deals were vital in decision 
making, and formed a well developed framework by the post-2004 period.  Each subarea had its 
own partnership.46 Many of them met regularly to discuss projects requested by cities and 
counties, and prepare for upcoming board meetings. These forums seem to have been especially 
crucial to the process after the revised Long-Range Plan and project criteria had been developed 
(Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, July 7, 2005).  At this point, subareas were asked to 
develop their own project lists to forward to the larger board, which were then compiled into a 
composite list of regional projects (Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, September 8, 2005; 
Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, December 8, 2005).  
Anderson, a board member from Tacoma in Pierce County, describes this process as one 
where her subarea board members would meet once a month, often in the presence of Sound 
Transit staff.  This helped eliminate confusion and ensure that everyone from her area was 
proposing the same projects when they got to the board meeting. As she recalls, “I remember just 
the relation being pretty darn good.  There wasn’t a lot of secretiveness.  We just generally were 
not surprised at board meetings, with board members proposing something that we hadn’t heard 
of before, or board members withholding discussion” (Anderson, interview, September 9, 2014). 
Furthermore, Anderson remembers board members from other subareas sometimes would attend 
the Pierce County meetings to discuss projects that affected both counties (Anderson, interview, 
September 9, 2014). 
 Staff helped bridge the inconsistencies from one subarea plan to another.  As Ladenburg 
recalls, “The staff was good enough, you know, to see those issues already and bring them to 
                                                
46 Listed in Sound Transit minutes as: Eastside Transportation Partnership, South County Transportation Board, 
Seattle Shoreline Area Transportation Board, Snohomish County Policy Forum, and RAMP in Pierce County 
(Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, June 9, 2005). 
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both subareas.”   Staff would say, “…wait a minute, if you do this, they need to do that, to fit 
together. And between the two, they’d worked it out, you know, a solution to it”  (Ladenburg, 
interview, September 9, 2014).  This could result in deals when, “…occasionally you just, you 
know, if you wanted to do something over the subarea, you paid for it. For years Pierce County 
subarea paid for the Express Buses to King County… So, I mean, sometimes a subarea will just 
say, ‘Well, if it’s going to cost an extra $8 Million dollars to gain, we’ll just pay it… So, regional 
efforts are not uncommon really” (Ladenburg, interview, September 9, 2014).    
Anderson credits Sound Transit’s CEO, especially, for seeing potential parochial conflict 
before it occurred.  “She would immediately get people together to talk about things…. And 
sometimes she would even let us know the political pressure the person was under and why they 
were asking for it” (Anderson, interview, September 9, 2014).  Indeed, one board member recalls 
discussions at meetings about how they could make the plan work for the local political needs of 
particular board members.  As Kirkland Mayor Burleigh puts it, “…they got to take home to 
their folks something that’s worthwhile.  We would talk about setting up things like this, how 
can we sell this to the people of Everett, how can we sell this to the people of Puyallup and 
Sumner and Tacoma?  How do we sell it to the East Side?”  (Burleigh, interview, September 8, 
2014).   
That is not to say the process was devoid of parochialism.  Certainly the subarea 
framework was parochial at its core, and ensured projects would be selected to consider subarea 
needs over regional ones.  Snohomish County repeatedly demanded light rail extensions over 30 
miles long, which stretched the limits of the technology and the agency’s budget; and supported 
a 20 year tax over a 12 year one, presumably to help pay the cost (Sound Transit Board Meeting 
Minutes, June 26, 2008). Many of the amendments added to the plan just before final approval 
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could be described as nothing but parochial, guaranteeing any “extra” money would be used to 
cover planning for various local projects that did not make it into the financed plan (Sound 
Transit Board Meeting Minutes, July 24, 2008). And County Executive Sims’ surprise last 
minute decision to vote against the plan in hopes of getting more urban bus service for his area 
was a very prominent example of parochialism (Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, July 24, 
2008).  It would be unlikely to have such a regional process of this size without any 
parochialism.  But the subarea framework, and general staff outreach, attempted to reduce the 
negative consequences. And it attempted to provide a platform for cross-jurisdictional 
negotiation, to ensuring a more integrated system. 
The Impacts of Subarea Equity 
When asked about the planning limitations from subarea equity, Finance Officer 
McCartan couldn’t cite a single project decision Sound Transit was deterred from making due to 
divisions across subarea boundaries. However McCartan noted another, more subtle consequence 
of subarea equity—implicating it for reducing transit investments in low income jurisdictions 
with fewer resources to pay for them—notably South King County—even as the board has spent 
large sums on bringing rail to Bellevue’s technology centers.   As McCartan puts it, “So we 
might chase an investment in an area that’s not appropriate, necessarily, or the best return, 
because that subarea has to get something” (McCartan, interview, September 3, 2014).  
Indeed, the subarea framework has not just been problematic for South King County. 
Pierce County has suffered too, from being located beyond South King County, and therefore, 
cut off from many of the services coming out of Seattle.  Any light rail to Pierce County must 
pass through South King to get there, which helps explain why Pierce County has willingly paid 
the cost of express bus service to its major city, Tacoma (discussed above).  This also explains 
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why the 2008 plan included light rail all the way to Lynnwood on the north, but on the southern 
end, only as far as Federal Way, 10 miles shy of Tacoma.    
Ladenburg—himself the Chief Executive of Pierce County—tried to overcome this 
obstacle in 2007, by crafting a proposal to spend $200 million of Pierce County’s funds to bring 
light rail farther south, in hopes that a future Phase 3 might bring it the rest of the way to 
Tacoma.  However in 2008, other Pierce County board members reversed his proposal after 
some constituents “…complained that Pierce County was giving away its money…Yeah… just 
parochialism” (Ladenburg, interview, September 9, 2014). Ladenburg expresses frustration at the 
situation, saying “I mean, I was always against having the different districts.  …[Other subareas] 
have a lot more to spend, more massive projects in their districts than South King County does, 
which is one of the poor districts—is the poorest district in all of the Sound Transit Districts. 
South King County didn’t get much of anything other than the Light Rail extended down past the 
airport” (Ladenburg, interview, September 9, 2014, emphasis in the original) (Ilgenfritz & Beal, 
group interview, September 12, 2014), forcing them to add commuter rail service to Pierce 
County, in an effort to overcome the South King obstacle. 
It appears the subarea equity framework has been flexible enough to overcome 
jurisdictional divisions, but only when actors from multiple subareas have been willing to work 
together, and the default situation of division it has created has required board members and staff 
to actively pursue subarea agreements when they want to overcome it.  Unsurprisingly, it has 
been difficult to reach an agreement when there is no money to work with.  In Pierce County’s 
situation, this situation has not worked to their benefit. 
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Open Decision Making Process 
 
A key reason why the cross-subarea decision making process has worked so well is 
simply the openness of the process, and the lack of disagreement among board members on the 
agency’s goals. As noted earlier, Sound Transit staff were quite good at diffusing conflict before 
it began, and forestalling potential backroom alliances (Anderson, interview, September 9, 
2014).  Indeed, incidents like Ron Sims’ sudden reversal from strong rail supporter to opponent 
of the plan came as a shock to fellow board members, making it notable because it was 
considered so unusual.  Several interviewees cited this incident, and Anderson described it as 
“…the only kerfluffle we ever had on the board.  Like he was withholding his 
vote on the budget or something because he wanted additional …. Yeah, that was 
the only bad behavior we ever…Not bad behavior.  It would be typical for city 
[politics], you know.  It was a pretty typical legislative move, but it was unusual 
for our board to have somebody withhold their support for something that was 
very particular for their subarea…” (Anderson, September 9, 2014). 
 
Anderson cited the frequency with which the board met as a primary reason for members’ good 
relationship.  Indeed, the board met about every two weeks throughout much of the period 
studied, in addition to committee meetings, and numerous other opportunities to interact. 
 Many board members—not just the Chair—were paying attention to the local needs of 
other board members, and this appears to have resulted in a shared sense of mission. As 
Hammond noted, coming as she did from working outside the regionat the Washington 
Department of Transportation, 
“The Sound Transit board has always been a very strong and strongly connected 
board…. I think that the board, bought in…to what the mission was and that was 
to get Light Rail delivered throughout Puget Sound, North, South, East, West.  
There are differences of opinion on how far and how fast, where the stops should 
be, how much commuter rail while we’re waiting for Light Rail.  And you know, 
how much bus service… But by in large the majority, consensus really held up on 
expanding the light rail system in the way that it has [done]” (Hammond, 
interview, September 3, 2014).  
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 Board members’ agreement on the overall vision harkens back to the long-range plan 
approved in the very first Sound Move measure, and provided a plan for what the eventual build-
out could look like, if funds were unconstrained (Ilgenfritz, interview, September 10, 2014).  
This vision, just like the subarea equity framework, continued to be an integral part of planning 
at Sound Transit all the way up through the 2008 process.  It ensured stability even through the 
2007 joint roads and transit plan, with Nickels commenting that even the joint process did not 
disrupt the long-range plan (Nickels, interview, September 10, 2014).  The long-range plan also 
offered some continuity between board members, who changed frequently over time.  In 
interviews, several board members expressed their gratitude for having such a plan in place to 
guide them. Anderson noted how this vision helped solidify the coalition, making the process 
“…less transactional with your citizens and with your council, and more of a buy-in to long-
range policy.”  As she pointed out, “These projects take ten to fifteen years to complete, so…. 
some of that greediness is being tempered…. Because you’re not going to be an elected official 
long enough to see this thing reach fruition.” (Anderson, interview, September 9, 2014). 
 Perhaps one reason board members agreed to this vision so readily was it was so 
intuitive, with lines going north, south and east (there is no west, since Seattle sits by Puget 
Sound).  As Hammond says, the real controversies were over how far, how fast, not where or if?  
With the first phase already under construction, bigger questions from the 1995 measure over 
whether to proceed, and technology to use were less poignant.  And fierce disputes over 
geographic equity were subsumed by the sub area equity framework.  
Findings from Seattle 
The second phase of Sound Move was clearly less controversial than the first, and was 
aided greatly by Sound Transit’s continuing institutions, its decision making mechanisms, and 
commitment to a more focused mission.  Despite temporary legislative obstacles in 2007, Sound 
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Transit had a significant level of pre-authorization, under unusually permissive legislation, 
through most of its processes.   
Over the course of four different measures (three of them examined here), multiple 
‘boundary-spanners’ emerged.  None of them could be considered singularly indispensible to the 
process, though some of them clearly did an impressive amount to develop decision making 
frameworks; facilitate discussion among board members and local leaders; and push the process 
along.  Nickels even used his political apparatus as Seattle Mayor to help support the 2008 
process (Johnson, interview, September 4, 2014).  However, crucially, boundary-spanners were 
not needed to lobby for new legislation.  As a pre-authorized process, the most lobbying needed 
from boundary-spanners was to defend Sound Transit’s already substantial powers; though at 
times, certainly, boundary-spanners did lobby for ‘clean-up’ legislation to improve the operation 
of the decision process, though the process would have proceeded even without such bills.   
Boundary-spanning agents, and many other elements of the local/regional process were 
apparently divorced, as much as possible, from the need to lobby for the vital legislative 
elements governing the taxation process.  Decisions over boundaries, project selection, election 
cycles, tax instruments and tax rates were previously left to the discretion of local/regional 
decision makers (with HB 2871 of 2006 the big exception, when Sound Transit was unable to 
call a vote).  Project selections were entirely up to the RTA/Sound Transit board.  Over time, the 
board acted as representatives of local governments.  County Executives and big city mayors 
played an especially large role in decision making.  And decisions at RTA/Sound Transit were 
not consistently in concert with the desires of state-level politicians—for example the Governor’s 
tepid support for a transit-only tax measure in 2008 (Nickels, interview, September 10, 2014).   
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Local government gave RTA/Sound Transit its legitimacy and local government officials 
limited its decision making far more than the state did.  Election cycles, tax instruments, tax 
rates, and projects were all chosen with close attention to local elected officials, polling, public 
outreach, and the opinions of key constituencies like environmentalists and the business 
community.  State-level political imperatives loomed large as a potential threat, but, with the 
exception of 2006, local political imperatives, managed through the subarea equity decision 
framework, were the focal point for decision making in Seattle, while legislation only became an 
important factor when legislators expressly decided to take away existing authority—and even 
then, legislators granted RTA/Sound Transit blanket authorization to come back to the ballot 
should their proposal fail. 
This local dynamic appears to have helped ensure processes that were accepted by local 
actors.  No county was included in the RTA/Sound Transit District that did not want to be in.  
Projects were developed at the local subarea level.  Even tax rates and time until sunset were 
chosen to match the results from polling and focus groups (Sound Transit Board Meeting 
Minutes, June 26, 2008).  Whether this helped the measure pass or not, it gave the board the 
option to develop a plan they deemed to be politically advantageous at the time.  Similarly, pre-
authorization made it possible for the board to resume planning immediately after losses in 1995 
and 2007, and come back with revised plans the following years.  As the minutes reveal in both 
cases, planning began almost the meeting after the election (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, 
March 17, 1995; Sound Transit Board Meeting Minutes, November 8, 2007). 
There has been no shortage of structure at the agency or in its processes, which have all 
been highly transparent and inclusive to the public. However RTA/Sound Transit’s oversight has 
come from mainly below, rather than above.  
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Chapter 8: Denver Case Analysis 
Chapter 8 Summary: 
This chapter examines sequential proposals in the Denver Metro Region, which proposed an 
increase in the level of sales tax it was charging, in order to fund a system of light rail and bus 
rapid transit improvements.  The region’s previously existing Regional Transportation District 
(RTD) provided the institutional support needed to develop a detailed regional transportation 
plan that was visionary enough to garner support outside the agency, and convince legislators to 
authorize a multi-county vote on its approval.  The agency had no pre-authorization to hold a tax 
election on its plan, but RTD had sufficient autonomy to plan and lobby without needing new 
legislative authorization. Because RTD was not developing its plan under any particular 
legislative mandate, it had autonomy to select projects fully in accordance with local political 
imperatives before presenting the completed plan to the legislature for authorization to hold the 
election.   
In RTD’s 1997 proposal, the legislature mandated an election cycle that was unfavorable, 
contributing to the plan’s failure at the polls; however by most measures, RTD’s planning 
autonomy helped ensure legislation that supported the needs of local political imperatives.  This 
was true even with regard to selection of projects, in spite of the fact that Denver’s boundary-
spanner was not especially influential with the legislature. With RTD having strong pre-
authorized powers, many politicians and outside groups were lobbying the legislature to approve 
a multi-county vote, and the boundary-spanner’s role was diminished.  In fact, different 
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politicians and outside organizations assumed leadership roles at different points during the 
process.  Consequently, the boundary-spanner in the Denver case represents a leader and 
visionary among equals, rather than an ‘Alpha Participant’ power broker.  The process was not 
dependent on any one agent, and it was not very controversial (at least on the second attempt), 
due to the buy-in of many mayors and outside organizations. 
Introduction 
Denver represents a region with a strong regime of pre-authorized autonomous powers 
for regional decision making, including an elected board, and ongoing sales tax collection. 
Between 1995 and 2004, Denver area voters were asked to weigh in on two ballot questions on 
expanding transit in the region. The boundary-spanner in this case did not have particularly 
strong influence with the legislature.  Yet both times, the legislature largely refrained from 
requirements that could interfere with local political needs. This appears to be due, in part, to the 
Regional Transportation District’s (RTD) strong institutional support for planning a regional 
transportation solution even before the legislature weighed in on the matter, which ensured that 
the bills voted on by the legislature were heavily influenced by the plan, rather than the other 
way around.  
RTD’s pre-existing structure supported the development of a regional vision, followed by 
detailed studies needed to develop it into a plan, even before legislative sanction. Because RTD 
already had so many pre-authorized autonomous powers, the lack of pre-authorization was an 
asset, rather than a liability, because it provided RTD the flexibility it needed to lobby for a law 
that matched its planning, and the region’s politics.  At the same time, RTD’s institutional 
structure gave the legislature reasonable assurance that the agency could implement its plan, and 
made the vote an incremental 
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than a leap of faith on an untested idea.  All together, RTD’s institutional autonomy made the 
boundary-spanner less essential to the process, even as it ensured that the authorizing legislation 
would support local political imperatives. 
Case Outline 
 This case had nine phases: 1) Development of the regional plan, 2) Legislative process, 3) 
1997 campaign and loss 4) Preparation for second vote, 6) Refinement of the regional plan, 7) 
Second legislative process, 8) 2004 campaign and victory, 9) Implementation.  This chapter 
covers all phases except numbers three, eight and nine (campaigns and implementation). 
Figure 8.1 Timeline of Denver Events 
 
Denver’s Regional Transportation Structures 
By the time RTD was considering a regional ballot vote for 1997, RTD’s institutional 
support structures had been gradually gaining autonomous powers, experience and funding 
support since 1969.  RTD was designed to be a metropolitan special district, and covered all or 
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part of six counties by 1997.47  In fact, RTD’s 1997 and 2004 measures, studied here, were just 
two of a long series of regional referendums related to RTD.  Following voters’ approval to 
create the agency, in 1969, there was also a 1973 measure to fund bus service with a regional a 
sales tax (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1976: 15), a 1980 measure to give 
RTD an elected board, and a 1999 measure to approve bonds that financed a light rail/highway 
project (discussed below).  Consequently Denver area voters and politicians had time to grow 
accustomed to regional transportation tax votes, and RTD had time to gain sophistication and 
experience conducting them. 
RTD at the Outset of the 1997 Process: A Relatively Autonomous Actor 
Though the legislature had granted RTD many autonomous planning powers by 1995, 
RTD still needed special legislation to place one of its plans on the ballot.  Nevertheless, RTD 
had significant institutional support to develop a plan without the legislature having to weigh in. 
First and foremost, RTD’s pre-existing $0.06 sales tax provided funding for planning and transit 
operation, and made it possible for the agency to develop incremental capital infrastructure 
improvements, albeit slowly, over many years. 
Second, RTD’s member counties were codified, establishing a six county geography for 
regional ballot proposals (CRS §32-9-119.1, 119.3), and ensuring counties could not opt out 
(CRS §32-9, 101-164), though RTD could annex new areas without specific legislative 
approval.48  
Additionally, RTD was, and still is, one of the few examples of an elected multi-
jurisdictional transportation agency in the U.S.   RTD’s fifteen elected members represented 
districts, and provided the agency with added legitimacy by virtue of their electoral mandate.  
                                                
47 Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Douglas and Jefferson counties. 
48 Prior to the 1997 process, there were a series of referendums and statutes providing a system to annex new areas 
to the district that petitioned to join, or were contiguous to existing boundaries (CRS §32-9-106.6, §106.7, §106.8). 
  204 
Their district boundaries reinforced this autonomy by not adhering to municipal jurisdictional 
lines, thus establishing a dynamic where RTD board members were technically independent 
from city and county politics, rather than municipal appointees.49 
The 1997 “Guide the Ride” Process  
The gradual development of RTD’s regional plan, even before proposing it to the 
legislature and voters in 1997, indicates the degree to which RTD’s institutions supported its 
planning process and minimized the need for state direction. For example, RTD’s transit vision 
was well developed and readily accepted because it grew out of the DRCOG’s (short for Denver 
Regional Council of Governments)50 fiscally unconstrained version of its Regional 
Transportation Plan (RTP).  Known as the Metro Vision 2020 plan, this plan was to become the 
blueprint for subsequent regional rail proposals.  
Figure 8.2: 1997 DRCOG’s Metro Vision 2020 Unconstrained Long-Range Rail Plan: The 
Basis for the Guide the Ride Projects Selected 
 
(Metro Vision 2020, 1997) 
Development of a regional ballot proposal began in earnest in August 1995— 
                                                
49 In practice RTD’s autonomy was diminished somewhat by local governments’ own power. Interviewees agreed 
that city officials still ended up being much more powerful than RTD board members, and often had a great amount 
of influence in decision making at RTD. 
50 The Denver area’s MPO. 
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well in advance of any legislation—due to the interest of RTD’s new General Manager, Cal 
Marsella (Marsella Memo to Staff, August 22, 1995; RTD Board Meeting Minutes, January 17, 
1995-December 21, 1995).  By this point, RTD was one agency, among several others, studying 
rail proposals in a formal way, all based on DRCOG’s Metro Vision 2020 plan, including the 
Southeast Corridor, by the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT); the East Corridor, 
by DRCOG; and the West Corridor, by RTD.  Though each corridor had a different lead agency, 
they were all considered to be part of the same joint effort (RTD Board of Directors Report, 
December 8, 1995).  
This process could hope to produce incremental improvements, building one segment at a 
time.  However Marsella and some RTD board members had greater ambitions, and they were 
able to begin without new legislative approval, due to RTD’s considerable funding and planning 
capacity.  Within months of Marsella’s hiring, in September 1995, Board Member Benker 
proposed a resolution to bring rapid transit to all corridors.  This resolution proposed that voters 
should decide whether to support a regional plan with increased sales taxes in November 1996 
(RTD Board Meeting Minutes, September 19, 1995).  However Benker’s proposal required new 
legislation, and Marsella followed up with a plan to take this to the legislature (RTD Workshop 
Summary, November 13, 1995).   
While this was Marsella’s first foray into initiating and leading the process, he did not act 
in a singular capacity as boundary-spanner.51  He coordinated closely with the business 
community, the Metro Mayors Caucus (MMC), and many others.  Interviewees agreed 
Marsella’s role was characterized by initiating, providing vision, and, most importantly, acting as 
                                                
51 Many interviewees also talked about Denver Mayor Hickenlooper’s key leadership role.  However he was not 
elected until 2003, just after the RTD board had approved the draft plan for its second process (RTD Board Meeting 
Minutes, December 16, 2003).  Hickenlooper’s role was mainly as spokesperson during the 2004 FasTracks 
campaign. 
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chief salesman. As a senior staffer from the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce puts it, 
Marsella “…was the dream seller…. [He] could run a used car dealership without a car and sell it 
to people”  (Clark, interview, December 10, 2014).  He did not do this by himself.  As Martens, 
of Transit Alliance recalls,  
“Cal was a very effective proponent of the vision, for sure, but so was Linda 
Morton, so was Pat Cronenberger, so was Tom Clark…. this isn’t a story where 
the agency went out and did it alone.  This has been a story of a region and a 
coalition coming together across the region that’s committed to a vision of growth 
and development, for which transit is an essential component, and people that 
were willing to take risks to support that vision” (Martens, interview, December 
12, 2014). 
 
Indeed, broad acceptance of the necessity of proposing a regional tax meant that not one, 
but several organizations, were simultaneously developing such a plan.  In fact, many cities 
offered suggestions to improve RTD’s proposal, and many mayors lent their support to the 
process.   
Project Selection 
Agreement on the parameters for a plan translated into political support for RTD’s vision, 
and built on strong institutional support, enabling RTD to develop a plan even before the 
legislature weighed in on the matter.  Indeed, legislative prescriptions rarely became an issue for 
RTD’s planning process, which proceeded with project selection through a fairly cooperative 
regional process, supported by technocratic planning, and adjusted to conform with comments 
from citizens and cities, but few limits from the state.  This was possible partly because the 
planning was done before any legislation had been drafted.  Indeed, discussions in the summer of 
1995 began more than two years before the legislature began to talk about enabling legislation.  
If anything, RTD ran into occasional difficulties from legislation that was too flexible.  
The lack of legislative prescriptions created some challenges, since planning was not centralized 
 207  
under a single agency. A different agency, in fact, volunteered to conduct the major investment 
study (MIS) in each corridor.52 Only later were these sometimes disparate plans combined into a 
regional plan. However these challenges were mitigated by agreement from all three agencies on 
the general parameters for a plan. For example, they avoided controversy over route selections 
by using existing plans, like the Metro Vision 2020, and limited discussion to corridors for which 
a MIS was already underway. In fact, there was little disagreement on corridor routing, and RTD 
board members generally assumed corridors would follow the region’s main freeways.53 These 
routes were little changed from the Metro Vision 2020 plan (Figure 8.2), and stayed the same 
through final approval in 2004.  
Previous planning efforts played an important role in focusing the discussion and limiting 
controversy over the parameters, though RTD could certainly have changed those parameters 
had citizens requested it.  Soon after arriving at the agency in 1995, Marsella recalls looking 
through all the long-range plans of the RTD and DRCOG.  He remembers asking his staffers, 
“Let’s cull this down to the best, most efficacious projects, [that] have the best chance. Tell me 
what it looks like” (Marsella, interview, December 5, 2014). As a result, the corridors for the 
“Guide the Ride” plan were selected, through performance criteria, from a compilation of the 
three MISs.  For example, corridors were selected for inclusion based on logistical merits like the 
availability of right of way, and the strength of each corridor’s projected growth in ridership 
(Marsella, interview, December 5, 2014).54 Marsella’s technocratic approach made decisions that 
helped limit controversy. “I'll do it in any city,” Marsella said. “I could go in and look at their 
plans and probably in two hours tell you the best lines, or where the next lines should go, just 
                                                
52 RTD, DRCOG & CDOT. 
53 North to the airport, east to Aurora, west to Golden, north to Boulder and south to the Denver Technological 
Center (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, November 14, 1995). 
54 Numbers were projected based on existing parallel commuting corridors (Kenney, interview, December 9, 2014; 
confirmed by Morton, interview, December 9, 2014). 
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based on population densities, growth, congestion, time and delay. It's not that hard to do. It's not 
that hard to do” (Marsella, interview, December 5, 2014).  
Within corridors, the decisions became more difficult, though the process still remained 
technocratic. These decisions happened primarily within each alignment’s own MIS process 
(Kenney, interview, December 9, 2014; Van Meter, interview, December 9, 2014),55 and each 
process included a significant amount of outreach to elected and appointed officials, agency and 
technical staff, citizen groups and other interested members of the public (RTD Board of 
Directors Report, December 8, 1995). Together, these MISs formed the core of the 1997 regional 
proposal.  
However there was no legislative limitation as Marsella and RTD staff gradually 
conformed to local political demands by expanding the proposal beyond the three MIS corridors, 
including other projects from DRCOG’s MetroVision 2020 plan.  The MIS corridors were 
weighted towards the south side of the region, which was more developed, but additional 
corridors were needed to the north to balance the plan’s coverage across the district. Adding 
northern corridors was the first among many decisions to appeal to the needs and desires of 
people in the district, rather than to meet project criteria.  One such decision that required a great 
deal of discussion was how to serve the suburbs.  Kenney, of the MMC, recalls that suburban 
cities were asking why all the MIS plans’ routes went to Denver.  Suburban mayors wondered 
why none of the proposed rail routes connected the suburbs to each other, though RTD 
responded that crosstown ridership would be too low to justify such routes, and bus services 
were a more appropriate solution. Indeed, this was hardly a new concern.  In the very earliest 
discussions about the 1997 proposal, some board members asked why the routes all went to 
                                                
55 Criteria included: 1) Consistency with regional goals from the RTP, 2) Capital cost/ affordability, 3) Mobility 
levels achieved, 4) Environmental impacts, and 5) Community impacts. 
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Denver (RTD Workshop Meeting Summary, November 13, 1995). Marsella worked actively to 
appease this sentiment, first by including a significant number of new park and ride facilities in 
the plan; second, by including a neighborhood circulator system connecting people with rail 
stations; and finally, by including a corridor from suburb to suburb (along I-225) at the request of 
Aurora Mayor Paul Tauer (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, April 23, 1996 & May 28, 1996).  
RTD’s freedom to change the plan to conform to local requests was manifestly useful in 
appeasing local politicians’ concerns, and this flexibility became useful in a similar way when 
RTD presented its plan to the public. Following the board’s approval of the plan, in September 
1996 (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, September 17, 1996), RTD staff held meetings with 
officials in all counties but one, along with meetings with civic organizations like the Chamber 
of Commerce and the League of Women Voters.  The legislative language made it possible for 
RTD to accommodate changes suggested by attendees, which helped the final plan better answer 
voter’s concerns (RTD, Guide the Ride Plan, 1997).  The final plan incorporated a long list of 
additions designed to provide more service, extend lines, provide new park and ride facilities, 
increase local bus service, and improve carpool lanes used by express buses.   Indeed, the lack of 
legislative prescriptions also made it possible to extend the proposal’s sunset date from 2011 to 
2015, in order to accomplish the additional plans that were requested by citizens during the 
outreach process (RTD, Guide the Ride, 1997; RTD Board Meeting Minutes, May 20, 1997). 
Indeed, when writing the legislation at a later time, the legislature would adapt the sunset date to 
the timespan necessary for the plan to be paid off (RTD, Guide the Ride, 1997).  
RTD also had a free hand to incorporate late requests to change its plan only a month 
before final board approval.  These requests came chiefly from the City of Westminster and other 
cities along the U.S. 36 corridor, which lobbied to add rail service. Though express buses on the 
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Denver-Boulder corridor would serve this route, there was late concern that RTD would bypass 
Westminster and other small cities on their way to Boulder (Letter by Boulder City Manager, 
May 15, 1997; Letter by Denver Deputy City Manager, May 15, 1997; Letter by City of 
Broomsfield City Manager, May 15, 1997; Letter by Westminster Mayor, May 19, 1997).  Since 
there was no legislative prescription on what RTD could or could not include in its proposal, the 
agency was free to accommodate all of Westminster’s concerns by adding funding to study a 
supplemental commuter rail for the same corridor (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, May 20, 1997). 
1997 Legislative Process & Implications 
By the time RTD presented its plan to the legislature to request for legislation authorizing 
a multi-county tax election, the plan was fairly complete, which minimized the need for the 
boundary-spanner to lobby for favorable legislation.  By May 1997, when the legislature 
approved the final plan, the three core MISs had been finished, Guide the Ride’s public comment 
cycle was complete, and the media were supportive of the plan (Denver Post, Editorial, May 4, 
1997; Denver Post, Editorial, May 25, 1997).  The process had gained a great deal of 
momentum, and the legislature did little to stop it. Instead, RTD staff worked with legislators to 
help the bill meet their needs (RTD Legislative Liaison Committee Minutes, February 25, 1997).  
Consequently, the legislative process played a surprisingly small role in the development 
of RTD’s regional plan, signified by the fact that RTD continued to plan, confident of a 
favorable legislative outcome (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, September 19, 1995).  In one key 
example, the decision to go ahead with the vote in 1997 was made at RTD, not the capitol, and in 
one instance Marsella even cited this date to the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Panel56 on 
transportation and the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce without mentioning the need to 
authorize it first (October 22, 1996). Perhaps this was partly because RTD played such a large 
                                                
56 As seen below, the Governor was not a supporter of Guide the Ride. 
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role in determining what was in the legislation. RTD’s legal department helped write an early 
draft of the bill (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, February 18, 1997), and many features RTD 
sought were included in the final version.  
RTD representatives became less intimately involved in the final stages of writing the bill 
(known as SB 55), and continued to develop its Guide the Ride plan while legislators worked out 
the last details. By the time legislation was signed into law, the public comment process had been 
completed, and the RTD board had already voted to approve the final plan (Robey & Brown, 
May 21, 1997).57   
Only rarely did the legislature intentionally attempt to limit local decision making in the 
Guide the Ride proposal, and controversy never affected fundamental elements of prescriptive 
legislation identified in Table 3.2. For example, one hostile amendment would have required 
RTD to increase its rate of privatization, which would have fundamentally limited RTD’s ability 
to plan and implement its transportation system; however this was defeated (RTD Legislative 
Liaison Committee Summary, April 30, 1997).  Another amendment required a citizen petition 
process to place RTD’s proposal on the ballot, which was ultimately approved, but was an 
accountability measure rather than a severe limitation to RTD’s planning. Consequently, the 
legislative process did not significantly limit RTD’s planning capabilities.   
In fact, there was little strong opposition to RTD’s proposal, and there was little desire to 
impose strong regulations on its planning.  A strong opponent of the measure at the time, State 
Senate President Tom Norton,58 does not remember the bill being a controversial vote. “There 
was no coalition building prior to… the vote.  I don’t recall it being a particularly difficult battle 
one way or the other”  (Norton, interview, December 2, 2014). In his mind, legislators lined up 
                                                
57 In fact, the RTD board voted to submit its completed plan for voter consideration just hours after the Governor 
had granted final approval for the legislation that authorized the referendum. 
58 Norton was later a gubernatorial candidate, and CDOT Director. 
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more along geographical, rather than political party lines.  “It was a few people in the downtown 
Denver metro area that felt that it was the right thing to do, but the coalition or the—not really 
coalition, but the suburbs, at that point in time, were not convinced that they were getting their 
fair share, which is always a question in transportation” (Norton, interview, December 2, 2014).   
However even without significant intention to regulate RTD’s process, the legislature and 
RTD were working separately, and certain fissures emerged.  Most importantly, SB 55’s short 
timeline specified that RTD had to adopt its finished plan by July 1, 1997 (Colorado SB 55, 1997 
§3)—a little over a month after SB 55 was approved. RTD had only finished MISs for some, not 
all, of its corridors by this time, and the legislature wanted many things to be completed before 
projects could be built, including the identification of projects, and the completion of MISs (RTD 
Board Meeting Minutes, May 20, 1997).  RTD board members wanted these things too (RTD 
Board Meeting Minutes, May 20, 1997), but by the spring of 1997, projects in the northern half 
of the region remained unstudied. Had the legislature made the election date more flexible, RTD 
could have taken another year to study the northern corridors, and identify potential alignments 
and station locations.   
The RTD board was divided on whether to proceed with an unfinished plan, and a large 
minority of board members favored waiting until the next year to place the proposal on the ballot 
(RTD Board Meeting Minutes, May 20, 1997). This would have made it possible to study the 
region’s northern corridors more carefully before the election.  However staff did not 
recommend waiting, due to the time constraints in SB 55 (RTD Board of Directors Report, May 
20, 1997), which left the RTD board with no alternative, other than to approve the regional 
transit plan in its incomplete form. 
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Guide the Ride’s lack of specificity turned out to be the most important point of attack for 
opponents in the campaign (Denver Post, editorial, October 19, 1997).  SB 55’s short timeline 
for voter approval created a situation where RTD was unable to provide voters with sufficient 
data about ridership and cost.  As Lauren Martens, then a staffer at the Environmental Council, 
recalls, “The concept [of light rail] was popular, but the opposition was able to raise too many 
doubts about cost effectiveness of the plans, the vagueness of the plans… There were a lot of 
things we didn’t have answers for” (Martens, interview, December 12, 2014). Garcia-Berry, the 
campaign manager for the 2004 proposal (discussed below), understood the weaknesses of the 
1997 effort quite intimately.  She opines, “I’m glad Guide the Ride failed, because it forced us to 
come together to a plan that actually had discipline and structure and not just this ‘trust us and 
we will build it” (Garcia-Berry, interview, December 8, 2014). 
Indeed, by the summer of 1997 the regional plan was still a somewhat loose compilation 
of corridor studies, not always integrated.  Staff had done multi-million dollar studies on the 
southern corridors.  They had proposed alternatives, and brought local citizens and politicians 
into the process for the three southern corridors.  However on the northern corridors (the I-225 
corridor, the Gold line corridor, the North Metro corridor, and the US-36/Northwest corridor to 
Boulder), one senior staffer recalls, “We had lines on a map, but we didn’t have technologies, we 
didn’t have stations, we didn’t have a lot of the detail that, in hindsight, we realized we needed to 
have” (Van Meter interview, December 12, 2014). People living in these corridors were 
uncertain what RTD was promising them.  While RTD provided dollar amounts, it was unclear 
what those amounts could buy, or what would be built, should the approved money prove 
insufficient (Van Meter, interview, December 12, 2014).   
  214 
Even for the three corridors with extensive studies, there were inconsistencies across the 
studies, because each had been written by a different agency, and needed to be reconciled.  In 
one example, RTD used DRCOG’s earlier data on the West Corridor in its plan to speak to 
citizens groups. At an RTD board meeting, a Citizen Advisory Committee member complained 
that RTD had changed the corridor endpoints.  In reality, it turned out RTD had used corridor 
data from DRCOG, which used different endpoints (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, March 18, 
1997). This should have been a relatively minor problem to fix, but the short timeline did not 
allow RTD the time necessary to uncover and resolve such discrepancies. 
Inconsistencies in the plan and insufficient planning on the northern corridors created 
uncertainty for voters.  However voters’ greatest cause of uncertainty came not from the 
planning process at all, but RTD’s own divided and combative board members, some of whom 
were ideologically opposed to raising taxes for transit. The board was described as a 
“dysfunctional, embarrassing board of directors” by one of the board’s own members, and while 
some RTD board members were testifying in favor of the proposal at the Colorado Senate, others 
were testifying against it (Brown, Denver Post, February 12, 1997).  
Contemporary newspaper editorial boards saw the RTD board members as inexperienced 
and unable to work collaboratively (Brovsky, March 6, 1997; Denver Post, Editorial, March 7, 
1997).  In Marsella’s mind, “The board was incredibly antagonistic…. The board was acting 
crazy purposefully. [Board Member] John Caldera will tell you, ‘I love it when you go crazy and 
make the paper because then it erodes confidence in the agency and I love that.’ As he put it, 
‘We put the fun in dysfunctional.’ It was a contrived strategy to make us look bad” (Marsella, 
interview, December 5, 2014).   
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It is remarkable, then, that the legislature gave RTD as much authorization as it did to 
develop a plan, hold a vote, and manage a multi-billion dollar regional transportation building 
project. Legislators could have added more severe roadblocks, but limited themselves to more 
modest accountability measures.  As it turned out, legislators were more concerned about 
whether RTD would follow through in implementing its plan than what the plan looked like.   
The best explanation for the legislature’s willingness to approve permissive legislation 
appears to be RTD’s accumulation of institutional powers over its long history, which gave it the 
financial and legal ability to plan and tax.  By the time SB 55 was discussed in the legislature, 
the plan was developed to such an extent that legislators saw no reason to limit the contents of 
the plan.  They already knew what they were going to get, it seemed reasonable enough to 
support, and it was popular. Still, lawmakers weren’t rushing to offer RTD blanket authorization 
to conduct the measure a second time, should the referendum fail. SB 55 required citizen 
signatures to go on the ballot (Colorado SB 55, 1997: §5), and limited the time to go to the 
ballot.  This, combined with a disagreeable board, facilitated the proposal’s defeat.  Still, even 
though Guide the Ride lost in 1997, the regional transit vision lived on and transit proponents 
built upon the 1997 loss to develop a stronger, more detailed, and more popular proposal. 
Preparation for 2004 Measure 
Support for the vision of a regional plan continued to grow and benefit from RTD’s 
strong institutional autonomy even after the proposal’s defeat in 1997.  This was evident 
immediately afterwards, when RTD’s pre-existing electoral process made it possible to reform 
the agency’s quarrelsome and dysfunctional board without the need for new legislation. This 
made it possible for a coalition of outside groups to make major changes at RTD, which earned 
the agency greater credibility when it proposed a second ballot measure. 
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The Transit Alliance was a coalition of transit supporters who led the electoral reform, 
and their first meeting was the brainchild of MMC59 staffers and the Chamber of Commerce 
(Cronenberger, interview, December 1, 2014).  The breadth of its coalition helped solidify its 
ability to make changes at RTD.  Several mayors, environmental, and business organizations, 
from around the region met in late November 1997, just weeks after the Guide the Ride proposal 
had failed (Cronenberger, interview, December 1, 2014). Cronenberger, a Littleton mayor, and 
early Transit Alliance member, said it was clear how to proceed and whom to include. “These 
things are sometimes amorphous.  Everybody sort of knows who needs to be there giving the 
blessing” (Cronenberger, interview, December 1, 2014).   
From the start, the coalition had a clear goal.  Attendees discussed how they would 
maintain the vision of regional transportation in the wake of Guide the Ride’s defeat (Clark, 
interview, December 10, 2014). Indeed, maintaining the momentum was an important motivation 
for many of the attendees at that meeting (Clark, interview, December 10, 2014; Cronenberger, 
interview, December 1, 2014; Kenney, interview, December 9, 2014).  As Peter Kenney, a senior 
staffer from the MMC, recalls,  
We felt like we had great momentum and a lot of broad base of support for Guide 
the Ride. We knew why it had failed, which was largely dysfunction on the RTD 
board, and a lack of trust by the public in RTD’s ability to manage the money…. 
but we still felt it was the right answer, and thought that we ought to just not say, 
‘That was that. We tried it and it failed and let’s think about some other problem’ 
(Kenney, interview, December 9, 2014). 
 
The MMC organized support for the Transit Alliance from many of the region’s mayors 
out of fear that Governor Owens’ competing vision—funding a single line at a time—would 
never lead to a finished system.  Many worried this could culminate in a situation already seen 
on the region’s south side, where a ‘one line at a time’ approach had fostered intense competition 
                                                
59 Metro Mayors Caucus 
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between the Southeast and Southwest corridors, with each sponsoring its own lobbyists to fight 
for federal money (Tonsing, interview, December 11, 2014).  As one leader from the Southeast 
Line leadership recalls, once the southern line was built, the northern, western and eastern 
suburbs “…began putting a lot of pressure on DRCOG—‘where’s our piece of the action?”  
(Neukirch, interview, December 5, 2014).  
Martens, the Transit Alliance’s Executive Director, recalls cities’ great concern that 
“…someone would be the last one and get left out,” so in response, there was “a political drive to 
just go for it all” (Martens, interview, December 12, 2014).  Counter-intuitively, this concern 
over geographic equity helped unify politicians and cities from around the region, to the degree 
that the largely suburban Transit Alliance members invited Denver to join (Transit Alliance, 
Letter to Denver Mayor Wellington E. Webb, September 18, 1998)—quite unlike the city-suburb 
disagreements seen in other regions.   
By the fall of 1998, several cities and civic organizations became dues-paying members 
of the Transit Alliance,60 and the organization began to hire staff.  Growing interest in the 
Alliance attracted other cities to join, even though many of them were far less enamored of rail 
or transit. Aurora Mayor Paul Tauer, hailing from a moderate to conservative suburb, was 
particularly reluctant to join, believing the Transit Alliance was “narrowly focused” on light rail.  
However by September 1998, he was ready to consider the group, and the rail plan it supported. 
Tauer was against building light rail—at least until the Southwest Line opened with 
impressive ridership.  Speaking of Tauer, MMC Staffer Kenney recalls “….there was one mayor 
who was particularly opposed to light rail and to transit in general and he said, ‘I’m never going 
                                                
60 Early members included the cities of Lakewood, Arvada, Littleton, Golden, and Northglenn, the West and Denver 
Metro Chambers of Commerce, the Cherry Creek Transportation Management Organization, the Colorado Public 
Interest Research Group (CoPIRG), the Colorado Environmental Coalition, and the Center for Neighborhood and 
Regional Action (Transit Alliance Letter to Arapahoe County Commissioners, September 18, 1998). 
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to get any benefit out of this for my city. I don’t think it’s a good idea, but I see I’m in the 
minority, and I see these other cities want it, and I think it would help them and so I’m going to 
support it” (Kenney, Interview, December 9, 2014).  As Tauer explained at the time, “That’s 
another example of where it would probably be worth our while to be at the table and determine 
what direction they are going to take, rather than sit back and just let it happen” (King, Aurora 
Sentinel, September 23, 1998).  
 The Transit Alliance was just one group in a large coalition of supporters coming from 
outside RTD, and worked closely with the MMC and the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce.  
Martens argues that what the Transit Alliance added to the dialogue, which was not as evident in 
the 1997 process, was “Everybody’s holding everybody else accountable... [And] it’s not just 
RTD saying, ‘We have a regional vision.’  It’s mayors from around the region saying, ‘We have 
to stick together and support each other.’  It’s being able to speak with a political voice that’s 
separate from RTD, from the agency, so that when you go lobby for the bills, it’s an independent 
voice” (Martens, interview, December 12, 2014).   
The MMC and the Denver Chamber lobbied for legislation and gathered support as well, 
but approached the goal from different angles, with the Transit Alliance being especially useful 
for consolidating the environmental and business communities in the same coalition (Martens, 
interview, December 12, 2014). Meanwhile, the MMC built consensus among cities. However 
there was a great deal of overlap between groups, and many interviewees were members of 
several groups at once.   
 Together, these groups did much to make RTD a more professional organization. RTD’s 
raucous board was their primary target, and the Transit Alliance recruited and trained candidates 
to run in the 1998 election. In fact, several interviewees from this study were elected to the RTD 
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board as a result of these efforts.61 Alliance members did significant outreach at public events, 
held educational forums, and built a list of over 6,000 potential supporters. As a result, four out 
of five of the candidates they considered “anti-transit” (Ewegen, Denver Post, July 20, 1998) 
were voted out of office, or chose not to run in 1998 (Colorado Secretary of State, 1999).  This 
included Board Member Caldara, who had led the opposition to Guide the Ride in 1997.  
The electoral process hadn’t brought strong candidates to the RTD board in the past. As 
Kenney of the Metro Mayors Caucus recalls, “The RTD board flew under the radar for years and 
years and years.  Nobody really knew them.  The average voter wouldn’t have any idea who their 
RTD representative was.  Those campaigns were never very well… funded.  It was just 
somebody stood up and said, ‘hey, I’ll be an RTD board member,’ and they got elected.  Starting 
in 1997 that all changed” (Kenney, interview, December 9, 2014).   
RTD’s electoral structure made it possible to reform the agency without any legislative 
intervention. The Transit Alliance selected candidates through an interview process, which 
ensured experienced candidates genuinely interested in transit (Martens, interview, December 
12, 2014).  Marsella, in particular, was grateful for the new board members (Marsella, interview, 
December 5, 2014), recalling, “I was a caged animal, personally [in 1997]. I had already been 
taken out of the game. [The board] had neutered me in doing Guide the Ride. I saw what they 
did. They absolutely corrupted the entire system, wouldn't even tell the public what it is and, 
again, kept acting crazy, the board walking out of board meetings. They loved it. I said, ‘No. As 
GM, I need to get more control here…” (Marsella, interview, December 5, 2014).  RTD’s 
structure certainly facilitated that change.   
                                                
61 Directors Briggs and Garcia were interviewed in this study.  Briggs defeated an incumbent whom the Denver Post 
considered an “anti-rail director,” while Garcia defeated a director considered to be among the “…loose cannons,’ 
whose own agendas lead them to switch erratically between the pro- and anti-rail factions” (Ewegen, Denver Post, 
July 20, 1998; Secretary of State, 1999). 
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However this transition could not come directly from any one boundary-spanner, 
especially one situated as General Manager of an organization, in a position where it would be 
inappropriate for him to campaign for a change of its elected board.  Outside organizations were 
involved in the election by necessity, and if they cooperated with Marsella at all, it was only 
tacitly.  However Marsella was certainly grateful for the outcome, recalling “[The new board 
members] were ready [to support me] going in.  When they got elected, they already knew Guide 
the Ride. They knew what happened… They wanted a system built, they wanted transit 
investments and they were basically marrying up with me to make that happen” (Marsella, 
interview, December 5, 2014). 
RTD’s Growing Internal Credibility 
RTD’s reforms included a project that helped rehabilitate the agency’s reputation.  Built 
jointly between RTD and CDOT, this highway/transit line to the Denver Technology Center was 
known as T-REX.62 This project was constructed with $1.7 billion in bonds approved by voters 
in 1999, (Neukirch, Rocky Mountain News, December 12, 1999), and was only possible because 
RTD had the autonomy to take on bonded debt and make an agreement with CDOT.  
This partnership was a win for both agencies, since they could share resources and lobby 
jointly for federal funding. Success of the ballot measure proved RTD could finish a large project 
on time and under budget, and built confidence in the agency. T-REX also served as a ‘proof of 
concept’ for light rail in the region, making it tangible to politicians and voters.  By summer 
2001, as RTD was again considering a regional proposal, T-REX was about to break ground 
(Proctor, Denver Business Journal, July 6, 2001). In Marsella’s mind, this project contributed a 
great deal to support for the regional plan.  “Once people saw it, felt it, and touched it, they really 
liked it” (Marsella, interview, December 5, 2014).  
                                                
62 Transportation Expansion Project 
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Refinement of Guide the Ride Plan Through Major Investment Studies 
Marsella and RTD also worked to gain credibility from increasingly detailed Major 
Investment Studies (MISs), which strengthened support for its plans, and continued to develop 
RTD’s regional proposal before the legislature even began to discuss new authorizing legislation.  
As Fellman, from the Metro Mayors Caucus put it, “…So the issue was if we’re going to do this 
again, we got to be able to tell voters what it is they’re getting for this increase of taxes... and we 
better come up with a plan that we really think we could follow through on” (Fellman, interview, 
December 9, 2014).  
Marsella recognized that Guide the Ride had failed, at least in part, due to its lack of 
specificity in four out of the seven of its proposed corridors, most of them on the northern side of 
the region. To overcome this problem, Marsella requested board support to embark on MISs for 
the remaining corridors.  Senior RTD staffer Van Meter recalls that these appeared to be separate 
studies at the time (Van Meter, interview, December 12, 2014). However, Marsella had a larger 
goal: “[The full measure] was a gleam in our eye at that point.  The full measure was a gleam in 
our eye” (Marsella, interview, December 5, 2014). Additionally, as Van Meter points out, while 
the MISs didn’t appear closely connected, “…why else would we have embarked on 
multimillion dollars worth of studies on those corridors, other than to rework and bring that plan 
back to the public?” (Van Meter, interview, December 12, 2014).  
The Major Investment Studies helped lead to legislative support for a regional vote, 
created the plan, and framed the debate before the legislature even tried to.  As Marsella recalls, 
after Guide the Ride, “We used the Major Investment Study process, really, as part of the ballot 
initiative.  By taking it out, having all these public hearings to get input, we were able to go after 
[it]…The plan finally got sealed, and we said, ‘This is the plan” (Marsella, interview, December 
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5, 2014). RTD’s new board approved MISs for the northern corridors in March 2001—with 
considerably less infighting than in 1997, and more support from the region’s mayors (RTD 
Board Meeting Minutes, March 20, 2001).   
With the corridor plans complete, RTD packaged them into a regional proposal—
something RTD probably could not have done, had it not been for its strong pre-existing 
autonomy to plan and act independent of legislative action.  For example, RTD, CDOT and 
Transit Alliance partnered to commission a poll gauging voter interest, which found 78% support 
for a transportation sales tax increase (Leib, Denver Post, July 3, 2001). As part of this effort, 
RTD rebranded the corridor plans with a more appealing name—“FasTracks” (Ewegen, Denver 
Post, August 18, 2001). By the time this plan made it to the legislature, RTD had developed a 
sufficiently detailed plan to minimize opposition from key legislators and journalists before 
asking the legislature for new authorization to hold a multi-county vote. 
Legislative Process for FasTracks 
The completeness of the plan made it possible to win support for RTD’s program from 
both a Republican House and Democratic Senate. By the time the plan made it to the capitol, 
Fellman, Chair of the MMC, recalls, “We were telling legislators here’s what the plan will be” 
(Emphasis added; Fellman, interview, December 9, 2014), rather than what the process would 
be.  Indeed, RTD’s plan was developed and detailed enough to win key support from municipal 
elected officials, outside organizations like the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce, and, most 
importantly, the President of the Colorado State Senate, who played a critical role in neutralizing 
Republican opposition at the state capitol. 
RTD’s credibility at the capitol was much improved from 1997, due to its success 
building the T-REX project, and Marsella’s leadership and salesmanship continued to be 
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essential, though he was by no means a singularly essential Alpha Participant, but, rather, a 
visionary and advocate that worked closely with others.  RTD’s lobbyist (who asked to remain 
anonymous) recalls that, even in a legislature evenly divided along party lines, his voice 
resonated. “To Cal's credit…I think [he and RTD leadership] were instrumental in changing the 
debate here [at the capitol, so] that it's not just ‘transit is a liberal, environmental kind of thing.’ 
It is a part of a multimodal 21st century program.” (RTD Lobbyist, interview, December 10, 
2014).  
Marsella’s message was a tough sell to the Governor and many Republican legislators, 
but having a completed plan helped overcome their skepticism.  “You know, I think some of 
them were completely unconscious. They couldn't even dream it.  They were like, ‘Oh, okay.’ 
They had no idea that he was really serious” (RTD Lobbyist, interview, December 10, 2014). 
Owens opposed the proposal throughout the legislative process (RTD Lobbyist, interview, 
December 10, 2014).  Even so, the disputes were relatively minor, largely because RTD had 
already done most of the planning, and the plan was clear.  As Kenney of the MMC recalls, “I 
don’t know what went on in every conversation in the hallways of the legislature, but there was 
never any serious effort to say, ‘Well, you can do this, but only if you cut that line.’ There wasn’t 
stuff like that…. So what we had was pretty straightforward: Here’s the plan. These lines would 
be built” (Kenney, interview, December 9, 2014). 
While there were no disputes over the choice of lines, there was disagreement over how 
many of them should be built at once.  The Governor continued to favor an incremental, single-
corridor approach, using RTD’s existing funding sources, rather than new taxes, and he made it 
difficult for RTD to get its plan approved at the capitol (Kenney, P., interview, December 9, 
2014).  This was clear immediately after Marsella proposed FasTracks to the public. Tom 
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Norton, presumably acting as the Governor’s proxy,63 was reported “…urging RTD to slow it 
down at least a year, so that CDOT can develop a companion package of highway improvements 
to go along with it” (Flynn, Rocky Mountain News, August 22, 2001).  By December, Governor 
Owens made it clear to Marsella that he was “…not supportive of FasTracks and he [felt] the 
district should use the one corridor at a time approach” (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, December 
18, 2001).  
However RTD’s status as an elected metropolitan special district helped protect the 
agency from such opposition.  The Governor was opposed to the plan, but he also believed in 
local self-governance, and he considered RTD large enough to deserve democratic autonomy, 
causing him to temper his opposition.  This was illustrated soon after legislation was introduced 
on January 9, 2002, which authorized RTD to hold a tax election (Colorado SB 1, 2002, 
Legislative History). Only a week later, Owens softened his stance, saying he could let RTD go 
to the voters, as long as its plan was incorporated into the state’s transportation planning process 
(Leib, Denver Post, January 16, 2002; RTD Legislative Committee, meeting minutes, January 15, 
2002). RTD’s right to self-governance was an important part of the Governor’s shift.  Tom 
Clark, a senior staffer at the Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce, recalls the Governor 
willingly told people he opposed the bill, when asked during the legislative process; however 
Owens never sent his lobbyists to actively oppose it. “Owens has, like all of us, his own foibles.  
But I think he’s always been a man of his word… He was not a doctrinaire, right wing wack 
job….  He spent his whole life studying government, interested in what it could do and shouldn’t 
do.  And transportation is something government does” (Clark, interview, December 10, 2014).  
There were still obstacles for RTD to overcome, but the Governor’s predisposition to support 
                                                
63 Though he was State Senate President in 1997, by the time of the second process, in 2002, the Governor had 
appointed Norton Executive Director of CDOT. 
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local self-governance, and RTD’s status as an elected local/regional government, helped reduce 
opposition. 
However RTD’s elected status did not win explicit support, either. The Governor’s offer 
sounded conciliatory on its face, but RTD was uncertain whether conformance with the state 
transportation plan could be used later as a tool for the Governor and CDOT to direct how the 
agency chose its projects.  As Marsella stated to RTD’s Legislative Committee, he “…has been 
in meetings in which CDOT Director Tom Norton has indicated he would be the interpreter for 
FasTracks integration with the state transportation plan as required by this legislation and that he 
would not approve all the corridors included in FasTracks” (RTD Legislative Committee 
Meeting Minutes, February 19, 2002).  As it appeared, RTD would need to prove its projects 
would not cost the state transportation account unbudgeted funds, and RTD and CDOT each had 
a different interpretation of how much FasTracks would cost CDOT. This bureaucratic dispute 
likely stood as a proxy for the Governor’s own misgivings about FasTracks, which, perhaps, he 
was reluctant to express through the legislative process in a gubernatorial re-election year.  RTD 
was able to overcome Norton’s challenge by presenting its own cost estimates, which was 
possible because FasTracks was so well developed by this time. RTD’s numbers indicated 
CDOT would not, in fact, need to spend any highway dollars to support FasTracks projects 
(RTD Legislative Committee Meeting Minutes, March 19, 2002).  
This opened the door for a legislative deal, in which RTD’s growing reputation for 
competence helped induce legislators to propose a more permissive bill than even RTD had 
asked for. Separate bills proposed differing solutions, but one of them (Colorado SB 9, later 
renumbered SB 167, by Senator Windels) provided RTD with blanket authorization to choose its 
election cycle, even in the absence of an explicit request by RTD.  Indeed, as Fellman, Chair of 
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the MMC notes, blanket authorization to go to the ballot was simply “…not the main focus…. 
The main focus was, how do we get the FasTracks plan on the ballot?” (Fellman, interview, 
December 9, 2014). In fact, the RTD board did not anticipate a blanket authorization bill for its 
proposal, and the board’s first recorded discussion of its 2002 legislative agenda does not 
propose such a bill (RTD Legislative Committee Meeting Minutes, December 4, 2001). 
Nevertheless, when given the choice, RTD’s board was quick to side with the blanket 
authorization bill (Colorado SB 9, Windels) over a less permissive alternative64 (RTD, 
Legislative Committee Minutes, January 15, 2002; Colorado, SB 1, 2002; Colorado Special 
Session-SB 9, 2002).    
Even with a growing well of state-level support, RTD faced a number of challenges at the 
state capitol, as the debate rapidly became tied to statewide political concerns.  State leadership 
was politically divided that session, with the Republicans controlling the governorship and the 
General Assembly, while Democrats controlled the Senate. Partisan tension exacerbated 
perennial urban-rural divisions often seen in state-level politics, brought on by legislators outside 
RTD’s boundaries, who “…didn't see the value in the investment, or didn't care at best” (RTD 
Lobbyist, interview, December 10, 2014).   
The Governor’s opposition added to RTD’s challenge, but RTD also won powerful allies 
willing to do everything in their power to support FasTracks authorization.  The Governor’s 
concerns softened significantly when Senate President Matsunaka tied FasTracks authorization 
to a comprehensive state transportation deal (later codified as SB 179), which the Governor and 
many others saw as essential (RTD Legislative Liaison Committee, Minutes, May 7, 2002).  As 
political consultant Garcia-Berry recalls, “It wasn’t until 2002 when the Governor wanted 
something; he wanted a tolling enterprise created… Then the Democrats …in Congress [sic] 
                                                
64 SB 1, by Senator Tupa. 
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drove a very hard bargain and said, ‘Okay if you…want that, let us tell you what our price is. 
Our price is you give RTD the authority to go to the ballot” (Garcia-Berry, interview, December 
8, 2014). As RTD’s lobbyist recalls, “A huge part [of the credit] goes to Stan [Matsunaka] for 
being willing to play the poker game along the way and play this out so that we ended up in a 
conference committee where the administration was going to get a lot of the things they wanted 
up or down…” (RTD Lobbyist, December 10, 2014).  
By this point, FasTracks’ success was completely caught up in state-level politics.  It is 
very likely that the Senate Democrats were motivated by a desire to offer an opposing 
transportation plan during an election year where Matsunaka was running against Governor 
Owens.  However their choice of a plan was consistently focused on transit. Based on newspaper 
accounts, it appears the Democrats did not have a strong proposal to offer (Leib, Denver Post, 
January 15, 2002), and the RTD FasTracks proposal provided one that was readily available.   At 
the same time, Owens was willing to support FasTracks, as long as it became part of the state 
transportation plan.  By this time, both sides felt the need to support RTD’s proposal, though the 
Democrats more enthusiastically.  However the key question remained, how to fund it (Leib, 
Denver Post, January 30, 2002)?   
RTD’s status as an elected agency helped win political support and protected the proposal 
from excessive state intervention, even in the face of high-stakes state political negotiation.  
Autonomy of local governance continued to be very important to the Governor and other 
Republicans, and in conference committee, this became Matsunaka’s core argument for why the 
legislature needed to grant RTD authorization to hold its election. As RTD’s lobbyist put it, “Our 
arguments were, it doesn’t mean it’s going to pass, but the district, and it’s a district made up of 
elected board members, would like to have that authority to make their case to the voters” (RTD 
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Lobbyist, interview, December 10, 2014).  The Governor eventually used this argument as well.  
After the bill passed, his spokesperson explained that, “As a conservative, the governor has 
always supported the use of citizens’ initiatives” (Leib, Denver Post, May 10, 2002). 
RTD’s strong preparation was especially helpful throughout the legislative process. In 
fact, RTD’s lobbyist recalls being surprised by the magnitude of RTD’s request from the 
legislature, considering the state political environment:  
“I think RTD had done some polling already about how to craft that ballot 
measure question in the best way to get voter approval. So, we as the lobbyists 
weren't just making up ballot language. It had been fairly vetted through the 
district. Accompanying all that preplanning work. I mean, they'd been doing the 
EIS [Environmental Impact Studies]… So, it was a matter of… I remember at the 
time thinking we're really pushing this early, and Cal being very aggressive, was 
like ‘We can do it.’ I remember thinking I get that's what my job's going to be, but 
knowing how challenging it was going to be, based on that political 
environment…” (Lobbyist, interview, December 10, 2014). 
 
 As aggressive as Marsella and RTD were, the agency’s status as an elected local 
government district was very important for winning legislative support.  The agency provided the 
institutional support needed to develop a detailed measure, which eventually translated into 
support at the state capitol. 
Impact of SB 179 
Even though the bill that resulted from the legislative process was flexible in many ways 
desired by RTD, it was authored separately from them, and there were inconsistencies on one 
key issue—the deadline for returning petition signatures to place RTD’s proposal on the 
November 2002 ballot.  This did not become clear until a month after the bill had been signed, in 
the newspaper. The article explained that, in conference committee, Republicans had asked to 
remove the “safety clause,” in the bill, meaning voters could repeal the measure in a referendum 
if they so desired—but also meaning the bill would not go into effect until August 7, 2002, rather 
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than immediately. In practice, this meant voters could not circulate petitions for the legislation 
until the bill went into effect, which just happened to be the same day the Colorado Secretary of 
State required those signatures be turned in, for the proposal to be placed on the November 2002 
ballot (Leib, Denver Post, June 12, 2002).65   
This revelation put Republican committee members on the defensive, and the Governor’s 
spokesman said, “It was totally inadvertent” (Leib, Denver Post, June 12, 2002). House member 
Rob Fairbank (R-Littleton) explained further, “…neither he nor his Republican colleagues had 
the ‘evil genius’ to adjust the legislation to ensure no vote on FasTracks this year. ‘We were not 
whipping out our calendars’ to see if the law's effective date meshed with the secretary of state's 
timetable for a November initiative petition” (Leib, J., Denver Post, June 12, 2002).66 On the 
other hand, the same journalist speculated the Governor was on the ballot, and wanted to avoid 
having FasTracks on the same ballot (but did not explain why).   
Intentional or not, this delayed the FasTracks vote by over a year. The delay was a 
surprise to those at RTD.  Marsella was eager to expedite the vote (Garcia-Berry, interview, 
December 8, 2014), and the board was discussing specific ballot language just two days before 
the Denver Post article (RTD Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, June 10, 2002); however 
the signature provision compelled RTD to consider 2003 instead. 
The power dynamic changed in 2003, however.  With the legislation approved, 
legislators no longer had strong leverage over RTD’s process, due to both the momentum in 
favor of a regional vote, and the flexibility of the legislation, which provided blanket 
authorization.  Even new legislative proposals did little to slow down the process, as evidenced 
                                                
65 Signatures were required to equal at least 5% of the votes cast for the office of Secretary of State in the previous 
election (Colorado SB 179, 2002, §5) within the district boundaries (Leib, Denver Post, May 10, 2002). 
66 One reporter pointed out that Governor Owens was against RTD holding its election in 2002, perhaps because the 
Governor was up for re-election on the same ballot (Leib, Denver Post, June 12, 2002).   
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by some legislators’ unsuccessful attempts to thwart the regional initiative after SB 179 had 
passed.  This was true in spite of the fact that the Senate changed hands to Republican control in 
2002, bringing a leadership staunchly opposed to public transit (Flynn, Rocky Mountain News, 
December 16, 2002), and explicitly seeking to reverse the compromise transportation package 
approved the year before. For example, Senator Andrews, the new Senate President, proposed 
legislation allowing voters to repeal or reallocate funding from all RTD’s local tax funding—not 
just the FasTracks 0.04% sales tax, but the original 0.06% funding RTD operations, as well 
(Colorado SB 257, 2003).  However the process had already progressed too far for Andrews’ bill 
to gain traction.  Even though Andrews was the Senate President, he had a hard time winning 
supporters, and newspapers chastised him for offering a bill that “…breaks faith with voters of 
metro Denver who approved the RTD tax to begin with—with the promise that it would be 
dedicated to a modern transit system” (Editorial, Denver Post, January 28, 2003).  
This first failure did not deter Andrews from making several more attempts at derailing 
FasTracks, and his 2003 legislation amounts to the farthest any legislators tried to go to halt 
FasTracks.  RTD was able to overcome the challenge because its FasTracks plan had already 
progressed to a near-final form, and the agency had already won over a diverse coalition of 
allies.  For example, a typically neutral journalist came to RTD’s rescue to write, “This is my 
40th year covering state government and I have never before seen an attempt to divert a voter-
approved tax without resubmitting the issue to the voters” (Ewegen, Denver Post, February 1, 
2003). Republican State Senator Bob Briggs—a former RTD Board Member—also came to 
RTD’s aid, as a member of Andrews’ caucus.  As Briggs recalls, “I voted against that. I ran the 
campaign against that… I got more political heat on that one than I did with the rest of them. It 
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was ridiculous what he was trying to do, but it passed because R's [Republicans] voted for it. I 
was one of the token R's that didn't... “ (Briggs, interview, December 10, 2014).  
In addition to strong momentum for the FasTracks plan, Senator Andrews’ proposal 
failed due to its lack of constitutionality. This issue, too, was a function of the legislature’s 
declining leverage once authorizing legislation had been approved: it would be unconstitutional 
for voters to later repeal taxes that had been approved and bonded for construction to begin; nor 
could jurisdictions later opt to leave and halt tax payments under such circumstances (RTD 
Board Meeting Minutes, April 15, 2003).  
It is telling that Senator Andrews was the leader of a Republican majority in the Senate, 
in an all-Republican state government; yet was only able to pass one out of his seven attempts 
between 2003-200467 to limit RTD’s finances, regulate its organizational structure, and limit 
campaign fundraising for FasTracks.  The bill Andrews was able to pass was by far his most 
mild proposal, calling for state oversight of RTD (Colorado SB 114, 2004), a sign of the 
legislature’s limited ability to halt the direction of the FasTracks' process after 2003. 
Developing the Final FasTracks Plan 
The development of the final FasTracks plan proceeded apace even as such legislative 
roadblocks continued to come its way. With clear legislation in place by this point, there was 
little need for a Bay Area style Alpha Participant figure to manage the process (as in Chapter 5), 
and it was guided primarily by economic, political and practical considerations instead. This 
process included a full discussion by the RTD board over which year was the most economically 
and politically optimal to hold the election, considering the advantages and disadvantages of 
each. Economic circumstances, rather than the boundary-spanner, or legislative influence, were 
the most important element in shaping the board’s decision.  While board members were eager to 
                                                
67 SB 74 (2003), SB 257 (2003), SB 323 (2003), SB 54 (2004), SB 114 (2004), SB 242 (2004), SB 248 (2004). 
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go to the ballot in 2003, the regional economy had declined since they originally began working 
on the measure in 1998, and it appeared the economy might no longer generate enough sales tax 
revenue to support the entire plan (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, December 17, 2002).68  
However the legislation was flexible enough for the RTD board to adapt the plan to changing 
circumstances, and there was no need to seek legislators’ assistance.  This is evidenced during 
the board’s March 2003 debate over whether to ask voters in 2004.  Board members had 
different perspectives, but the flexibility manifested itself in one staffer’s comment, “When the 
board says it’s ready, we’ll be ready” (RTD Planning and Development Committee Minutes, 
March 3, 2003). 
Consequently, political calculation and logistics, rather than legislative prescription, 
guided the final decision. When Garcia-Berry’s polling data indicated that FasTracks was 
unlikely to pass in 2003, many RTD board members took a closer look at 2004 (Leib, Denver 
Post, July 8, 2002), and polling data guided the board’s final decision (RTD Board Meeting 
Minutes, November 18, 2003). Based on the polling data, Garcia-Berry insisted on an even year 
as well. “I mean, the numbers are very clear. If you need a high margin and a high vote count out 
of Denver and out of Boulder you needed to do it in an even year” (Garcia-Berry, interview, 
December 8, 2014). Logistical considerations were also crucial. Recalling this time, Garcia-
Berry discusses the extent to which practical considerations shaped the board’s decision. “We 
had a big fight about that. Cal wanted to go right away. His staff finally said, ‘We can’t get 
through the 208 process69 in less than 18 months.’ So the earliest we’d go was 2004. He didn’t 
like it” (Garcia-Berry, interview, December 8, 2014).  On the other hand, there is no evidence 
                                                
68 Board of Labor Statistics numbers indicate the Denver-Aurora MSA unemployment rate jumped from 2.1% in 
November 2000 to 4.8% in November 2001, and peaked at 5.6% in 2002.  By 2003, it had plateaued, and begun to 
decline (BLS http://www.bls.gov/sae/#data). 
69 The process that required DRCOG to approve RTD’s proposal before presenting it to voters, so named because it 
was based on requirements from Colorado SB 208 of 1990. 
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that legislative requirements influenced this final decision, since SB 179 contained no sunset 
clause, providing blanket authorization to choose the election cycle. 
The Boundary-Spanner in Project Selection—First Among Equals 
Legislative permissiveness facilitated the selection of projects to include in the final 
proposal, as well.  The boundary-spanner continued to offer vision and guide the process, but did 
not hold singular control over it. Instead, he cooperated closely and from an equal power 
relationship with many local politicians, when resolving geographic equity disputes.  This is 
especially noticeable when resolving a difficult $850 million shortfall from the region’s 
economic downturn during that period (Flynn, Rocky Mountain News, August 14, 2003). RTD 
staff, board members, city officials, and outside organizations had to grapple with hard choices 
over what to keep in the final plan.  
Until this point, the RTD board had spent little time limiting lines.  In fact, one of the 
primary reasons for doing a regional plan had been to minimize disagreement, by including 
something for everyone. This strategy had its critics, especially CDOT Director Norton, who 
characterizes the process as one where “Many times in a RTD board meeting they’d say, ‘If you 
get a bus, I get a bus” (Norton, interview, December 2, 2014).  Nevertheless, ‘spreading the 
peanut butter’ held the plan together, so, as Van Meter puts it, “…we wouldn’t have to pick 
winners and losers, and wait 30 to 50 years to have built out that system”  (Van Meter, interview, 
December 12, 2014).   
All this was threatened by the funding shortfall. Marsella proposed a new plan, with some 
lines truncated, parking at stations severely reduced, and the rail line from Boulder to Longmont 
postponed into a Phase II (Flynn, Rocky Mountain News, August 13, 2003; Flynn, Rocky 
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Mountain News, August 14, 2003).70 As soon as it became apparent that FasTracks could not 
reach every area equally, old rivalries between the different parts of the region immediately 
resurfaced, requiring a new understanding among cities, counties and RTD board members. 
County commissioners began to speak, once again, about their area not getting its fair share—
which was especially true for representatives from the northern part of their region (Flynn, Rocky 
Mountain News, August 14, 2003).71    
Marsella hardly could be described as ‘leading’ or ‘leveraging over’ the process that 
followed.  Tensions went beyond the traditional north-south axis, extending to cities in the west 
and east as well, which were all concerned that Marsella’s two-phase proposal would require a 
second vote to bring rail to their area.  As one reporter put it, “…Voters already served by rail in 
the first phase would be inclined to vote against expansion in the future for outlying areas” 
(Flynn, Rocky Mountain News, October 9, 2003). Marsella responded with a revised proposal 
with only one phase, but made up the lost revenue by stretching out the construction time from 
10 years to 12, and reducing service on some lines in their early years (Flynn, Rocky Mountain 
News, November 5, 2003).72  
Even Marsella’s compromise elicited anger from cities scheduled to be served last, 
indicating the power cities had in the final decision process.  Aurora Mayor Tauer made his 
concerns known immediately after RTD staff released the new plan, saying to the Rocky 
Mountain News, ``It casts doubt on the credibility of RTD's commitments to the eastern metro 
                                                
70 Additionally, the Gold Line was truncated from Olde Town Arvada to Ward Road; the West Line from Denver 
Federal Center to Golden; the North Metro Line from 124th Avenue to Colorado 7; an extension of the Southwest 
Corridor to Highlands Ranch was eliminated; as was the Central Connector line into downtown Denver. 
71 In just one example, Elaine Valente, Chairwoman of the Adams County Commission, expressed her concern that 
“The north area has always felt like it hasn't gotten its fair share… that everyone share equally in the cutbacks” 
(Flynn, Rocky Mountain News, August 14, 2003). 
72 This would lower the cost from $5.1 billion to $4.8 billion—which was still more than the $4.2 billion cost for the 
first phase of the segmented plan (Flynn, Rocky Mountain News, November 5, 2003). 
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area [where Aurora is located]. I have become less inclined to be a supporter of FasTracks than I 
was before today. I'm not an outright opponent yet, but this is a slap in the face' (Flynn, Rocky 
Mountain News, November 14, 2003). Tauer’s hesitation with Marsella’s compromise reveals 
the key role cities played in shaping the final plan, in the absence of strong state-level 
prescription over the process.   
RTD’s relationship with cities had always been complicated by the fact that the 
boundaries of RTD directors’ districts were not coterminous with those of the cities, which made 
it unclear exactly which jurisdiction should be used to measure whether tax collections were 
equivalent to services returned. According to Martens of the Transit Alliance, RTD directors’ 
low salaries ($3,000 per year) further diminished their power and ability to do their jobs, making 
Marsella more powerful than the elected board members “in many ways” (Martens, interview, 
December 12, 2014). This dynamic varies, as well, from city to city, since cities are quite 
different in size and power, making the web of relationships between directors and mayors quite 
complex.  Consensus on a final plan required some kind of formal agreement that could satisfy 
all cities that RTD would fulfill its promises to their jurisdiction. 
 The challenge was resolved when mayors led the way in calling for a system of “trust, 
but verify” (Fellman, interview, December 9, 2014). By December 2003, the mayors of Arvada 
and Aurora were asking Marsella to develop a formal mechanism to ensure FasTracks corridors 
constructed in earlier years would not consume the monies promised to later corridors (RTD 
Board Meeting Minutes, December 16, 2003).  The product of this discussion was a resolution to 
minimize cost overruns on corridors in order to “hold harmless” FasTracks corridors scheduled 
to be built later (RTD Planning and Development Committee Minutes, January 5, 2004).  
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It seems unlikely RTD could guarantee each corridor against cost overruns in all other 
corridors, and indeed, the resolution left RTD plenty of room to make adjustments.  For example, 
the resolution specified that its guarantee was “…contingent upon a successful ballot initiative 
and obtaining funds and commitments from various sources as identified in the financial [sic] for 
FasTracks” 
Figure 8.3: RTD’s Final FasTracks Proposal 
 
Regional Transportation District, 2004, pg. 1-2 
(RTD Planning and Development Committee Meeting Minutes, January 5, 2004). Presumably, 
the resolution was referring to successfully applying for federal New Starts grants, and other 
outside sources, but it is hard to see how this agreement provided any protection that would not 
have existed in its absence. Nevertheless, RTD’s “hold harmless” resolution provided political 
insurance for mayors against the possibility of RTD overspending its budget.  As MMC’s 
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Fellman explains, the goal for cities at the end of the schedule was to have reasonable assurances 
that RTD wouldn’t be able to change the plan and say, “Oh, we can’t do your line anymore” 
(Fellman, interview, December 9, 2014). The best answer they could come up with was to 
assume that “everybody’s going to hold everybody else’s feet to the fire” (Fellman, interview, 
December 9, 2014).  This mutual accountability mechanism depended not on the continual 
oversight of a single powerful person, but the same multi-city engagement that had led to its 
development, which, like the previous stages of the Denver proposal, was the preferable way to 
resolve the geographic equity dispute because the legislation did not specify the outcome, or the 
process leading to it. 
Findings from Denver 
The lack of pre-authorizing legislation to conduct a regional tax vote enabled RTD to 
develop its plan before the legislature weighed in on how to conduct the process. Paradoxically, 
without legislation authorizing the vote, RTD was able to shape its process and outcome with 
limited state influence, ensuring that the plan matched the region’s political imperatives, rather 
than ones imposed by the state. However this was possible only because RTD already had such 
strong institutional autonomy to plan and act.  This included a 0.06% ongoing sales tax funding 
bus operations, and allowing for gradual capital investment in new infrastructure.  RTD was able 
to take out bonds, and had the experience needed to conduct plans.   
However most extraordinarily, RTD had an elected board. RTD’s status as an elected 
local/regional government helped make the case for providing additional decision making 
powers to a legitimate and autonomous local government, and won support for authorizing 
legislation from many legislators and the Governor. 
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RTD’s strong institutional structure meant the boundary-spanner was the most pre-
eminent actor among a group of people that assumed leadership roles in supporting Denver’s 
regional transportation process.  The boundary-spanner was not singularly essential.  He 
provided vision and direction, but other regional agencies like DRCOG and CDOT did much 
planning, in addition to RTD.  Outside organizations like the Denver Metro Chamber, the Transit 
Alliance, and the Metro Mayors Caucus all played crucial roles at different times in the process, 
including the efforts to lobby the legislature for authorization to hold a multi-county tax vote.    
Following RTD’s failure to win in its 1997 attempt, the agency needed significant reform 
to rebuild its reputation.  RTD’s institutional autonomy made it possible to make major changes 
at RTD through the electoral process, rather than through new legislation.  This made it easier for 
outside groups like the Transit Alliance to assume a large role in making these changes, and at 
times, the boundary-spanner was more dependent on these outside groups to make major changes 
possible than the other way around. Their assistance made reforms at RTD easier and faster, and 
made it possible for RTD to gain credibility sufficient to win the legislature’s authorization in 
2002 (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, February 18, 1997).  Consequently, it appears that RTD’s 
strong institutional structure facilitated the swift repetition of the process after its 1997 defeat. 
Following 2003, RTD’s blanket authorization to choose its election cycle led to a 
boundary-spanner that was essentially the ‘first among equals,’ along with local mayors, who 
made the final decisions over how to resolve a budget shortfall in the FasTracks proposal.  The 
resulting plan was influenced primarily by practical considerations, political and economic 
needs, and city-level politics, rather than state-level political imperatives. With no sunset to 
RTD’s authorization, mayors as well as RTD board members were able to find solutions to 
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geographic-equity disagreements with vision, assistance and leadership from the boundary-
spanner, but not political leverage. 
Many people did not buy into Marsella’s vision right away. Marsella encouraged board 
members, coalition members and legislators to act.  And, indeed, he didn’t need to push too hard, 
since many already supported the concept.  Ironically, it was easier to overcome geographic 
equity concerns and unite the region with a large regional plan, than with small incremental plans 
that would have required continual fights over which corridor to build next. A regional plan 
minimized the politics, and RTD’s structure incentivized the development of a regional plan by 
including districts spread evenly across the region.  Every board member wanted to ensure the 
plan had a project in his/her district.  
Regionwide planning appealed to potential supporters outside RTD as well, due to its 
visionary outlook for the region, which won support from the MMC, the Transit Alliance, and 
influential legislators. There was no worry of cities and counties leaving, due to difficult exit 
requirements.  Nor was there a sunset date on approving the tax, after the 2002 legislation. 
Consequently, RTD was able to plan for the very long-term on a large geographical scale. RTD 
was able to compose a plan that was to its liking, and won the legislation it needed—legislation 
that imposed few limitations based on state political imperatives.  Indeed, the lack of pre-
authorization to hold a tax vote facilitated RTD’s development of a plan that both served local 
and regional, more than state-level concerns, and, at the same time, was visionary enough to gain 
the legislative support for authorization.    
RTD’s achievement was only possible because the agency had a strong institutional and 
financial structure to plan. This provided the autonomy necessary to develop this plan. It made 
sufficient money available to begin developing trial rail lines. And it ensured RTD had the 
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institutional autonomy needed to commission polls, write legislative language and lobby 
legislators.  Had RTD been a new agency with no reputation, no power, no staff, no money and 
unelected officers, it is questionable whether the agency could have developed a seven county 
plan in such detail; or whether RTD would have had the credibility to win legislative support for 
authorization, without significant changes to either the projects themselves, or the process used 
for selecting them.  Nor is it likely RTD would have accomplished any of this without a much 
more significant role by the boundary-spanner to initiate legislation, overcome state legislative 
and gubernatorial opposition, or local geographic equity concerns. Not only did a robust regional 
agency support a smaller role by the boundary-spanner, but it made the planning process easier 
to conduct, more repeatable, and possible to initiate even in the absence of legislative 
authorization. 
  
 241  
 
 
 
Chapter 9: Cross-Case Comparison 
Chapter 9 Summary: 
This chapter compares the seven processes examined in four regions analyzed in Chapters 5-8.  It 
begins by comparing the legislative features in each case, and assessing their level of 
prescriptiveness.  It identifies and examines important factors not included in the study 
hypotheses.  It classifies cases with high levels of prescriptiveness versus permissiveness, and 
strong pre-authorization/blanket authorization versus those with special authorization.  The 
chapter then compares across processes, examining the impact each indicator of strong 
prescriptiveness had on the way the various processes developed.  The discussion then examines 
whether the hypotheses from Chapter 3 were upheld on a case-by-case basis, and finally, the 
chapter draws conclusions that compare the findings across cases. 
Introduction 
This study is interested in how different levels of pre-authorization and permissiveness 
have impacted the way proposals for multi-jurisdictional transportation funding were assembled. 
Dimensions include the role played by various collaborative actors, the presence of obstacles as 
the process moved forward, as well as differences between state political motivations 
encapsulated in legislation and local policy needs.  The case chapters discuss how the various 
factors of prescriptiveness and the extent to which the legislation was pre-authorized have led to 
different processes in each of the cases studied. Differences are to be expected to some degree, 
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due to varying contexts and histories, but even with this in mind, noticeable patterns still emerge 
across cases, which this chapter will identify and discuss.   
In order to properly compare cases and test hypotheses, it is important to classify them 
based on their levels of pre-authorization and prescriptiveness.  Tables 9.1-9.3 do this by 
organizing the information from the previous four chapters.  Table 9.1 classifies cases by level of 
pre-authorization, based on whether the legislation was tied to the specific process that was 
analyzed in this study (pre-authorization vs. special authorization), and whether the legislation 
included a sunset clause (the absence of which would constitute blanket authorization).  Table 
9.2 follows by identifying legislative features from the authorizing legislation governing each 
process.  These are used in Table 9.3 to summarize the levels of prescriptiveness for each 
process, for each of the factors of prescriptiveness originally found in Chapters 1 and 3 (Table 
1.1 & Table 3.2).  Of course any summary masks the complexities discussed in the earlier 
chapters to some extent, for the sake of cross-case comparability, but legislation was considered 
“prescriptive” if it carefully specified the rules, whereas legislation was considered “permissive” 
if it did not specify how a factor was to be fulfilled, or did not mention it at all.  For example, a 
number of legislative features are marked “not specified” in Table 9.2, meaning the authorizing 
legislation did not identify the extent of the local permission to act, thus making these permissive 
features.  In other cases, the limits are less distinct, like voting requirements, which are 
considered prescriptive if they require a supermajority for passage.   
Table 9.1: Authorization Types By Process 
 
 
 
 
*Mentioned in the case studies, but there was never a proposal using this law. 
   Special Authorization Pre-Authorization/Blanket Authorization 
High Permissiveness Denver (1997),  
Seattle (2007) 
 
Denver (2004), Seattle (1995),  
Seattle (2008) 
Low Permissiveness Atlanta (2012), Bay Area (2004) Bay Area (1997 Fuel Tax)* 
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Table 9.2: Prescriptiveness of Authorizing Legislation73 
 
Factors Bay Area, 
2004 
Atlanta, 2012 Seattle, 1995 Seattle, 2007 Seattle, 2008 Denver, 1997 Denver, 2004 
Taxing 
instruments 
Bridge toll 
only 
Sales tax only Sales tax, 
Motor Vehicle 
Excise Tax 
(MVET)* 
Sales tax Sales tax Sales tax Sales tax 
Tax rates to 
be imposed 
$1 toll increase 
(exactly) 
1% sales tax 
(exactly) 
-Sales tax, up 
to 0.9 % tax 
 
-MVET, up to 
0.8%* 
Up to 0.5% 
(the unused 
portion from 
Phase 1) 
Up to 0.5% 
(the unused 
portion from 
Phase 1) 
Up to 0.4% Up to 0.6% 
Timing of 
the election 
process 
-March 2004 
ballot primary 
only 
-Can resubmit 
proposal to 
voters, if it 
loses 
-July 2012 
primary only 
-Future 
elections, 
with approval 
of half the 
counties 
Within two 
years of 
forming the 
RTA (1993-
1995) 
Any year after 
2006 
No Sunset November 
1997 
-November 
2003 onward, 
any odd year 
general 
election  
-No sunset 
Length of 
Collection 
In perpetuity 10 years Not 
specified** 
Not 
specified** 
Not 
specified** 
Not 
specified** 
Not 
specified** 
Geography 
of local 
jurisdiction
s to be 
included 
7 counties, 
excluding 
(Napa & 
Sonoma, which 
are MTC 
members, were 
excluded) 
10 counties 
chosen in 
legislation 
Boundaries 
decided by 
RTA Board. 
Adjustment & 
annexation 
permitted 
Boundaries 
decided by 
RTA Board. 
Adjustment & 
annexation 
permitted  
Boundaries 
decided by 
RTA Board. 
Adjustment & 
annexation 
permitted  
-Hard for 
cities to exit 
-Hard for cities 
to exit 
-Annexation 
possible 
Project 
Selection 
Process 
Projects 
written into the 
legislation, but 
selected before 
legislation 
approved 
Roundtable of 
local leaders 
select from 
menu of state-
approved 
projects 
Not specified Not specified Not specified Not specified Not specified 
Equity 
Require-
ment 
Nexus between 
toll collection 
corridors and 
projects 
selected 
Ensured by 
GDOT 
guidelines, 
not the 
legislation 
Calls for an 
equity 
mechanism, 
but details 
decided locally 
Not specified Not specified Not specified Not specified 
Voting 
Process 
Simple 
majority, 
aggregate vote 
Simple 
majority, 
aggregate 
vote 
Simple 
majority 
RTA/Sound 
Transit district, 
aggregate vote 
Simple 
majority of 
both Sound 
Transit & 
RTID areas 
Simple 
majority 
RTA/Sound 
Transit 
district only 
Simple 
majority 
districtwide 
Simple 
majority 
districtwide 
Issuing 
Agency 
MTC & local 
operators 
None RTA/Sound 
Transit 
RTA/Sound 
Transit & 
RTID 
RTA/Sound 
Transit 
RTD 
 
 
RTD 
Local action 
to Place on 
Ballot 
  County 
Councils must 
place plan on 
ballot. 
County 
Councils must 
place plan on 
ballot 
County 
Councils must 
place plan on 
ballot 
-Petition of 
voters to 
place on 
ballot*** 
Petition of 
voters required 
to place on 
ballot. 
*Cancelled by Proposition I-776 in 2002. 
**Length of tax collection decided at the local/regional level. 
                                                
73 California AB 595, 1997; California SB 916, 2003; Georgia HB 277, 2010; Washington HB 1825, 1990; 
Washington 2610, 1992; Washington 2871, 2006; Washington 1396, 2007; Colorado HB 1070, 2003; SB 55, 1997; 
SB 167, 2002. 
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***Petitions must be signed by enough voters to equal 5% of the votes cast within the RTD district for Secretary of 
State in previous general election. 
 
Table 9.3: Comparison of Prescriptiveness Across Cases  
Factors 
(Number 
Prescriptive) 
Bay Area, 
2004 
Atlanta, 
2012 
Seattle, 
1995 
Seattle, 
2007 
Seattle, 
2008 
Denver, 
1997 
Denver, 
2004 
Taxing 
instruments 
(6/7) 
Prescriptive Prescriptive Permissive Prescriptive Prescriptive Prescriptive Prescriptive 
Tax rates to 
be imposed 
(2/7) 
Prescriptive Prescriptive Permissive Permissive Permissive Permissive Permissive 
Timing (4/7) Prescriptive Prescriptive Permissive Prescriptive Permissive Prescriptive Permissive 
Geography of 
local 
jurisdictions 
to be included 
(2/7) 
Prescriptive Prescriptive Permissive 
 
Permissive 
 
Permissive 
 
Permissive Permissive 
Project 
Selection 
Process (2/7) 
Prescriptive Prescriptive Permissive Permissive Permissive Permissive Permissive 
Voting 
Process**** 
(1/7) 
Permissive Permissive Permissive Prescriptive Permissive Permissive Permissive 
Number 
Prescriptive 
5/6 5/6 0/6 3/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 
*Bay Area Toll Authority can resubmit to voters at future general elections, if it loses. 
**Future elections, with approval of half the 10 counties. 
***Considered “prescriptive” when the required vote threshold is higher than a simple majority. 
****Categories were classified “prescriptive” if they carefully specified the rules, whereas they were considered 
“permissive” if they did not specify how a factor was to be fulfilled, or did not mention it at all. 
 
Examining the Hypothesized Factors of Prescriptiveness Across Cases 
Comparing the impact of both high versus low prescriptiveness, and of pre/blanket 
authorization across cases, it appears that high levels of prescriptiveness made it more difficult 
for local policy makers to develop regional plans without great concern for state-level political 
imperatives. However this impact varied to some extent by factor.  For example, prescriptive 
project selection rules were much more important than similarly prescriptive rules over the tax 
instrument.  It is necessary to examine the effect for each prescriptive factor cited in Table 9.3 
(exception of Voting Process, which is outside the scope of this study).  In the subsequent 
section, this study can use these cross-case comparisons to examine whether the hypotheses, 
from Chapter 3, hold true. 
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Tax Instrument 
 The tax instrument was the most consistently prescriptive feature across cases, with seven 
out of eight restricted to a single potential tax instrument.  Yet the impact of high 
prescriptiveness was surprisingly limited. In almost all cases, the tax instrument was the one 
prescriptive factor for which local policy makers did not usually seek more flexibility than the 
law provided. In most cases examined, it was not a major impediment to decision making.  
 However this study selected for cases that made use of the legislation.  In one case where 
the legislation was never acted on, the tax instrument was the primary impedance, and illustrates 
the way a tax instrument can limit the policy process. In the fuel tax proposed by AB 595 in 
California (California AB 595, 1997), the area’s MPO, MTC, has long wanted to go to the polls, 
but has still not done so, more than 20 years after their authorization was signed into law.  As a 
measure limited to a fuel tax, it has several undesirable limitations.  Most importantly, fuel tax 
increases have never polled highly enough to in their region to make this feasible. Perhaps fuel 
taxes are undesirable in many regions, due to their limited tax base—just targeting one part of 
the larger economy (driving). This means the tax rate needs to be high to achieve sufficient 
revenues, and makes the tax appear more ‘expensive’ than a sales tax might be (Wachs, 
2003a,b). In California, fuel taxes face the additional burden of a state requirement that all taxes 
(distinct from fees) need a two-thirds supermajority to pass (Kane et al., 2001: 63-66).  This 
explains why the Bay Area’s fuel tax never polled highly enough to be acted on, though some 
staff at MTC certainly said it was something they hoped to do, should the polls ever prove 
favorable.  
The Bay Area example helps explain why Perata chose to write special authorizing 
legislation for a measure that was independent from the pre-authorized fuel tax. Since they 
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developed their proposal before the legislative process took place, the boundary-spanner was 
able to choose the tax instrument, and ensure that he could use a fee, rather than a tax, to pay for 
the measure.  However doing this required additional connections on the part of the boundary-
spanner, to ensure that his measure was considered to be a fee, not a tax by the state’s attorney 
general.  Consequently, this case provides perhaps the clearest example of how a limitation in the 
taxing instrument ultimately led to complications and limitations for the process itself. 
Seattle was another case where local/regional policy makers discussed their desire that 
the authorizing legislation contain (ironically) a fuel tax.  However in Seattle, the legislation 
authorized several potential tax instruments, making this a very minor limitation. Seattle, in fact, 
had the most flexibility on its tax instruments of any of the cases, with the ability to choose 
between a sales tax and a Motor Vehicle Excise Tax (MVET). In fact, prior to ballot initiative 
limiting RTA/Sound Transit’s flexibility on tax instruments, 74 they had so many choices in both 
taxing instruments, as well as sunset date and tax rates, that they even had trouble deciding 
which combination to use (RTA Board Meeting Minutes, October 14, 1994).  At one point the 
board considered asking for legislative approval to use a fuel tax.  However gaining new 
legislation became too complicated and appeared too time consuming to undertake.  Yet this did 
not become a serious limitation for them because of all the other options they had available. The 
board decided it was not important enough to be worth the effort and potential delay, and they 
went ahead with a measure that combined use of a sales tax and MVET (Sound Transit Board 
Meeting Minutes, October 14, 1994).  Flexibility on tax instrument provided them the ability to 
adapt to the circumstances and it expedited decision making.  However in most cases in this 
study that did not have such flexibility, like Atlanta, Denver, and Seattle (2004), inability to 
                                                
74 Due to passage of state ballot initiative I-776, in 2002, Seattle’s RTA/Sound Transit could no longer use the 
Motor Vehicle Excise Tax in subsequent voter initiatives.   
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choose the taxing instrument never really registered as a major impediment, or a reason to 
request new legislation. 
Tax Rates 
Precise specification of tax rates significantly limited tax plans’ ability to earn citizen 
support and choose desirable projects.  Only two out of seven processes had such limitations, and 
in most cases, the legislation actually allowed up to a particular level, while not specifying 
exactly how much.  The Bay Area 2004 and Atlanta 2012 cases were the two places where the 
legislation specified a precise amount.  However in the Bay Area case, this precision was only 
the consequence of a long process to craft a proposal at the local level before seeking legislative 
approval, and the boundary-spanner carefully considered polling choosing a bridge toll of $1.   
By contrast, Atlanta’s legislation was very limiting, specifying a 1% sales tax that many 
local citizens considered too high.  Indeed, this was almost twice the rate of the next highest 
sales tax request studied here—0.6% in Denver. The difference is even wider when taken in 
context, since Denver’s proposal came after RTD had already begun building light rail lines, 
making this a tested concept, in voters’ eyes.  In Atlanta, MARTA had built rail before, but a 
regional tax vote was entirely new, and 1% was a lot to ask on the first time. Furthermore, 
Atlanta’s sunset date limited the collection time substantially, to just 10 years (Georgia HB 277, 
2010: §48-8-241), the only legislation examined in this study to impose such a strict limit. The 
next closest was the Bay Area’s 1997 fuel tax law, which allowed up to 20 years (California AB 
595, 1997 Georgia HB 277, 2010).  Atlanta’s legislation (the Transportation Investment Act) 
further restricted project selections to those that were ready to construct within the 10 year 
timespan.  This made it difficult to include projects that required a federal grant, since these 
could be slowed by an additional federal process (RTR Meeting, audio recording, July 7, 2011).  
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In this way, Atlanta’s tax rate requirements combined with other limiting factors to rule out more 
ambitious projects, like commuter rail or MARTA extensions. This made the final list less 
attractive to citizens, even while the tax rate appeared too high for many people to support. 
Timing 
Limited choices of election cycles or election dates impacted four out of seven cases, and 
had a significant in most cases.  These could lead to regional measures that appear on the ballot 
during an unfavorable election cycle—for example, Atlanta’s requirement that they go during a 
July primary, which was expected to be low in turnout and high in anti-tax voters, but chosen so 
the governor could avoid putting himself on the same ballot (a state-level political 
consideration).  Atlanta was not the only case with such issues.  For example, Denver’s 1997 
legislation required RTD to go to the ballot before the plan was entirely ready. Though, in this 
case, the plan was developed at the local/regional level before the legislation was approved, the 
legislative restriction over choice of election cycle may have made the process unable to adapt to 
changing circumstances. As the process moved along, it became apparent the transit lines to the 
northern half of the region were not sufficiently developed, and the board was uncomfortable 
taking it to the voters that year. The rigid authorization language did not make it possible to 
delay the vote (RTD Board Meeting Minutes, May 20, 1997).  In fact, something similar 
happened again in 2002, when another authorizing bill made it impossible for RTD to conduct a 
vote that year, when their prospects seemed good, though it was uncertain whether this 
restriction caused problems intentionally or accidentally (Leib, J., Denver Post, June 12, 2002).  
Either way, the limitation over the choice of election year was a limitation for RTD in both 
processes.75  
                                                
75 After 2002, this changed, and the bill’s blanket authorization provision gave RTD the ability to choose its election 
cycle. 
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In Seattle, an example of limited election timing can be found in 2007, where the state 
actively rescinded RTA/Sound Transit’s previous authorization to bring a proposal to voters in 
2006 (Washington HB 2871, 2006), the year the board preferred  (Sound Transit Board Meeting 
Minutes, March 23, 2006).  This was clearly for state political reasons, primarily to satisfy the 
business community’s concerns by ensuring any transportation measure included roads, while 
holding the vote during a year when legislators would not share the same ballot (Johnson, 
interview, September 4, 2014; State Senator Clibborn, interview, September 11, 2014; Ilgenfritz, 
interview, September 12, 2014; Ladenburg, September 9, 2014). This decision became entangled 
in state-level politics, and RTA/Sound Transit was left to deal with the consequences—namely a 
poorly planned voting process confusing to voters, not conducive to passage.   
By contrast, the Bay Area stands as the only case with a carefully prescribed election 
cycle that passed at the polls.  However that is only because its boundary-spanner ensured that 
the decision process and the legislative process were closely connected before submitting his 
proposal to the legislature.  This allowed Perata to gauge local/regional support for his proposed 
election cycle while crafting the proposal (EMC Research 2001, 2003), ensuring that the results 
gained support from the legislature, while at the same time producing an outcome appropriate for 
local circumstances.   
However in processes, where the legislation was written before the policy process took 
place, limitations on election cycle made it very difficult to seek voter approval during years 
when political leaders judged to be most conducive to victory. 
Geography 
Legislation prescribing the jurisdictions that participate in the proposal created significant 
challenges for developing a plan, while more permissive cases could resolve such issues with far 
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less conflict. The two processes with prescriptive legislative language defining the geographic 
scope of their process were in Atlanta and Bay Area.  However because the Bay Area’s 
prescriptive language was developed during the local/regional collaborative process, before it 
was submitted to the legislature, their bill was only prescriptive from a technical standpoint, and 
did not have a negative impact.  In fact, in their case, the counties were chosen before the 
legislation was written, and the proposal was actually quite carefully tailored to the local political 
circumstances, based on polling data (Evans, A.; Linney, D., Capitolo, M., Group Interview, 
February 10, 2011).   
The Atlanta example was quite different, and in their case, the Georgia legislature’s 
requirement that the Atlanta tax measure include all ten counties that were part of the area’s 
MPO (the Atlanta Regional Commission) limited local/regional policy makers’ ability to cut 
counties that were not interested in being part of the process.  This forced local leaders to craft a 
deal between exurban counties that were interested almost exclusively in highway 
improvements, and more urban ones interested primarily in transit (Floyd, B., interview, June 18, 
2014; Stoner, D., interview, June 19. 2014).  Inclusion of so many counties meant that many of 
them did not see themselves as having similar interests, and were burdened by a history of 
conflict between the “inner” and “outer” counties (Bullard, 2000).   
Atlanta had, perhaps, the strongest historical and cultural regional divisions among the 
regions in this study, but they were hardly alone in facing highly contentious intraregional 
politics. Permissive geographic legislation was quite helpful in allowing regions to bridge these 
divides. For example, the Bay Area faced difficulty deciding whether to leave out Napa County 
or Sonoma County, because they were too rural (and polling was unfavorable), or Solano County 
because they had voted against all their previous attempts to pass a local option sales tax, or 
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Santa Clara County76 because they were more moderate, and had few bridges.  Seattle also faced 
issues what to include, and eventually decided to leave out unsupportive rural areas in Pierce 
County, and Thurston County (where the state capitol is located).  Nor was Denver immune to 
such issues, as they faced annexation concerns over Lonetree, and occasional discussion of 
including lines to more far flung areas like Greeley, which was not in their district.  
In regions with permissive legislation on selection of geography, geographic inclusion 
issues never turned into political problems, and were resolved, instead, through discussion within 
the region, based on reasons more favorable to the local political circumstances.  In Seattle and 
Denver, and the Bay Area, local decision makers were able to choose counties and cities for 
participation based on their likeliness to vote for the measure,77 minimum density to need 
transportation services, feasibility of access, and likelihood of residents in expansion areas to be 
interested in paying for the new service.78  Permissive legislation made it easier to develop a 
proposal, and ensured the proposal was one desirable to the politicians developing it.  On the 
other hand, perhaps in a region like Atlanta, with so much conflict, a regional proposal could not 
have developed without such prescriptions, due to their history of conflict, and differences over 
how to spend the money, though the counties could have been chosen more carefully, with local 
input, and local circumstances in mind.   
Project Selection 
Project selection limitations were particularly important, since they directly shaped the 
plan itself, and thus, its ability to appeal to citizens.  Both the Atlanta and Bay Area legislation 
                                                
76 Home of Silicon Valley 
77 For example, Pierce County left out its western half, which was seen as more conservative, lower density, and 
probably less likely to need transit (Ladenburg, interview, September 9, 2014). 
78  For example, in Denver’s Lonetree area, citizens were divided on the issue, but eventually voted to join 
(Editorial, Rocky Mountain News, October 10, 2003).  In Washington State’s Thurston County extension, the Sound 
Transit Board even bought the right of way up to the county line in hopes of someday extending a line to the state 
capital, Olympia.  However residents were largely retired, and not interested in paying the cost of an extension they 
would be unlikely to use, at least in the near term (Ladenburg, interview, September 9, 2014). 
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had highly prescriptive language. Yet, in the Bay Area, while the legislation chose projects 
directly in the bill, it was only reflecting the results of the collaborative process conducted at the 
local/regional level.  Even so, the California legislature did make some important changes to the 
proposal after the collaborative process was over.  There is evidence that an influential 
assemblyman had objections to the inclusion of a project to study high speed rail routes, which 
might have affected his district (Rapport, interview, 2014; Toll Bridge Advisory Committee 
Meeting Notes, November 22, 2002).  Decision making at the legislative level was the exception, 
not the rule in this case.  Even so, the boundary-spanner, who was himself a state senator, 
Senator Perata, personally influenced what projects could be selected at the local/regional level, 
making clear, for instance, that 27-28% of all money would go to ferries (Rapport, E., interview, 
August 22, 2014).  Furthermore, Perata and his lieutenant Rapport set the criteria for project 
selection, and the boundary-spanner’s staffer personally inserted one important project that 
violated the project selection rules.  While the rules were made at the local/regional level, it was 
possible to break them too, sometimes to the benefit of legislators. 
Unlike the Bay Area case, Atlanta’s project selection decisions, perhaps, followed too 
many rules. This process had innumerable procedures that sharply reduced the potential for 
developing a cross-county vision, and reduced creativity in planning.  Projects were limited to 
ones already in GDOT’s long-range Statewide Strategic Transportation Plan. Projects had to 
have an impact within the ten year life of the program. The process itself even minimized the 
potential for transformational planning by asking counties to propose projects, and then reducing 
the list one step at a time, leaving little potential to make major changes at later stages, when 
citizens began to identify a number of specific needs. 
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By contrast, both Seattle and Denver used last minute political deals among the members 
of the project selection committee to make agreement possible.  Seattle’s proposal, for example, 
ensured large changes to the plan and new thinking in what to prioritize that ensured the support 
of Snohomish County, by bringing light rail to their area.  (Requiring innovative cost savings to 
pay for the extension).  This kind of complex multi-county agreement was much more difficult to 
achieve in Atlanta, where late proposals to add commuter rail and extend MARTA were not 
taken seriously, because these projects had already been eliminated at an earlier stage of the 
process (RTR Project Lists: 4/15/11, 6/8/11, 7/7/11, 7/21/11, 8/11/11, 8/15/11, 10/13/11). 
Table 9.4: Summarizing Dependent Variables (Taken from Case Chapters, 5-8) 
Factors Bay Area, 
2004 
Atlanta, 
2012 
Seattle, 
1995 
Seattle, 
2007 
Seattle, 
2008 
Denver, 
1997 
Denver, 
2004 
Boundary-
Spanner’s 
Legislative 
Connections 
State 
Senator 
Perata 
 
 
Strong 
Metro 
Atlanta 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
Insufficient 
 
RTA Board 
Chair Laing 
 
 
Weak 
RTA Board 
Chair 
Ladenburg 
 
Medium 
RTA Board 
Chair 
Nickels 
 
 
Weak 
RTD General 
Manager 
Marsella 
 
Weak 
RTD 
General 
Manager 
Marsella 
 
Weak 
Obstacles 
Measure 
Ran Into 
Few Significant Medium Significant Few Significant Few 
State-Local 
Disconnect 
(Permissive 
features 
visible) 
Boundary-
spanner 
overcomes 
disconnect 
for all 
factors 
Tax rates, 
timing, 
geography, 
project 
selection 
Not 
significant 
Timing, 
voting 
process 
Not 
significant 
Timing 
(minor & 
technical) 
Timing 
(minor & 
technical) 
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 Results for Hypotheses A-D, Described for Each Case (Table 9.5) 
(Based on Summary of Findings in Table 9.4) 
Hypothesis A: Pre-authorization or blanket authorization, rather than special 
authorization, removes the main point for legislative intervention, resulting in fewer 
prescriptive features.  
Bay Area: The Bay Area case confirms this hypothesis, because the legislature intervened on a 
number of occasions during the legislative process—a process that had to occur because this 
process required special legislation.  Assemblyman Dutra intervened to some extent during the 
passage of the bill.  However most intervention took place during the project selection, the result 
of the boundary-spanner’s requirements to use particular selection criteria and specific projects. 
Some of these requirements (e.g. the selection of ferry projects) conflicted with what local public 
officials would have done on their own.  [R1] 
Atlanta: Like the Bay Area, this process was specially authorized, and created an opportunity 
for the legislature to influence its outcome.  In this case, the Georgia Legislature significantly 
changed the proposal from the one originally put forth by the Metro Atlanta Chamber of 
Commerce, passing much more restrictive language, which conflicted with local needs and 
hindered the process. [R1] 
Seattle: Seattle’s processes followed the same pattern.  The 1995 and 2008 processes were pre-
authorized, and removed a potential point for legislative intervention for most legislative features 
(except the election date and voting method). Legislative features were not intended for a 
particular election cycle, and key decisions were made almost entirely at the local/regional level. 
For example, projects were chosen based on local decision making motivations.  Boundaries 
were left to county councils and Sound Transit board members to decide.  The election date was 
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chosen based on political and practical reasoning.  The legislature devolved leverage over 
planning decisions to the county councils as well, through their ability to approve the final plan.  
By contrast, Seattle’s 2007 process was specially authorized, and while it retained many of the 
permissive project selection features that had become an expected element of the Seattle 
processes, the legislature imposed crucial provisions over the election date, the geography, and 
the combination of the transit measure with a separate highway package. 1995: [R2]; 2007: [R1]; 
2008: [R2, R3] 
Denver: Denver did not follow the same pattern as the other cases, and even though its 1997 
process was specially authorized, the legislature did not make significant use of this opportunity 
to alter the proposal.  Nevertheless, even the legislature’s minimal intervention caused 
difficulties for RTD, as their decision to hold the election in 1997, when RTD was not yet ready, 
made approval more difficult than it might otherwise have been.   
The legislature’s decision to only make a minimal intervention may be due, in part, to RTD’s 
status as a local/regional elected government, which the governor, and, likely, many legislators, 
felt the need to grant autonomy over decision making, whether or not state elected officials 
agreed with what RTD was doing.  RTD’s robust institutional structure also facilitated 
development of a fairly complete plan, reducing the risk for the legislature to authorize it.  
In 2002, the legislature passed another bill for RTD to go to the ballot, this time providing 
blanket authorization.  This legislation followed the pattern of the other regions, with few 
restrictions on RTD’s decision making.  However, once again, it limited the year RTD could go 
to the ballot (though perhaps through typographical error).  Nevertheless, it was also similar to 
the bill from 1997 in that it passed after RTD had already completed a significant amount of 
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local/regional planning, and largely facilitated the needs of the plan that RTD had already 
developed. 1997: [R1, R6, R12]; 2004: [R2, R3, R12] 
Hypothesis B: Pre-authorization or blanket authorization, as opposed to special 
authorization, would reduce the need for a boundary-spanner with legislative connections 
to place a multi-jurisdictional proposal on the ballot, reducing the importance of the 
boundary-spanner in the process, and making the process easier to initiate and repeat, 
since more people or organizations could perform that role.  
Bay Area: This pattern was present in the Bay Area, where the boundary-spanner’s legislative 
connections made it possible for the process to occur, using special legislation.  Perata relied on 
his connections at the state capitol to initiate the process and pass the legislation.  His reputation 
convinced transit agencies to take the process seriously and participate in it.  And the strength of 
his political apparatus made it possible for him to undertake special legislation. However the 
dependence on one politician meant that he made many important decisions on project selection, 
and required a committed politician with a number of resources at his disposal, making the 
process difficult to repeat. [R1, R7] 
Atlanta: Like the Bay Area, the Atlanta process was authorized through special legislation.  
However its boundary-spanner, the Metro Chamber of Commerce was not a member of the 
legislature, and had weaker legislative influence than in the Bay Area case, leading to legislation 
that contained many problematic provisions. Unlike in the Bay Area, the boundary-spanner did 
not participate actively in the project selection.  However this was due to reasons unique to 
Atlanta’s boundary-spanner, rather than the process.  (i.e. business leaders’ fear of overstepping 
their bounds, and disagreement within the Metro Chamber’s coalition (Williams, S., interview, 
October 14, 2014).  While in both Atlanta and the Bay Area, the process required a boundary-
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spanner to initiate, the unique connections, motivations—and inadequacies—of the boundary-
spanner took on an outsize role.  In the Atlanta case, the Metro Chamber certainly had plenty of 
connections, just not enough to get a permissive bill.   At the same time, there were not many 
other organizations in the region with the motivation, and level of resources, they had to put 
together a regional plan and propose new legislation.  This makes it highly unlikely that new 
legislation can pass, and a new regional vote can take place in the near future. [R1, R8]       
Seattle: In comparison to the Bay Area and Atlanta cases, the boundary-spanners in the Seattle 
processes were not nearly as involved in state politics.  In fact, all were representatives from city 
and county councils, serving on the RTA/Sound Transit board.  Some of them had moderate 
legislative connections, mostly as a function of their role as RTA/Sound Transit board Chair, 
lobbying on behalf of the agency. In keeping with this pattern, the boundary-spanners’ legislative 
connections were mostly necessary for the one special authorization, in 2006, which prevented 
RTA/Sound Transit from going to the ballot that year.  And as that case illustrates, the boundary-
spanners in Seattle mainly needed to defend the agency’s pre-existing authorization, rather than 
lobby for new measures. Indeed, in Seattle, in the two pre-authorized processes (1995 & 2008), it 
was more important for the boundary-spanner to have local connections, in order to manage the 
project selection at the subarea level.  Unlike the specially authorized cases like the Bay Area 
and Atlanta, multiple actors—often the entire Sound Transit board—were involved in initiating 
each process. And the role of boundary-spanner was less important, with this agent simply 
facilitating decision making across different local governments during the collaborative decision 
process.  Unlike the Bay Area case, the boundary-spanner did not make singular decisions over 
project selections (this was done largely at the local level).   And when one boundary-spanner 
was ready to pass on the leadership role, another board member was always ready to take the job 
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in his place.  This power dynamic was made possible, in no small part, by the existence of a 
robust regional agency, and a long-range plan that everyone accepted as their ultimate goal. 
Interestingly, the boundary-spanner’s role was similar through the 2006-2007 process as well, 
despite the fact that this one was specially authorized.  While this may seem to go against the 
pattern seen in the other cases, this appears to be due to the fact that many decisions over 
developing the proposal remained with the RTA/Sound Transit board, despite the state 
government’s assertion of authority over the election date, geography and method for voting.  
Within these limitations, the boundary-spanner still continued to serve as a facilitator and used 
the same project selection system. Hence, like the other Seattle processes, there was no need to 
wait for a boundary-spanner to emerge, and this agent’s role was diminished from the Bay Area 
and Atlanta regions.  
1995: [R2, R8, R9, R11]; 2007: [R2, R8, R9, R11]; 2008: [R2, R3, R8, R9, R11] 
Denver: Even though only one of Denver’s two processes was specially authorized, both 
followed a similar pattern to Seattle. The boundary-spanner’s legislative connections were not 
strong, though he had credibility built on the growing reputation of the agency itself, and he was 
good at selling the plan to legislators . The boundary-spanner was not singularly essential to 
either process, and acted mainly as the visionary, initiator, promoter and facilitator of 
collaborative discussion.  This was possible because RTD’s status as a local/regional elected 
government entity, and the plan’s high level of development supported the boundary-spanner’s 
argument. RTD’s resources supported its planning process, and ensured that the process was 
based on local political imperatives, since there was no legislation to constrict it.  The boundary-
spanner was a charismatic figure, but he also worked closely with other leaders that emerged at 
various points throughout the process, and many of them forcefully argued for RTD’s plans as 
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well.  This did not happen within the framework of pre-authorization to go to the ballot, as 
hypothesized, because there was no pre-authorization for Denver’s first process.  However the 
boundary-spanner and other leaders rose within RTD’s uniquely robust agency structure.  1997: 
[R6, R8, R11, R12]; 2004: [R2, R3, R6, R8, R11, R12] 
Hypothesis C: Pre-authorization/blanket authorization could result in legislation that 
languishes unused, since there would be no state deadlines to ensure local jurisdictions 
implement the process, or work together to develop a proposal. 
Bay Area: This pattern was present in the Bay Area, beginning with the 1997 fuel tax measure 
(California AB 595, 1997), which, at the time of writing, still has yet to be used.  There was no 
requirement that local/regional actors make use of this, and they didn’t.  That said, there were 
understandable reasons why this was the case, due to restrictions over the tax instrument and the 
supermajority requirement.  This stood in contrast to the 2004 toll bridge measure, which was 
specially authorized, had an election date specified in the legislation, and was already moving 
ahead prior to passage of the legislation. [R4] 
Atlanta: Atlanta’s process followed this hypothesis as well (except as a specially authorized 
process), because it was so prescriptive there was little option for local jurisdictions to delay it. 
Atlanta’s legislation compelled local officials to proceed with the TSPLOST process, even 
though many participants were unsure they wanted to work on a regional plan, and did not know 
what vision they were trying to achieve.  Despite such reluctance, state deadlines, as intended by 
the legislature, ensured the process would proceed, whether it was successful or not. The 
legislature strengthened these incentives by threatening a reduction in local money for 
transportation programs if the region could not, at the least, approve a plan.  While this helped 
ensure the proposal would be implemented, it lacked a sense of vision and direction, illustrating 
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the drawbacks to ensuring cross-jurisdictional collaboration by legislative prescription alone. 
[R1, R5] 
Seattle: The hypothesized pattern, as seen in the Bay Area and Atlanta, does not hold up in 
Seattle.  A series of four regional processes in the Puget Sound region moved forward without 
significant legislative deadlines or other prescriptions. Perhaps the most significant legislative 
intervention, in 2006, was not to force a process to happen, but rather, to delay a process that 
RTA/Sound Transit was then preparing.  Seattle’s enthusiasm for conducting a regional measure 
is the primary explanation for RTA/Sound Transit’s ability to move forward without strong 
implementation requirements, since all three counties in the region expressed interest in building 
a regional transit system well before the legislature acted on this issue. [N/A] 
Denver: Like in Seattle, there was no evidence of the hypothesized pattern occurring in Denver. 
RTD had pre-authorization/blanket authorization to go to the ballot, beginning in 2003.  Almost 
the day after the legislature granted it, RTD was working to place a measure on the ballot, and 
continued to try over the next two years, until their 2004 election.  Like in Seattle, perhaps this 
was due to contextual factors, like local enthusiasm for RTD’s proposal. In fact, RTD had 
actually developed its plan before the bill was written, and there was no doubt that they would 
use that bill to propose a tax vote. 1997: [N/A]; 2004: [N/A] 
Hypothesis D: Prescriptive, rather than permissive legislation may indicate a failure to 
coordinate between local and state policy makers, indicated by legislation following state 
policy considerations, but not local ones.  This could signify the need to have a boundary-
spanner with stronger legislative connections to lobby for local concerns when drafting the 
legislation. 
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Bay Area: This case certainly had prescriptive legislative features.  However these features do 
not necessarily indicate a failure to coordinate, since the legislation was developed after a 
local/regional project selection process—a “reverse sequence,” which was a possibility not 
considered in the hypotheses.  Therefore the Bay Area’s overwhelmingly prescriptive legislative 
language is merely an artifact of the sequence, while the project selection process was able to 
follow local political imperatives, since there was no legislation governing the process. This an 
instance where the boundary-spanner’s considerable legislative influence ensured a process that 
was relatively free from state legislative requirements, especially for the choice of election cycle, 
election date and geography. Even so, the boundary-spanner personally intervened in the choice 
of projects for issues that were particularly important to him, illustrating the cost of relying too 
much on a powerful boundary-spanner to initiate a special legislative authorization. [R6, R7] 
Atlanta: Atlanta certainly matched the pattern suggested in this hypothesis.  Its prescriptive 
legislation indicates a failure to coordinate between local and state leaders when drafting the 
legislation.  The legislation was prescriptive in a number of ways that were not conducive for 
local needs.  From the state’s perspective, these provisions were chosen partly to ensure the 
process happened at all, partly to meet the short-term political needs of the governor and 
Republican legislative leaders (like avoiding an election where the governor was running for 
office), but also simply because, from the state’s perspective, certain provisions made more sense 
than they did at the local level.  (For example, the choice of a geography that could be applied to 
all regions of the state, but included counties that did not want to participate, when applied to the 
Atlanta region). Certainly this illustrates what can happen when the local/regional coordination 
with the state is inadequate, and, in this case, the boundary-spanner tried to obtain different 
provisions, but did not have the influence needed to achieve that result. [R5, R8] 
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Seattle: Unlike Atlanta, RTA/Sound Transit planned using highly permissive authorizing 
legislation for two of the three processes analyzed here, where planning decisions were guided 
by local/regional needs, rather than state legislative requirements.  Indeed, local political 
imperatives were the main guide for developing the plan and so crucial to board members that 
they institutionalized a system for making local decisions in their planning processes.  
Local and state decisions were not always in concert, as when RTA/Sound Transit began its 
2006-2007 process at a time inconvenient for state politicians. Even then, the legislature changed 
the election date and voting process, but not many other features like the planning process, the 
tax rate, or choice of projects. As Seattle’s only specially authorized measure, and relatively 
restrictive process, the 2006-2007 measure follows the pattern of inadequate boundary-spanner 
involvement seen in other regions with restrictive processes.  Perhaps this was made more 
problematic for RTA/Sound Transit than in other regions by the fact that boundary-spanners in 
Seattle were typically local government elected officials, with weak legislative connections.   
When this threat to RTA/Sound Transit’s autonomy came along, from the highest levels in state 
government, it was impossible to change the proposal. However at the same time, RTA/Sound 
Transit’s decision process had become well established by two other regional measures, 
discouraging state politicians from intervening to a greater extent. 
1995: [R2, R4, R8, R11]; 2007: [R1, R5, R8, R11]; 2008: [R2, R3, R4, R8, R11]  
Denver: Denver did not follow the model proposed in the hypothesis, since its first ballot 
attempt, in 1997, achieved a plan that followed local political imperatives through specially-
authorized legislation, without a strong boundary-spanner.  However, the existence of a strong 
institutional framework supported local planning even in the absence of state legislation, through 
a ‘reverse sequence’ process. Paradoxically, the absence of pre-authorization facilitated the 1997 
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planning process in Denver, by removing the possibility for state legislative requirements that 
might limit the outcome. The plan produced was well developed, and attractive to the legislature.  
And the agency was robust enough to win their confidence.  Consequently, they approved 
permissive legislation even without a strongly connected boundary-spanner. The permissive 
legislation was helpful to RTD, providing the flexibility to shape their proposal by political 
concerns, the demands of shifting economic conditions, and practical local concerns, rather than 
the demands of state politics. However the boundary-spanner was not the primary reason for the 
legislation’s passage. 1997: [R1, R4, R6, R11, R12]; 2004: [R4, R6, R11, R12] 
 
Table 9.5: Summary of Cross-Case Findings 
 
Factor: Bay 
Area, 
2004 
Atlanta, 
2012 
Seattle, 
1995 
Seattle, 
2007 
Seattle, 
2008 
Denver, 
1997 
Denver, 
2004 
Prescriptiveness 
(Table 9.3) 
5/6 5/6 0/6 3/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 
Authorization 
Type (Table 9.2) 
Special Special Pre/Blan
ket 
Special Pre/Blan
ket 
Special Pre/Blan
ket 
Reverse 
Sequence? 
Yes No No No No Yes No 
Hypotheses: Reasons For Findings, by Hypothesis: 
A R1 R1 R2 R1* R2/R3 R1/R6/R
12 
R2/R3/R
12 
B R1/R7 R1/R5/R
8 
R2/R8/R
9/R11 
R2/R7/
R9/R11 
R2/R3/R
8/R9/R11 
R6/R8/R
12 
R3/R6/R
8/R12 
C R4 R1/R5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
D R6/R7 R5/R8 R2/R4/R
8/R11 
R1/R5*
*/R8/R1
1 
R2/R3/R
4/R8/R11 
R1/R4/R
6/R12 
R4/R6/R
12 
*This case had both specially-authorized and prescriptive features, and pre-authorized, permissive ones, since the 
special authorization applied only to the timing of the vote and the voting process, but not the tax rate, the 
geographic boundaries, or the selection of projects. 
**For the election timing. 
 
Reason 1: Special Authorization. 
Reason 2: Pre-Authorization. 
Reason 3: Blanket Authorization. 
Reason 4: Permissive Legislation. 
Reason 5: Prescriptive Legislation. 
Reason 6: Reverse Sequence Process. (Process occurs before the legislation is approved). 
Reason 7: Boundary-Spanner With Strong Legislative Connections. 
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Reason 8: Boundary-Spanner Without Strong Legislative Connections. 
Reason 9: Municipal Government Role Institutionalized into the Process. 
Reason 10: Requirement for Citizen Petition to Place on Ballot. 
Reason 11: Agency-Level Institutions Ensure Continuity and Expedite Process. 
Reason 12: Status As An Elected Local/Regional Government. 
Not Applicable (N/A): No Evidence of This Hypothesis. 
 
Cross-Case Findings 
  
 The course of events in each case, by no means, should be expected to proceed in other 
places precisely as observed, due to different histories and contexts.   Yet the patterns can be 
used to expand upon researchers’ existing understanding of local and multi-jurisdictional option 
taxes and regional governance. Some general observations appear across the hypotheses in this 
study.  First, pre-authorization and blanket authorization removed a potential leverage point for a 
legislature to influence the process in ways that added costs at the local level.  There was a clear 
contrast on this dimension between most of the specially authorized cases (Bay Area 2004, 
Atlanta 2012 and Seattle 2007 cases) and the pre-authorized/blanket authorized cases (Seattle 
1995, Seattle 2008, and Denver 2004 cases), in the degree to which the legislature inserted 
provisions that were costly at the local level, though they may have benefited state-level 
politicians for political reasons, or been pragmatic decisions from a state point of view.     
Of course there were complications to this pattern.  The Seattle 2007 process did not 
quite follow this model in that the legislature significantly altered and reduced its previous pre-
authorization to conduct a process, rather than granting new authorization. The actual provisions 
of the bill were still permissive on a number of counts like project selection, but not on many 
critical features like the election cycle, and compared to other Seattle processes, it was a 
significant reduction of permissiveness, and increased the local cost of planning.   
The Bay Area 2004 case required special legislation as well, but its costs came not so 
much from the legislature as a whole, as from the particular legislator who initiated the process 
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and lead it (as boundary-spanner). Yet he had a mixed record, and was responsible both for 
imposing explicit costs in the project selection as for lobbying the legislature to reduce potential 
costs that might result in a process with features problematic for local/regional political needs.  
Finally, the Denver 1995 case departed most significantly from the hypothesized impact of pre-
authorization and special authorization, in that it was not pre-authorized at all.  Yet RTD 
managed to plan with very little legislative intervention, and to win legislation that was relatively 
permissive.  Indeed, the legislature did not use its leverage much at all, and planning took place 
primarily at the local/regional level.  This was not thanks to the efforts of a strongly connected 
boundary-spanner, but instead, due to the presence of a strong and well established regional 
elected agency, which had the resources to develop a robust plan, even before the legislation was 
written, and win adoption for legislation that adapted to its needs. 
 The Denver 1997 case also highlights another factor not considered in the hypotheses—
the strength of the agency structure.  In this case, a robust RTD ensured that local/regional 
planning could proceed, even in the absence of pre-authorized legislation, and without a well 
connected boundary-spanner to win special authorization.  Unfortunately, this finding will not 
apply to very many U.S. regions, which rarely have the level of regional governance autonomy 
found in Denver.  The Bay Area, Atlanta, and Seattle 2007 circumstances represent more typical 
U.S. regional governance situations, where special authorization is needed to undertake a multi-
jurisdictional tax, and no strong regional agency exists to support planning, provide vision or 
financial support for initiating the process.   
Regions without a robust agency or permissive pre-authorized legislation probably need 
to find a boundary-spanner with strong ties to the state capitol, enabling the development of 
supportive legislation.  And this requires significant legislative connections.  As the Atlanta case 
  266 
illustrates, simply having ties may not always be enough to ensure legislation is conducive to a 
local/regional process.  Indeed, the boundary-spanner in the Bay Area was only able to ensure 
that state legislation supported the projects that locals desired because he himself was a powerful 
member of the California State Senate.  Conversely, the boundary-spanner in the Seattle 2006-
2007 case was unable to stop the legislature from removing significant autonomy over 
developing their plan.  
 This is why pre-authorization/blanket authorization was so helpful, as the 1995 and 2008 
Seattle processes illustrate best. Previous authorization and blanket authorization ensured that 
these processes could proceed without the need for a boundary-spanner with strong legislative 
connections. This did not guarantee success, when RTA/Sound Transit lost some autonomy in 
2006.  However even then, RTA/Sound Transit’s blanket authorization for future processes 
remained, and they proved successful at rebounding with a new proposal that won voter support 
the following year—just as they did in 1996, just following their 1995 defeat.  RTA/Sound 
Transit’s repeated attempts at going to the ballot reveal a remarkable level of ease initiating each 
new ballot measure, but also repeating them.   
Furthermore, pre-authorization brought many people into the process, enabling any 
municipal government official sitting on the Sound Transit board to act as boundary-spanner, 
initiating and leading their effort.  The agency did it four times in 13 years—the most of any 
region examined.  This removed the need to lobby the legislature every time, expediting the 
process and significantly lowering the cost at the regional level.  And while it was helpful to 
have Seattle’s mayor take the leadership role in 2008, and offer his political apparatus to support 
it, the other three attempts did not benefit from this level of support, but proceeded nonetheless.   
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That is not to say Seattle’s success was due entirely to the legislation.  County level 
support was quite high, with a great amount of participation and interest in the program, and this 
played no small part in helping initiate RTA/Sound Transit’s tax referendums. The Washington 
Department of Transportation and the legislature were also supportive of Seattle’s early 
processes, providing financial resources, and additional legislation whenever RTA/Sound Transit 
board members felt they needed further powers to make their efforts succeed. It definitely helps 
to have support from other levels of government, and this is something that was clearly lacking 
in Atlanta.  
 Seattle, in fact, was not the only case to display a high level of ease initiating its 
processes, and especially its later ones.  In Denver, the 2004 process had been authorized two 
years earlier, and, like in most Seattle processes (except 2007), the Denver process did not 
require lobbying to begin, nor did the boundary-spanner need strong legislative ties.  Most of 
Denver’s political and processual costs came at the local level, rather than from higher levels of 
government—for example, RTD’s quarrelsome board.  Fittingly, these obstacles were resolved at 
the local level too, through electoral change. 
The pre-authorized cases also had diminished costs in their reduced dependence on the 
boundary-spanning agent. While the boundary-spanner’s role in Seattle and Denver was 
important, it was not absolutely essential to initiate the process.  Instead, that agent’s work was 
tied more to defending existing legislation and facilitating the cross-jurisdictional discussion, 
once the process had begun.  In Denver, the agency had to fight against several legislative 
attempts to disrupt its planning process.  Similarly, in Seattle, the Sound Transit board and the 
agency’s boundary-spanners failed to stave off the legislature’s 2006 attempt to alter the process.  
In fact, this was the most extreme legislative involvement in the Seattle case, but even then, the 
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boundary-spanner had a limited role, and the majority of Sound Transit’s permissive powers 
remained, simply due to inertia. In fact, this is analogous to the failed attempts in Colorado to 
thwart Denver’s regional transit process by taking away powers previously granted to RTD, 
which caused outrage by experienced capitol journalists.  Once the legislature had begun these 
programs and granted strong autonomy to these agencies, the programs and institutions played a 
larger role in influencing the process than boundary-spanners and legislation.  In contrast, 
Atlanta had no process from which to build, no pre-authorization for a new process, and no 
regional transportation agency.79  This made it much more difficult to ensure permissive 
legislation, and added costs like the wait for a boundary-spanner and the limited legislative 
support.  
Trends Not Anticipated in Hypotheses 
 The hypotheses assume the legislation in each case precedes the local/regional process 
for developing a proposal; however, as noted above, in some cases, this order was reversed. In 
‘reverse-order’ cases, instead of lobbying for legislation to be permissive, and to serve local 
political needs, the local/regional agency planned first, and sought legislation later, to codify the 
proposal they had already produced. 
This strategy was only possible under circumstances where there was a strong regional 
agency in existence to support the process, or a strong politician to lead it. For example, the 
existence of a supportive agency structure was especially helpful in Denver’s 1997 process, 
which was not pre-authorized.  In this example, RTD began planning, even without legislative 
sanction to hold a vote.  This ensured that Denver’s plan closely followed local priorities, and 
was not strongly affected by the legislature’s own prerogatives. Indeed, RTD had the resources 
and authority to proceed with the planning, even though it did not have the power to call a vote, 
                                                
79  Other than GRTA, which is a state agency.  
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and the plan could be developed to conform with local political circumstances, like the project 
choices, length of the sunset, election date, and other factors—all without a well connected 
boundary-spanner to lobby for permissive legislation. In fact, the reversed order and RTD’s 
strong finances combined with its ability to write the plan before the legislation, to ensure that, 
even though the bill was specially authorized, it was far more accommodating to local/regional 
political imperatives than imagined in the hypotheses. 
The Bay Area case also proceeded in reverse order, not because it was managed by a 
strong regional agency, as in Denver, but because it was managed by a boundary-spanner with 
strong connections to the state legislature (and a powerful state senator himself).  There were 
important reasons why it was a politician, rather than a regional agency, that provided support 
for a reverse order process in the Bay Area. While there was a pre-existing regional planning 
body in the Bay Area (MTC), as in Denver, MTC had far less taxing and political power, relative 
to their region, than Denver’s RTD. MTC was not an elected agency. But more importantly, 
MTC’s main potential funding source for a MOTT required a two-thirds supermajority for 
passage (California AB 595, 1997), and had never been employed due to poor polling.  
Consequently, it was more politically feasible for Perata to authorize a bridge toll increase 
through new special legislation than to use MTC’s previously authorized tax, since the bridge 
toll could be classified as a fee, not a tax, and pass with a simple majority.   
As this situation suggests, there was no routine mechanism for proposing a regional 
funding referendum in the Bay Area, though in 1988, a previous state senator had organized the 
passage of Regional Measure 1 (California SB 45, 1988)—a much smaller measure, but a good 
precedent for Perata to build upon.   Expanding on this concept, from 2002-2004, Senator Perata 
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stepped forward once again, providing support for the proposal (Rapport, interview, August 22, 
2014).   
As in the Denver example, there was no previous legislation to govern the Bay Area’s 
project selection process, and it could be closely attuned to local/regional political circumstances.  
Projects were proposed by local county transportation agencies (Toll Bridge Advisory 
Committee Complete Submittals, 2002).  Polls and political instinct guided the selection of 
counties for inclusion, and timing of the election (Evans, A.; Linney, D.; Capitolo, M., Group 
Interview, February 10, 2011). While this situation provided a great deal of flexibility, it 
depended on a boundary-spanner from the legislature who could support passage of the special 
legislation.  And, as Perata’s associate, Rapport, made clear to participants, the price of that 
support was the inclusion of some projects, like ferries, which counties and transportation 
agencies would not support under normal circumstances (Rapport, E., interview, August 22, 
2014).   
Reverse sequence cases add a new layer of complexity not considered in this study’s 
hypotheses, which were focused on the legislation, but did not fully consider the sequence of 
decision making.  This is particularly apparent when categorizing reverse sequence legislation as 
either “permissive” or “restrictive,” since the local/regional process was quite flexible, likely 
more so than specially authorized ones, but when codified into law, the legislation can appear 
quite specific. As this indicates, contextual circumstances are of the utmost importance in fully 
understanding how each process progressed. 
Conclusions 
The Denver 1997 process managed to plan without state-imposed obstacles, yet without a 
strongly connected boundary-spanner, using a reverse sequence planning process. This may be a 
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model for how specially-authorized legislation can work in the 41 U.S. states that have no form 
of pre-authorized MOTT legislation in place (Goldman et al., 2001).  However it comes with an 
important caveat.  If applied, as it was in the Bay Area, this strategy could provide the potential 
for the boundary-spanner to influence the process and insert costly projects very important to 
him/her, but not to others in the region—perhaps projects that are unjustifiable from a 
transportation planning perspective.  The Bay Area illustrates this concern quite vividly.  On the 
other hand, Denver avoided this problem, while still using special authorization, through its 
supportive agency structure. This ensured planning could proceed while minimizing the need for 
the boundary-spanner to have legislative connections in order to achieve approval at the state 
capitol. This presents an interesting combination, but not one that can be repeated in many 
regions.   
On the other hand, the Seattle case offers a model that many areas are likely to find 
intriguing—an institutionalized structure for planning, with full consent and participation by 
local governments, which are often the chief skeptics of a regional planning approach.  Counties 
were consulted before joining the Regional Transit Authority.  They contributed board members.  
They developed project lists that were the basis for the regional projects selected.  Counties were 
assured that locally collected money would come back to them.  Local governments even had to 
approve RTA/Sound Transit’s final plan.  Not only did this model offer the best chances for 
initiating MOTT processes, but of repeating them too.  
Seattle and Denver represent different solutions to the same problem.  However taken 
together, they suggest that to make regional transportation tax processes occur more often and 
happen more reliably, either a regional agency needs to be created, a pre-authorized process 
needs a high level of permissiveness—or both. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 New strategies will be necessary in the coming years to develop regional infrastructure, 
but legislative requirements and funding methodology are two clear limitations to developing 
more robust, better integrated cross-jurisdictional infrastructure in U.S. regions.  This study has 
examined one potential alternative to the fragmentation caused by growing use of local option 
transportation taxes (LOTTs).  However this study has also identified immense challenges to 
employing this strategy on a regular basis in order to provide regional transportation 
infrastructure, not least of which is the fact that only nine states have authorized them to date. 
Without more state authorizing legislation, regions seeking to conduct such taxes in non-
authorizing states will have to seek special legislation, which is a slow and difficult process.  It is 
also hard to repeat in cases where the tax loses on the first attempt, or policy makers want to 
raise taxes to improve the program at a later date.  
 Previous authorization significantly reduced local/regional costs of initiating a MOTT.  In 
most specially authorized cases, it was important to have a well connected boundary-spanner to 
lobby for legislation that reduced the local cost of undertaking a MOTT process.  Unfortunately, 
this need sometimes came along with additional costs, tied to the unique assets, limitations and 
demands of the boundary-spanner.  In the Bay Area case, this meant a boundary-spanner who 
leveraged the fact that there were few others in his position to initiate a regional transportation 
proposal, and used this as an opportunity to ensure particular projects were included in the final 
plan.  In another case, in Atlanta, the boundary-spanner did not have the political leverage 
 273  
needed to ensure the final proposal was conducive to the Atlanta region’s needs, and lost out to 
an alternative proposal that was a poor fit for the Atlanta region. Atlanta’s dependence on a 
boundary-spanner from the business community also meant disengagement with the project 
selection process, and a much weaker political apparatus than, say, a politician might have 
provided had one been interested in acting as boundary-spanner.   
In the other two regions too, boundary-spanners’ roles were determined by their unique 
assets and limitations. For example, in Seattle, the boundary-spanners’ role was much more 
limited, in part, because of their limited resources as local government officials.  Similarly, in the 
Denver, the boundary-spanner’s role was strongly tied to his position as RTD General Manager 
(which required, for example, that he not campaign openly for the measure).  Few agents have 
both the resources and the desire to act as boundary-spanner, and overdependence on one person 
not only makes the process less likely to happen and harder to repeat, but ensures that the 
outcome will be colored heavily by the unique characteristics of this one agent. 
 Perhaps it is even possible to talk about different kinds of boundary-spanning agents that 
are appropriate for different situations.  For example, cases without pre-authorization require a 
legislatively focused boundary-spanner to lead the lobbying effort, while cases with pre-
authorization need an agent who can manage the local/regional politics, and defend against 
potential new state legislation that might diminish their existing authorization. But they would 
not need to lobby for new authorization.  And all cases probably would benefit from a boundary-
spanner with a vision, who can work cooperatively with others to develop a plan.  Cases with 
pre-authorization appear to have more ease finding new boundary-spanners, in no small part 
because the requirements for one are not as strong.  The Seattle region, for example, saw four 
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different boundary-spanners over the course of four processes from 1995-2008, while in Atlanta, 
it took over three years just to pass their special authorization through the legislature.   
 The assets and limitations of each boundary-spanner also can contribute to their ability to 
ensure that the process is able to adapt to the local/regional political situation, and facilitate 
passage of the plan.  For example, a boundary-spanner without enough leverage at the state 
capitol might not be able to ensure that the authorizing legislation is well adapted to geographic 
boundaries or election dates (and other factors) that are well suited to a successful process.  
Based on examples in this study, a boundary-spanner from local government or the private sector 
was not nearly as effective in this regard as one from the political sector. 
One way to mitigate against the need to have such a highly specialized boundary-spanner 
was to develop the proposal before seeking legislative approval, as the Denver process did.  This 
reduced the costs of conducting a specially authorized process by ensuring that the major 
decisions could be made locally, without the difficulty of seeking state legislation, and without 
the need to find a powerful boundary-spanner who could mitigate these costs. However Denver’s 
strategy was only possible because of  the significant resources and political autonomy of the 
region’s multi-county transit agency, which made it possible for RTD to develop the plan before 
introducing it to the legislature for approval—not a scenario most U.S. regions will be able to 
emulate.  
These findings point to the potential for processes developed by regional agencies, and 
later codified in legislation, as in Denver.  Perhaps some regional governments can make this 
happen even without Denver RTD’s unusual level of autonomy and financial resources, though it 
remains for further study whether Denver’s situation was a prerequisite, or one potential regional 
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structure among many that can reduce local/regional costs sufficiently to make the process work 
without pre-authorization.  
These findings also indicate the desirability of having legislation that provides permissive 
pre/blanket authorization in regions that do not have a regionally elected special district.   
Both the Seattle and Denver examples required more faith in regional planning on the part of 
state lawmakers, but perhaps the Seattle approach required less so, even though it was a pre-
authorized process.  This was because the Seattle process required a great deal of local 
government involvement and consent at every stage of the process, from initiation to approval of 
the final plan. Local governments are often just as large an obstacle to the creation of regional 
governments as state governments are, with both being afraid to cede too much authority, and the 
Seattle approach offers a way to maintain the power of local governments while providing a 
robust framework for funding and planning of regional infrastructure.   
Still, the Seattle approach has its drawbacks, especially for a region with strong local 
disagreements.  A locally-oriented strategy may have seemed impossibly difficult for a region 
like Atlanta, with a long history of animosities.  Yet the Georgia legislature’s strategy of 
ensuring progress through deadlines and rules did not work well either.  While the process 
moved forward, there was a notable lack of interest in the final plan, and the primary motivation 
at the local level became not one of developing a vision for the region, but of getting to the end 
of a state mandated exercise.   The challenge of overcoming parochial concerns about financially 
supporting a regional plan was a common theme throughout the cases, not just in Atlanta, and all 
these regions had cross-county disagreements.  The common challenge was developing a 
framework for overcoming these challenges, and the most successful MOTT measures were able 
to reduce the political cost of local actors negotiating cross-jurisdictional agreements. 
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Multi-Jurisdictional Taxes in a Regional Planning Context 
 Local collaborative negotiations will usually have costs, and successful state legislation 
should attempt to minimize them.  All seven processes, in all four regions, had difficulty 
balancing the tension while distributing resources across jurisdictions.  This led to conflict over 
whether to develop transportation infrastructure based on anticipated ridership, cost per new 
rider, and other performance measures, versus infrastructure located where the tax revenue was 
raised (known as geographic equity).  MOTT processes cannot be expected to erase the 
challenges present in any regional planning process, which are hardly unique to MOTTs, but 
they can facilitate the process of local decision makers finding a way to agree on a solution.  
Transportation planners will find geographic equity problematic because it leads to a plan 
developed under political considerations, rather than transportation performance criteria alone.  
Yet agreements to manage geographic equity may simply be a necessary cost of any regional 
agreement.  State legislation can’t remove these costs entirely, without using a state-funded 
technocratic planning process—and even then, there will be state-level political costs that may 
influence the choice of projects.  While self-help funding is likely to contain geographic equity 
costs, supportive state legislation can reduce them by facilitating the local development of 
geographic equity frameworks.  
 Regional decision making can be helpful in developing projects too, and distribution of 
infrastructure across jurisdictions is not entirely a ‘cost,’ though its benefits might be understated 
in the literature.  Past research has often criticized the return of tax dollars influenced by political 
motivations, rather than transportation need (Taylor & Norton, 2009). But perhaps geographic 
equity is less problematic when funding infrastructure connections across jurisdictions, rather 
than local transportation operators.  For example, geographic equity for public transit dollars 
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used by local operators runs the risk that an excessive amount will go toward suburban operators, 
where few commuters take transit, and the cost per rider is high, while sending too little money 
to operators in the urban core (Taylor, 1991).  This is problematic because these operators are 
local, not designed to connect from one locality to another. On the other hand, it would not be 
possible to connect each local area on a metropolitan scale if the funds were focused just on high 
ridership areas at the region’s urban core, and in this case, geographic equity may be a necessary 
cost to developing agreements across the places infrastructure seeks to link.  
As the processes examined here indicate, it is difficult to determine whether geographic 
equity is imposing a ‘cost’ without knowing exactly what projects could be considered a 
‘benefit,’ and this was highly subjective in all cases examined.  One could define a benefit as a 
project that runs through a particular jurisdiction, and this is how a benefit might be described for 
distribution of MPO funds to local jurisdictions, or for politicians looking for more projects in 
their jurisdiction.  When developing a regional system, projects really benefit everyone in their 
corridor, and perhaps beyond. Indeed, if jobs are distributed across the region in a polycentric 
manner, commuters and reverse commuters alike will need connections to all major job and 
housing centers.  It would be difficult for transportation to do this if it were concentrated 
primarily at the urban core.  This may call for a rethinking of what is ‘fair’ for regional 
transportation systems.  Riders like James Robertson (Chapter 1) living in the urban core of a 
sprawling region might find it is ‘unfair’ if the system does not allow them to access jobs in the 
suburbs, through a reverse commute, even though the required infrastructure needs to be located 
far from their home. 
 Politicians in most regions in this study favored the more parochial definition of a 
benefit, as a service for the locality paying the cost—especially when that was their own 
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jurisdiction. This should not surprise anyone who recalls Congressional Representative Young’s 
(R-AK) famous “bridge to nowhere” (Murray, Washington Post, October 21, 2005).  Politics is 
replete with examples of politicians steering money to their district, whether it makes policy 
sense or not, and MOTTs, as a political process, are likely to result in deviations from 
technocratic, criteria-based planning in order to satisfy local political necessities—an inherent 
cost of the process no matter how the legislation is written.80 In the processes studied here, local 
politicians met the challenge of distributing ‘benefits’ through a variety of locally-developed 
decision frameworks (Table 10.1, and Appendix C) designed to reduce the cost of cross-
jurisdictional planning in a way single-jurisdiction LOTTs could not.  
Table 10.1: Geographic Equity Solutions, By Region81 
Bay Area Atlanta Seattle Denver 
-Nexus 
principle* 
-Performance 
criteria 
 
-80% return to 
counties 
-Gentleman’s 
agreement on 
inner/outer 
county money 
-15% back to 
counties 
-Long-term plan 
-Subarea Equity process 
- Accounting of 
benefits received 
-Projects proposed by 
board members of each 
subarea 
 
 
-Long-term plan 
-Regional plan to 
minimize equity disputes 
-“Hold harmless” 
resolution 
-Mutual accountability 
 *The expectation that each transportation project could be tied to, and relieve congestion in, a specific bridge 
corridor, thus providing a logic to distributing projects according to the corridor in which the bridge tolls were 
collected.  
 
In most regions studied, local politicians had a strong desire to ensure sufficient benefits 
went back to the jurisdiction where tax dollars were collected.  This became a major limitation 
for both Seattle and Atlanta, with Seattle politicians in outlying areas sometimes frustrated that 
they could not receive light rail service, when a low income subarea along the light rail route 
meant they couldn’t build the connecting leg of the line.  The Atlanta program did not witness 
                                                
80 This is a cost in the MPO process of distributing federal funds, even though that process is more technocratic. 
81 Further description of each geographic equity framework can be found in Appendix C. 
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this concern because fewer projects crossed jurisdictions in the first place, and 80% of the money 
simply returned to the county from which it was collected.   
These were clear costs of geographic equity discussions, but the regional conversations 
made possible by the MOTT processes also led to a number of examples in which projects 
seamlessly crossed county lines, including some for which jurisdictions funded projects in 
neighboring counties.  For example, in one case in metro Atlanta, a suburban county saw more 
benefit for a freeway interchange in Atlanta than the people in Atlanta did. There also was the 
case in Seattle, in which suburban counties agreed to pay for improving the main train station in 
downtown Seattle.  The collaborative conversations afforded by these processes made it possible 
for local elected officials to see past their jurisdictional boundaries, develop trust with elected 
officials elsewhere in the region, and, at times, make deals to provide better connections.  Thus, 
while collaboration had inherent costs, they were significantly lower with a MOTT than would 
otherwise be the case. 
 In a number of situations, local elected officials even developed formal—and informal—
frameworks to make cross-jurisdictional decisions, thus reducing the geographic equity costs by 
setting parameters for decision making. For example, in the Bay Area plan, they recognized the 
potential problems that could come from allocating projects by political jurisdiction, and since 
the money came from bridge tolls, it was possible to justify allocating projects by bridge 
corridors, thus developing a “nexus” between bridge tolls and congestion relief projects.  This 
had the added benefit of making it possible to think about the entire corridor, thus avoiding the 
problem seen in Seattle. Yet this process still came with inherent costs of its own, as the decision 
over which bridge to tie each project to was often rather contrived, even inaccurate, and 
motivated by politics of ensuring every jurisdiction received a respectable number of projects—
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even those without many bridges. As this example illustrates, any distribution of resources across 
a large area will have winners and losers, especially if local jurisdictions continue to have their 
own funding and planning processes in parallel to the regional process. 
Denver succeeded in overcoming some of these challenges precisely because they had a 
single regional elected board, with their own constituents, a regional mission and a regional tax 
base.  This afforded them the opportunity to think about an integrated regional system to a larger 
degree—first as integrated corridors, competing for funding, and then as an effort to remove 
geographic equity concerns by building everything at once.  
Certainly Denver’s geographic equity framework was the most effective at reducing the 
costs of collaboration.  However theirs may also be the least transferable to other regions, since 
few places have single regional governments with elected representation.  Policy makers in most 
regions need to work with the myriad existing local jurisdictions, yet provide a method for 
managing planning disjunctures between them.  In fact, this should be one of the key goals of 
any regional infrastructure planning process, including MOTTs.  
 By contrast, Seattle’s process was a model that built upon existing local governments, 
and made them part of the regional process, rather than developing the regional approach in 
parallel. Seattle’s process certainly came with major costs, but RTA/Sound Transit was also able 
to manage those costs by resolving any planning inconsistencies before the board adopted the 
final plan.  Transparency was very important in doing this, and the RTA/Sound Transit board 
officially assigned ‘benefits’ each county received, as well as costs incurred, from projects 
outside their own jurisdiction.  And the agency made these clear to the voting public by 
publishing the ongoing accounting of costs and benefits between jurisdictions. This made it 
possible to forcefully answer accusations that the board had made decisions unfairly, that it 
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would take too long for proposed projects to reach outlying areas, or that the plan sent money 
from one jurisdiction to other parts of the region.  All three accusations were frequent throughout 
the cases, but the Seattle model managed these problems the most successfully. 
Reducing the Cost of Including Cross-Jurisdictional Projects 
The Seattle decision making framework effectively managed local decision making costs, 
but these costs persisted in each of the four regions (Table 10.1), despite their best efforts to 
manage geographic equity issues.   This is not surprising, due to the inclusion of local 
governments in the process, and the local decision making that is integral to any form of local 
option tax.  The challenge for MOTTs is to minimize local costs from politically motivated 
decision making while making local governments the primary leaders and decision makers, with 
ownership over the process.  
 Even in the Atlanta case, which probably did this least successfully, the end result was far 
better than would be the case without the MOTT, though the process needs to be viewed in the 
context of the larger regional planning environment.  Each regional MOTT is composed of 
project proposals provided by local governments, and with participation from local advocacy 
organizations.   And all of these processes occurred alongside existing single-county LOTTs 
within the region (Goldman et al., 2001). Indeed, MOTTs did not replace the system of poor 
coordination that existed before. Rather, they added another layer of funding and decision 
making for projects that could not be supported by the prior funding methods. (And MOTTs are 
just one method for achieving cross-jurisdictional collaboration). 
The reduced cost of cross county collaboration is evident in the results produced in each 
case, with all regions’ plans including a significant number of cross-county projects (Figure 
10.1), which one imagines would have likely been very difficult to do using LOTTs, or other 
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funding methods like voluntary local participation in joint powers authorities, though similar 
research on other regional funding models will be necessary to say for sure.  Certainly there was 
a significant amount of cross-county cooperation from the MOTT model studied here. Even in 
Atlanta, which didn’t have the same kind of concentration as in the other three regions on bold 
projects designed to connect the region, an analysis of the final project list indicates that over 
34% of the funds were spent on projects marked as serving more than one city or county (RTR 
Project Final List: October 13, 2011).  In other regions, like Seattle and Denver, this figure was 
even higher, and sometimes the entire project list included proposals designed to connect local 
jurisdictions. 
Figure 10.1: Share of Projects that Cross County Lines 
 
TBAC, 2004; RTR, 2011; RTA, 1997; RTD, 1997 & 2004; Sound Transit, 2007 & 2008 
 
The discrepancy between the percentage of projects crossing jurisdictions in Atlanta 
versus the other three regions may be one more example of the challenges the state legislation 
imposed in the Atlanta case, though cross-county disagreement was an important factor as well.  
All costs in the Atlanta case did not by any means come from the legislation, but it magnified the 
local costs, and made it more difficult for local policy makers to develop a more integrated, more 
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popular regional plan. Ironically, one reason this legislation was so prescriptive was to ensure 
that local jurisdictions would develop a plan, but deadlines were not enough to ensure 
cooperation in project selection decisions.  
Alternative Solutions to MOTTs 
MOTTs usually require collaborative planning across local jurisdictions, and perhaps an 
approach based on local decision making simply does not work well in cases like Atlanta, where 
local governments have very different desired goals.  It is worth considering what the options are 
for regions that simply have too many differences from one jurisdiction to the next to bear the 
full cost of negotiation. Indeed, some Georgia lawmakers expressed concern that such permissive 
authorizations could give too much opportunity for local elected officials to put the authorization 
aside, or, worse, fight over what to do.  As one former Georgia senator recalled, “…there was so 
much infighting between the cities and counties that we couldn’t just leave it open. We had to 
have hard deadlines, so then you had to get certain things accomplished… There was a lot of 
posturing going on and if we didn’t have those hard deadlines, there would have even been more 
of it” (Sheldon, interview, June 26, 2014).  It is not always easy for state legislators to let go of 
the process and leave the decision making to cities and counties.  However the legislator’s 
concern is likely true.  Writing authorizing legislation while mindful of decades of cross-
jurisdictional discord gives a sense of the political challenges at both the local and state levels. 
As noted above, Atlanta’s strict deadlines didn’t work very effectively. Nor did this 
strategy result in a coherent regional plan. This is not a likely strategy for success, either for a 
MOTT or an LOTT, because ultimately, the plan needs to capture the voters’ imagination, and 
answer citizen concerns.  A list of 150 loosely connected projects is unlikely to do that.  
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 If the region is too divided to develop a fully integrated plan, perhaps any strategy 
requiring a regional vote is simply asking for too much unity to succeed.  This study has 
identified other regional approaches that hold promise for places in this predicament (Chapter 4).  
Most promising would be the use of a single joint powers regional agency, supported by 
voluntary local funding—and St. Louis, MO and East St. Louis, IL used it in a similar way to 
connect across state lines—typically a very difficult political situation, and one that is far more 
legally complex than what Atlanta faced.  It is unclear whether using voluntary local money 
would be more politically complex as well, and more research will be needed to say for sure.  In 
theory, this strategy would be easier to implement, since it could be developed incrementally, 
one transportation route at a time, or one jurisdiction at a time, and this strategy might not 
require the same type of cooperation as an MOTT that reaches across the entire region.  On the 
other hand, if the St. Louis example is any indication, it could result in uneven service from one 
jurisdiction to another, depending on the tax dollars each jurisdiction is willing to devote to the 
system.  This situation would leave fragmentation in place, and social equity challenges as well, 
since people in low income areas might not receive transportation access to major job centers, 
even as wealthy counties built infrastructure in their jurisdiction.   
 Alternatively, a fragmented region like Atlanta could simply allow the state to act as its 
regional government, and develop transportation directly.  This would erase inter-jurisdictional 
fragmentation, but would also reduce local autonomy by leaving funding decisions with the state.  
(And this strategy would not be sufficient in regions that cross state lines). The problems Atlanta 
encountered with state legislators during their 2012 MOTT measure would become an annual 
occurrence during budget time.  In fact, the region’s state-funded Georgia Regional 
Transportation Authority (GRTA) already ran into similar issues when a new governor was 
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elected from a different political party, who was disinterested in supporting his predecessor’s 
programs, and significantly slowed the program’s progress (Chapter 7). 
 The MOTT approach would clearly be an improvement over these challenges for Atlanta 
and many other regions, though perhaps a region like Atlanta would do best to try a less 
ambitious strategy in the future.  In fact, the original plan offered by the Georgia Chamber of 
Commerce was more like the Seattle approach, allowing two to three counties to join together for 
a single vote, rather than require the entire 10 county region to develop a single plan.     
Federal Role Promoting MOTTs 
 Certainly there is more than one strategy available for local and regional governments, 
and further reliance on self-help funding may demand approaches that are increasingly 
customized to each region’s needs.  There is increasing pressure for regions to take the initiative 
in self-funding their infrastructure, and to a surprising degree.  The U.S. Department of 
Transportation and the Federal Transit Administration have long encouraged local governments 
to adopt self-help financing by incorporating a local match into the requirements to receive 
federal New Starts transportation funds.  As it turns out, regional planning is no different, and 
federal representatives urged several regions examined in this study to conduct their own 
process, and to do it regionally as a way to integrate services across jurisdictions.  This reveals 
the degree to which self-help finance has become a mainstay of Washington policy, and indicates 
that strategies like MOTTs, and the other state and local approaches identified in Chapter 4 are 
likely to be important regional infrastructure funding methods for years to come.   
One illustration of this trend came at Atlanta’s very first Regional Transportation 
Roundtable meeting, when DeKalb County CEO Burrell Ellis commented on a recent ARC-led 
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trip to Washington, D.C., where they had met Ron Sims, 82 Deputy Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development.  As Burrell recalled, “The message that’s 
coming down from the federal government is that we’re going to have to compete with other 
regions to be eligible for funding.  And they’re going to be looking to those regions that are 
working together and working well.”  The motivation was obvious, and as Burrell put it, “We 
want to be on their radar screen as we compete for funding going forward…. We heard about 
competitiveness of grants.  More than going just to cities or just to counties, they’re going to be 
looking at funding regional initiatives. And we want to be in there” (RTR Meeting, audio 
recording, February 17, 2011).  
Indeed, many regions are responding to the federal encouragement to help themselves.  In 
November 2016, Seattle will vote on a Phase Three of its three county light rail plan.  Southeast 
Michigan will consider a four county proposal including bus rapid transit and commuter rail.  
There is even a chance the Bay Area may go ahead with MTC’s long delayed fuel tax measure in 
the near future—if polls indicate they can win the required supermajority (Baldassari, San Jose 
Mercury News, May 13, 2016).  Multi-jurisdictional option tax processes were difficult in every 
case studied here, but some regions have realized they simply have no other choice. 
The Limitations of Cross-Regional Advice 
The small group of regions that has conducted MOTTs has tried to learn from one 
another to identify strategies and mistakes. But these efforts focused almost entirely on campaign 
tactics, which depend on local/regional context, rather than the legislation, and the process as a 
whole, which are more generalizable across regions.  Consequently this collaboration did not 
help to avoid serious challenges in Atlanta and other regions.  
                                                
82 The same former King County Executive who served on the Sound Transit Board throughout the 2007 process. 
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For example, awareness of the problems elsewhere did little to change the course of the 
Atlanta process. Decatur, GA Mayor Floyd even reported from his Seattle trip, quite presciently, 
that the people in Seattle had complained that “…the [2007] one that didn’t pass, was criticized 
for being too, what they called, ‘peanut butter.’  Spreading the love everywhere, but with no 
clear vision.  And for being too long, and bureaucratic in tone—I’m not so sure we’re not dealing 
with something like that here,” he said to general laughter (RTR Meeting, audio recording, May 
24, 2011; Clark, interview, December 10, 2014). Yet despite being fully aware of such concerns, 
due to the way Atlanta’s legislation was written, there was little the Roundtable participants 
could do to change the situation.  In fact, Floyd commented, as well, on Seattle’s ability to come 
back to the ballot in 2008, just a year after their loss in 2007, “I don’t know that we have that 
luxury here.  It this doesn’t pass… it’s two to three years to get something on the ballot.” As it 
turned out, Floyd was being optimistic.  Clearly, the local politicians in Atlanta knew the legal 
parameters in their state did not allow the same approach that would be possible in Seattle.  
But there was not much else local elected officials thought they could do.  Perhaps by the 
time the Roundtable began, they did not have many options.  The legislation was approved and 
the process was beginning, after years of negotiation at the state capitol.  Furthermore, these 
processes happen so rarely that they seem to catch local elected officials by surprise—especially 
in regions that required special authorization, where multi-jurisdictional processes were not a 
routine part of their funding regime or political culture.   
Hopefully just by defining and categorizing MOTTs, local leaders may become more 
aware of their existence, and propose plans or legislation themselves, before legislative leaders 
do so using a model that is less costly for them, based on state-level concerns.  Perhaps state 
legislators can craft pre-
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have already approved for LOTTs. However legislation for MOTTs will need to be more 
complex than for LOTTs, with provisions for determining which jurisdictions would be included, 
and what regional body should make decisions over choice of election date or implementation of 
the program, among other things.  Seattle’s legislation provides the best example of the cases 
examined in this study of a process that allows a high degree of local/regional decision making 
while reducing the cost of initiating a proposal and developing it across jurisdictions.  Their 
strategy may work especially well in cases where all the region’s counties shared the same 
vision.  In metro areas like Atlanta, without broad interest in developing a single regional system, 
perhaps the Seattle example would be helpful because it preserves the role of local government 
decision making. But it would be unrealistic to expect all ten counties to join.  Nevertheless, 
even if several counties were to participate, this could be a major improvement over the county-
based LOTTs on which the region now relies for its self-help funding.     
Permissive pre-authorized legislation can reduce the cost of conducting a process 
substantially over the cost of using special authorization, but more states will need to approve 
MOTT authorization bills in order to make this possible. Perhaps national civic organizations 
and federal agencies can draft model legislation for states to approve, so local governments do 
not need to wait for the next legislatively connected boundary-spanner to emerge in order for 
their process to begin; perhaps just a boundary-spanner with local leadership abilities would then 
be sufficient.  In the vast majority of U.S. regions, which do not have a well funded, publicly 
elected regional agency of the type Denver relied on, pre-authorized, permissive MOTTs may be 
their best option for developing regional infrastructure using self-help funding.  However even 
with the help of model legislation, many states may still be reluctant to entrust local/regional 
policy makers with so much authority.  Approval of transportation agencies of the RTD variety 
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in more U.S. regions would provide another way to provide the supportive framework needed to 
initiate MOTT processes in the 43 states that have not pre-authorized MOTTs.  Yet, as noted 
before, Seattle-type pre-authorization legislation respects city and county autonomy.  In states 
that still find this to be a concern, it is even more unlikely that they would accept an autonomous, 
regionally elected special district instead.   
Another potential option for regions that do not have either pre-authorization to conduct 
an MOTT, or a robust regional government, is for the federal government or MPOs to support 
the development of a proposal, which can then be implemented through special legislative 
authorization. This could provide the advantages of planning with local/regional political 
imperatives in mind, but without dependence on an autonomous regional agency.  If federal 
policy is going to rely more on self-help funding for its transportation, perhaps support for 
regional planning and development of MOTT plans and legislation is an integral, essential 
component of that policy. 
MPOs could play a stronger role in developing and approving MOTTs than they do now. 
MPOs provide a structure for cross-jurisdictional coordination, but most do not have the fiscal or 
operational authority needed to ensure an integrated regional system.  Local governments 
participate in them voluntarily, and without fiscal powers, and MPOs are often left to accept 
local self-help plans as part of their own—in no small part because the MPO board members are 
often local elected officials, who are intimately involved in developing LOTT and MOTT plans.  
This helps explain MPOs’ limited leadership role in each of the cases, since they simply did not 
control the local self-help money (though they continued to distribute federal highway funding). 
MPOs have assumed a more technocratic, planning function, and self-help funding often 
operates outside the MPOs structure. More integrated regional planning using self-help funding 
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sources requires more than just regional planning, but also a willingness to initiate a proposal, 
fund it and develop the plan.  MPOs are unelected, and had difficulty taking this level of 
initiative in the cases examined here.  In all the cases examined, MPOs’ Regional Transportation 
Plans played a key role providing the outline for a regional MOTT, but others had to initiate that 
process, often outside the MPO framework, using MOTTs and other regional transportation 
agencies that had the capability of raising taxes, and developing infrastructure. 
With these limitations in mind, it might be unrealistic to expect MPOs to provide the 
initiative to start a MOTT plan.  However one can imagine MPOs playing a stronger role in 
lobbying for state pre/blanket authorizing legislation, and supporting the composition of a 
regional MOTT funding proposal. However the leadership to initiate a regional plan might have 
to come from outside the traditional regional governance structure, from civic organizations, 
local governments and others.   
Even with all these changes, the cases examined here illustrate the immense challenges 
associated with undertaking a multi-jurisdictional option transportation tax to fund a region’s 
infrastructure, though they also reveal the spectacular rewards for regions that have approved 
them. Even in the best of circumstances, it is difficult to put together a plan that can satisfy so 
many local jurisdictions, outside civic organizations, and, of course, voters.  In all these respects, 
MOTTs are significantly more challenging than a single jurisdictional local option tax.  That is 
why state and federal governments should do everything they can to make MOTTs easier and 
less costly for local and regional actors to conduct. Atlanta was by far the most difficult case, but 
not the only one that faced inter-jurisdictional challenges, especially on their first attempt, and 
even the Seattle and Denver cases faced significant obstacles, and lost their first elections.  
However state legislation can make this a more resilient process, with more points of entry for a 
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wider range of actors, and easier to repeat when it fails.  Indeed, the LOTT literature has noted 
the difficulty of passing a single-jurisdictional LOTT on the first attempt (Beale et al., 2007), and 
the same was true in the cases studied here.  
The processes do appear to become easier with time, practice, and development of a civic 
infrastructure around conducting them.  Advocacy groups and politicians alike appear to make 
them a more integral part of their agendas in regions like Seattle and Denver, where they have 
been around for almost two decades.  Even political consultants become more accustomed to the 
unique challenges of a regional campaign.  If federal and state policy makers want to see more 
self-help funding, they can facilitate region’s adaptation to the unique challenges of MOTTs and 
LOTTs by taking an active role in developing pre-authorized legislation what would make 
MOTTs a viable long-term funding solution.  This would make MOTTs easier to initiate, and 
provide the legal platform needed to make them more regular occurrences.  By doing so, this 
could add a missing dimension to the self-help funding approach that appears to be evolving into 
a de facto national infrastructure finance policy.  If this approach does not include a regional 
dimension, it is hard to say how U.S. will provide essential intraregional transportation with local 
option taxes alone. 
MOTTs will not work in all cases, and the academic community will need to do more 
research on a variety of self-help funding methods, like some of the ones outlined in Chapter 4, 
as well as regional HOT lanes, and other potential methods that allow regions to pay for 
transportation with less federal support. Self-help means greater voter choice, and likely requires 
customization not just of transportation projects, but of the funding strategies themselves, in 
order to serve each region’s local political environment.  For example, a multi-state region might 
find a MOTT approach so costly it is not worth the benefits from full integration of services, and 
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might, instead, need to adopt a funding approach reliant on voluntary local participation. Self-
help funding means that transportation and other infrastructure planning needs to become more 
attuned to these local political nuances, which are likely to shape the planning itself.  
Infrastructure planning is increasingly tied to local politics, and more research needs to be done 
on a variety of regional approaches to overcome them.  But the local governments and local 
divisions will remain in every approach and the cost of mitigating these will not go away.  
Regional approaches are likely to sit side by side with local politics for the foreseeable future.   
Frameworks for overcoming these divisions were much more successful when developed 
at the local level, rather than imposed from above, and if states want to make self-help finance a 
viable tool for the long term, they will need to approve legislation that makes repeated multi-
jurisdictional processes a realistic proposition.  By the same token, local governments will need 
to become more adept at knowing what to ask for and seeking pre-authorization legislation long 
before the politics of an upcoming process motivate state-imposed costs.  This is a challenge for 
both local and state governments, but one they need to accept if regional transportation is to be a 
regular component of a self-help infrastructure network. 
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Appendix A: Case-Specific Data Collection Issues 
 
San Francisco Bay Area Data: Specific Issues 
The Bay Area interview process began by contacting key people at the Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission (MTC, is Bay Area’s MPO). As noted above, in one special 
circumstance, this study used a three-person group interview rather than a simple interview, 
according to the interviewee’s request.  
Regional Measure 2, the case analyzed here, took place from 2000-2004.  Most 
interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2011; additional follow up emails and interviews 
were conducted in 2013 and 2014. Almost all key figures were still in the area for interview. 
Most documents were still available, and several interviewees still had large files on the subject 
that they were gracious enough to share.  However the archival record is decidedly more 
complete after the process became official in the spring of 2002. Before that time the process 
consisted of private strategizing and hearings of a Senate Select Committee on Bay Area 
Transportation for which the archivist at the California State Library was unable to find any 
official records. For the early part of the process, the analysis relies on interviews, newspaper 
accounts, legislative committee analyses, polling data and references to that time in later 
documents. Interviews were approximately an hour each, using semi-structured interviews.  
Atlanta Data 
The “TSPLOST” process took place in 2012, while the interviews for this research took 
place in June and October 2014.  Interviews began by contacting people found in the extensive 
newspaper articles, blogs and legislative histories available online.  The interviews focused on 
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members of the Executive Committee of the Regional Transportation Roundtable, which was the 
group of mayors and county commissioners that selected all projects to include in the ballot 
measure.  Interviews also targeted an influential planner at the Georgia Department of 
Transportation (GDOT), the former Georgia House Speaker and Atlanta mayor, members of the 
Georgia Legislature, lobbyists, and advocacy groups, including the Atlanta Metro Chamber of 
Commerce, the Sierra Club, the Tea Party and the NAACP.  Follow up emails were sent as 
needed to clarify information and set up a new round of interviews.   
Due to the recent nature of the case, and its heavy presence on the Internet, there was a 
wealth of documentation available for most of the process.  This study focuses on legislative 
records, official reports, audio recordings of committee meetings, newspaper articles, and 
advocacy blogs.   These do not reveal actors’ motivations, however, which are based primarily 
on the interviews. 
Seattle Data 
 Interviews took place in September 2014. They began with sources mentioned in 
newspapers and focused on RTA/Sound Transit board members during the time of the processes 
studied, but also included a state legislator, the Washington Secretary of Transportation, and 
environmental advocacy groups that were influential in the process. It is important to note that 
almost all RTA/Sound Transit board members doubled as local government officials, and usually 
described the process from both the regional and local perspective. It was difficult to find 
participants from the early processes, but due to the agency’s lack of staff during its early years, 
meeting minutes were largely unedited, almost approaching verbatim accounts, in many cases 
nearly 60 pages long.  From these, it was possible to gain a strong insight into the discussions 
and concerns during RTA/Sound Transit’s first regional decision process.  Minutes from 
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Seattle’s post-2004 processes were limited to essential details.  However more information was 
available on the Internet, participants were much easier to find, and they remembered the process 
much better.  Interviews focused on this period, and were used to learn people’s motivations and 
views of the process, which was unavailable from archival documents. 
 One key interviewee, the CEO of Sound Transit, was highly involved in the process, but 
unfortunately, unable to participate due to medical reasons.  However her deputies, all intimately 
involved as well, spoke extensively.  The chief opponent of the processes, Kemper Freeman, 
refused to speak when he was reached.   
Denver Data 
Most interviews took place in December 2014, with a few exploratory interviews in 
2012.  Interviews began with sources mentioned in newspapers, the Internet and academic 
articles on the case.  Interviews focused on key participants from RTD staff and its board, the 
Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG), mayors on the Metro Mayors Caucus, the 
chief staffer at the Chamber of Commerce, a political consultant that managed the campaign and 
was involved throughout the process, a lobbyist that worked on the authorization bill at the state 
capitol, and an advocacy group. The 17-year timespan covered by this case included two 
different ballot proposals, one in 1997 and one in 2004.  An effort was made to include as many 
people as possible from the first process, but several key people were deceased, and many of 
those who were still alive did not remember it very well.  Consequently, this study relies more on 
secondary sources, like newspaper accounts, to understand the context and motivations behind 
the 1997 case than the 2004 case.  However RTD had extensive archival files on the 1997 
process, including meeting minutes, workshops, committee meetings and reports.  Archives 
provided a fairly complete picture of events, as well as people’s reaction to them. 
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Appendix B: Local Home Rule in the United States 
Local governments have limited power to act in the U.S. legal system without state 
authorization, since the ultimate authority for local government is vested with the states, rather 
than the local governments themselves.  States can create, dissolve, and empower local 
governments, and any understanding of its effectiveness must begin with the legal framework in 
which the process is nested, and the history of how this developed.  Although citizens often 
assume local governments’ powers are a right, they are actually a privilege, dependent on the 
discretion of the state government. Since 1903, the Supreme Court has accepted states as the 
ultimate source of local power (Kane et al., 2001: 10). 
This wasn’t always so.  Cities existed in colonial America before states did, and were part 
of a legal tradition dating back to the Middle Ages, designed to safeguard individual property 
and provide services. However following the American Revolution, the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution granted states any powers not explicitly given to the federal government, thus 
preserving the state-federal relationship existing at that time.  In the process, the Constitution 
ended up strengthening states at the expense of local governments—even though state 
governments had originally emerged from collectives of cities (Krane et al., 2001: 8).   
This relationship continued to change over the course of the 1800s, as incorporation was 
opened to the general public—and private companies feared competition from public 
corporations like cities.  Additionally, the Panic of 1837 exposed profligate borrowing practices 
by cities—and some responded by simply dissolving themselves out of existence in order to 
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avoid repayment.  This demanded state-level action to clarify cities’ murky legal status at the 
cusp of private corporation and public entity (Kane et al., 2001: 9).  However this question was 
never truly resolved.   
 Since 1868, many state constitutions have followed a principle known as Dillon’s Rule, 
which treats cities as “creatures of the state,” meaning state governments can regulate them or 
dissolve them out of existence. Essentially, cities and other local governments have only those 
powers granted expressly by the state (Kane et al., 2001: 10).  
A “Home Rule” movement tried to respond to this, under the principle that local 
governments could write their own charters without state interference, and grant themselves 
autonomy in situations not expressly prohibited by the state. However this movement has had 
incomplete results.  The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Home Rule authority in 1903 and 1923. 
Thus, in all states, local governments are, by default, considered to be subordinate to the state.   
Home Rule has instead taken on an informal meaning—a general local autonomy, 
whether by state constitutional provisions or statutes granting autonomous powers to local 
governments.  Many states have granted local governments powers by law, and sometimes, even 
the ability to write their own charters, as the Home Rule movement originally sought. Many state 
constitutions operate under a Home Rule principle, offering city governments a large degree of 
deference and autonomy to act, without the need for specific state legislation authorizing them to 
do so (Briffault, 2004: 253). However, many states alternate between using Dillon’s Rule and 
Home Rule principles, depending on the circumstances, granting local autonomy in some cases 
but not others.  Sometimes this can even differ from city to city within a single state (Briffault, 
2004: 253).  Indeed, “Home Rule” never means total freedom from state involvement, and cities 
remain so-called “creatures of the state” (Kane et al., 2001: 10).  Home Rule often refers to 
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legislative, rather than constitutional authority, and it is highly dependent on the policy area 
under consideration.   
This has led to a vigorous and continuing judicial debate over which functions should be 
local, which should be managed by the state, and how this should be interpreted.  For example, 
land use is commonly viewed as a local function due to its role protecting private property—the 
original purpose of cities (Briffault, 1990). Thus land use has been seen as a function where local 
interests are regarded as paramount.  By contrast, taxation for state purposes, elections, or 
annexation of territory has historically been seen as state functions.  And taxation for local 
purposes, of the type examined in this dissertation, has been seen as a “controversial” subject 
that varies from state to state (Kane et al., 2001: 13).   
In fact, there is no single idea of “Home Rule.” Many states have tried to clarify exactly 
which policy areas “Home Rule” applies to, and many have allowed cities to adopt a Home Rule 
charter, in which they have discretion over any function the state legislature has the power to 
devolve to a non-Home Rule local government, and which is not explicitly denied to it by the 
state.  Nevertheless, even legislatures’ best efforts to grant blanket local autonomy have not 
translated into judicial support for the Home Rule principle, since many seemingly local matters 
affect people outside a single jurisdiction’s boundaries, and Dillon’s Rule prevails in such cases.  
As a result, it is necessary for state governments to write legislation expressly granting local 
authority to perform a particular action, even in “Home Rule” states.   
This is true especially with regards to fiscal policy of the type examined in this 
dissertation. Fiscal home rule has remained a controversial subject among states, one for which 
few grant local autonomy (Kane et al, 2001: 13).  For example, all four of the states examined in 
later chapters of this study can be considered “Home Rule” states (Appendix B). But none of 
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them provides sufficient authority to allow local governments to make fiscal decisions without a 
high degree of state requirements.  In fact, all of them have imposed a number of restrictions on 
local taxation decisions, permitting some kinds of local taxation decisions, but not others, and 
requiring legislative authorization to permit a new taxing instrument (e.g. sales tax instead of 
property tax), or a different tax rate from what is already permitted. 
Table B-1: Home Rule in States from this Study 
State Home Rule/Dillon’s Rule Fiscal Home Rule 
 
California Home Rule Property Taxes limited by Proposition 13, a 1979 voter-approved 
constitutional amendment.  That proposition also specified that 
other taxes require a 2/3 supermajority of citizens to approve.  
Following Proposition 13, the state has made many local fiscal 
decisions directly (Kane et al., 2001: 63-66). 
Colorado Home Rule State limitations on local sales and property taxes (Kane et al., 
2001: 72-76). 
Georgia Home Rule Taxes exempted from Home Rule provisions in constitution.  
Local discretion over property taxes, but state must expressly 
authorize any new forms of taxation (Kane et al., 2001: 106-110). 
Washington Home Rule Home Rule poorly defined and does not include taxation.  Tax 
rates and types limited by state law (Kane et al., 2001: 437-443). 
Kane et al., 2001 
State governments, therefore, must authorize any form of regional governance system, 
and any local tax, including LOTTs and MOTTs, even in so called ‘home rule states.’  These 
authorizations can include a number of specific local or regional powers, which the state 
government can devolve if it so chooses.  Any regional governance solution requires such 
authorization.   
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Appendix C: Geographic Equity Approaches in Each Region 
Bay Area: The Bay Area was the only region that chose an explicitly corridor-based approach to 
identifying benefits, distributing funding for projects based on bridges they were near, or could 
relieve congestion on.  (Which they called a “nexus” between projects and bridges).  A corridor-
based approach was appropriate in this case partly because the money was coming from bridge 
tolls, which, by law, needed to be used for improvements that could be tied to traffic in their 
corridor.  This system offered a way to ensure those tolls were spent to support the commuters 
that had paid them.  Consistent performance measures for projects in all parts of the region 
provided additional assurance to local politicians that project decisions were made based on a 
uniform standard. However this bridge-based formula also had its drawbacks, favoring far-flung 
suburbs, which required a bridge to commute to San Francisco or Oakland (the urban cores). 
Areas far enough from San Francisco to require two bridges to get to the urban core did even 
better, while the central areas like San Francisco (and did not require a bridge at all) found it 
challenging to find favor for their projects, using this system.  
Atlanta: Atlanta’s solution was more haphazard than the Bay Area’s, relying on a formula, 
guaranteeing that 80% of the money each county put into the regional measure would come back 
to them in transportation investments.  This likely made cross-jurisdictional projects more 
difficult to fund than in the Bay Area.  Local politicians solved the city-suburb division by 
further dividing the money through an informal ‘gentleman’s agreement’ to set percentages of 
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money intended for so called “inner” versus “outer” counties.83.  Finally, local politicians made 
use of a legislative provision guaranteeing 15% of money would go to the counties for local 
projects, to even out any differences across counties (Georgia HB 277, §48-8-249(e). 
Seattle: Seattle used a long-term plan to guide decision making, but decided where to build and 
when based on what was, perhaps the most sophisticated geographic equity measure used in the 
regions.  RTA/Sound Transit provided citizens with full transparency of the deals made across 
counties through a formal accounting, published annually, which classified projects based on the 
subarea of the region they were designated to “benefit.” which was not necessarily the same area 
the money came from.  This certainly facilitated cross-county deal making, though it also 
encouraged parochial planning, and limited the options for subareas with low tax generation 
resources.  
Denver: Finally, Denver’s elected representational structure ensured projects were distributed 
across the district—whether that made sense from a transportation perspective or not. As in 
Seattle, RTD relied on the long-term Metro Vision 2020 plan, uniting the board around it from 
the very beginning.  However unlike Seattle, Denver RTD chose to develop much of the plan in 
just one phase, and used geographic equity to justify their decision.  Building so much of it at 
once minimized the need to negotiate over limited resources. Any lingering cross-jurisdictional 
distrust was further reduced by a “hold harmless” resolution, which ensured that money spent on 
projects built in early years of program would not reduce allocations for projects to be built later. 
This was not a perfectly enforceable solution, but was insurance against RTD changing the plan 
at a later date, and was designed to be enforced by mutual accountability.  
 
 
                                                
83 Determined by position inside or outside the Beltway. 
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